Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 19STCV29995, Date: 2024-08-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV29995    Hearing Date: August 12, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

This is a consolidated action regarding a September 2, 2017 motor vehicle accident. On December 23, 2020, Plaintiffs Joselyn Pham, Steven Uy, and Jeffrey Zhu (“Plaintiffs”) filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”) alleging they were passengers in a Lyft vehicle that was being driven by Defendant Matthew Cawley within the scope of his employment with Lyft. (FAC ¶ 1, 11.)

Starting on February 21, 2024, Plaintiffs served a deposition notice for Lyft’s person most knowledgeable (“PMK”). Lyft has served objections to the proposed topics, arguing they are overbroad, vague, unduly burdensome, and irrelevant. Despite attempts to meet and confer to limit the topics, Lyft contends Plaintiffs have failed to make revisions.

 Lyft has agreed to produce a PMK but now moves for a protective order to limit the scope of categories 1 to 6 in the deposition Notice and preclude categories 7 to 9. Plaintiffs oppose and Lyft replies.

LEGAL STANDARD

Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025. 420(a).)

The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.420(b).)

The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.420(h).)

MEET AND CONFER

The declaration of Kevin Liu, Lyft’s counsel, states the following: “On May 30, 2024, I emailed Plaintiffs’ counsel asking if another deposition notice with revised topics would be forthcoming as discussed during the May 17, 2024 meet and confer teleconference and as stated in Plaintiffs’ May 21, 2024 email.  However, Plaintiffs never responded to that email despite responding to several other emails in this case related to depositions of other witnesses.  On June 12, 2024, I sent another follow-up email to Plaintiffs’ counsel, reminding them that they have yet to revise the deposition topics despite their prior agreement to do so and that Court intervention would be necessary due to their continued failure to respond. (Liu Decl. ¶ 13.) Therefore, the meet and confer requirement has been met.  

DISCUSSION

            Here, Lyft argues that topics 7, 8, and 9 are irrelevant.

Topics 7 and 8 seek testimony regarding the following:

““Lyft’s Promotion of Passing Proposition 22” and “Lyft’s Political Action for Passing Proposition 22.” 

Lyft argues these topics are irrelevant because they have nothing to do with Defendant Cawley’s use of the Lyft platform, Lyft’s relationship with Defendant Cawley, or the facts of the accident. Furthermore, Lyft argues the passage of Proposition 22 occurred in November 2020 and went into effect in December 2020, more than 3 years after the subject accident, and therefore cannot possibly have any relevance to the issues in this case.

Topic 9 seeks the following testimony: ““The IDENTITY of the PERSONS who were in the vehicle being driven by Defendant Richard Edward Lee on the date of the SUBJECT INCIDENT.”

Lyft argues that Richard Edward Lee is not a party to this lawsuit. Lyft contends that Plaintiffs have conceded this fact, but nevertheless failed to exclude it in subsequent notices.

In opposition, Plaintiffs assert they will remove categories 7 through 9.  

Lyft also seeks to limit categories 1 through 6. Lyft argues the information is available through less intrusive means, it has already provided the information in written discovery, and the categories are overbroad. (Motion, 14-15.) Lyft argues that Plaintiffs theory against it is based on vicarious liability. Therefore, the discovery should be limited to Cawley’s relationship with Lyft, and not information on all Lyft drivers.

 The following are the categories at issue, along with Lyft’s proposed limitation:

Numbers 1 and 2: “PMK of driver onboarding” and “PMK of policies and procedures re requirements for driving for Lyft.”

Lyft has agreed to produce a witness to provide testimony about the process by which Defendant Cawley was approved to use the Lyft platform in California. 

In opposition, Plaintiffs claim that Cawley was using the Lyft application while operating his vehicle, which then led to the subject accident.

Plaintiffs fail to show how the facts of this case warrant information about Lyft’s driver onboarding and driver’s requirements beyond California, to the extent it varies from state to state. Therefore, the motion for protective order is granted in part to categories 1 and 2, in that these categories should be limited to driver onboarding and driving requirements within California (or other specific jurisdiction in which Cawley was a driver) at the time Cawley became a Lyft driver through the time of the accident.

Regarding Lyft’s argument that the information can be obtained through less intrusive means, Lyft has not established that a PMQ deposition, as limited above, would be intrusive.

Number 3: “PMK of policies and procedures for designating driver partners as independent contractors.”

Lyft has agreed to produce a witness to provide testimony about the operative Lyft Terms of Service to which Cawley and Lyft agreed at the time of the accident.

Lyft argues that the term “driver partner” is vague and has provided the Terms of Service that Cawley agreed to. Thus, it argues it has already produced relevant information on the topic. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the information regarding Cawley’s status as an independent contractor is relevant to the case. To the extent the term “driver partner” is vague, the category should be amended to: “PMQ of policies and procedures for designating Cawley, and similarly situated drivers, as independent contractors.”

Numbers 4 and 5: “PMK of the SUBJECT INCIDENT” and “PMK of communicating with Defendant Matthew Cawley about the SUBJECT INCIDENT.”

Lyft has agreed to produce a witness to provide testimony about the previously produced documents relating to Lyft’s communications with Harry Phan and Cawley relating to the accident.  

Though Lyft argues that all documents related to communications have been produced, the Court finds Plaintiffs are not precluded from deposing a witness about such documents. Seeing as Lyft as agreed to produce such a witness, the motion for protective order is denied as to categories 4 and 5.

Number 6: “PMK of handbooks issued on rules and regulations for driver partners.”

Lyft has agreed to produce a witness to provide testimony as to the operative Terms of Service between Lyft and Cawley.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue they should be able to question a witness about any handbooks that existed for drivers during the time when Cawley became a Lyft driver. The Court agrees that evidence about handbooks is relevant to this case and should be limited to what drivers, similarly situated to Cawley at the time, would have received. Therefore, category 6 should be limited to include the PMQ of handbooks issued on rules and regulations for drivers similarly situated to Cawley during the time Cawley was driving for Lyft.

Because the parties acted with substantial justification in making and opposing this motion, the Court declines to award sanctions.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court grants in part Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s Motion for Protective Order.

            Lyft shall provide notice of the Court’s order and file a proof of service of such.