Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 20STCV17211, Date: 2023-08-09 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 20STCV17211    Hearing Date: January 9, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPT:

32

HEARING DATE:

January 9, 2024

CASE NUMBER:

20STCV17211

MOTIONS: 

Motion for Determination of Good Faith of Settlement

MOVING PARTY:

Cross-Defendant Armstrong Transport Group, LLC

OPPOSING PARTY:

None

 

 

BACKGROUND

 

Cross-Defendant Armstrong Transport Group, LLC (Armstrong) moves for a determination that a settlement has been entered in good faith. No opposition has been filed.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

Under section 877.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, “[a] determination by the court that [a] settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor . . . from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor . . . for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6 (c).) Any party to an action may move for an order determining whether a settlement between the plaintiff and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors was made in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a)(1).) “The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).)

 

Section 877.6 requires “that the courts review [settlement] agreements made under its aegis to insure that the settlements appropriately balance the . . . statute’s dual objectives” (i.e., providing an “equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault” and encouraging parties to resolve their disputes by way of settlement.) (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 494 (hereafter, Tech-Bilt).) In Tech-Bilt, the court set forth the factors to consider when determining whether a settlement is made in good faith. The Tech-Bilt factors are: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 498-501.) Not every factor will apply in every case. (Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (Shell Oil Co.) (2015) 242 Cal.4th 894, 909.)

 

“The party asserting the lack of good faith . . . [is] permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to [the above] factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of [Section 877.6]. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500.)

 

An unopposed motion for determination of good faith of settlement need not contain a full and complete discussion of the Tech-Bilt factors by declaration or affidavit; rather, a bare bones motion setting forth the grounds of good faith and a declaration containing a brief background of the case is sufficient.  (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.)   

 

DISCUSSION

 

Cross-Defendants Armstrong and JCM Freight Transport, LLC have entered into a settlement with Plaintiff Manuel Bofill Segrera (Plaintiff) and Cross-Complainant Francini, Inc. (Francini) by paying $70,000 (through its insurance carrier) to Plaintiff. In exchange, Plaintiff and Francini will release all claims against Armstrong.

 

Plaintiff alleges he was injured by granite slabs he was transporting that were negligently stacked by Francini. Plaintiff sued Francini, and Francini filed a cross complaint against Neon Logistics, LLC (Neon), Armstrong, and JCM. Neon is a logistics broker that connected Francini with Armstrong, a logistics company. Armstrong then brokered the transportation of Francini’s granite to JCM, which employed Plaintiff at the time of the incident.

 

Plaintiff agreed to settle for $950,000. Of that amount, Armstrong and JCM will contribute $70,000 to Plaintiff. Francini will contribute the remaining balance. Armstrong argues this amount is proportionate given that Plaintiff only sued Francini, and thus, is the main tortfeasor. The declaration in supports states that Plaintiff has alleged $19,152.42 in medical special damages. (Casey Decl. ¶ 4.) Armstrong notes the settlement amount is less than what would be paid if the case proceeded to trial. (Motion, 8.) Armstrong also argues this amount is not grossly disproportionate and that no fraud or collusion took place. Given the above, and seeing no opposition, Armstrong has met its burden to show good faith.

 

Armstrong’s motion refers to Moving Defendants as Armstrong and JCM. However, there is no indication that Armstrong’s counsel represents JCM. Moreover, default was entered as to JCM on July 19, 2022 on the amended cross-complaint filed by Francini. To the extent that Armstrong and JCM are not jointly represented, there is no proof of service of the motion as to JCM.

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

Therefore, the motion for determination of good faith settlement is DENIED without prejudice.

 

Cross-Defendant Armstrong Transport Group, LLC shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.