Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 20STCV34510, Date: 2023-12-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV34510    Hearing Date: December 15, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOVING PAPERS

1.      Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities

2.      Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

3.      Declaration of Paul McCachem

4.      Declaration of N. Asir Fiola

OPPOSITION PAPERS

1.      None

BACKGROUND

On September 10, 2020, Plaintiff Esther Ku (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants Kyle Schroeder, Lyft, Inc., and Does 1 to 25 for negligence resulting from a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff alleges that each Defendant was an employee or agent of the other and acting within the scope of employment. (Complaint ¶ 4.) Plaintiff also alleges that all Defendants breached their duty by “negligently entrusting, owning, operating, and/or maintaining” the subject motor vehicle. (Id. ¶ 9.)

Defendant Lyft, Inc. (Lyft) now moves for summary judgment, arguing that Kyle Schroeder (Schroeder) was not acting in the course and scope of employment or agency with Lyft at the time of the incident.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) ¿“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)  Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise.  If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.) .)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)           

DISCUSSION

Negligence and Negligent Entrustment

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)

Generally, “one who places or entrusts his [or her] motor vehicle in the hands of one whom he [or she] knows, or from the circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver's disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness.” (Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063 [quoting Osborn v. Hertz Corp. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 708] [alteration in original; citation omitted].) 

Respondeat Superior

An employer is vicariously liable for an employee’s tort under the doctrine of respondeat superior if the tort was committed within the scope of the employment.  (See Montague v. AMN Healthcare, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1515, 1520.) “[A]n employee must be driving a personal vehicle in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident to extend vicarious liability to an employer.” (Newland v. County of Los Angeles (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 676, 678–79.) “A plaintiff suing an employer under the doctrine must prove the person who committed the tort was acting within the scope of his or her employment.” (Marez v. Lyft, Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 569, 577.)

There are two tests for determining when an employee was “within the scope of employment.” Under the first test, “the employer is liable if the activities that caused the employee to become an instrument of danger to others were undertaken with the employer's permission and were of some benefit to the employer, or in the absence of proof of benefit, the activities constituted a customary incident of employment.” (Id. [quoting Purton v. Marriott Internat., Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 499, 509, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 912 (Purton)].)

The second test (Halliburton Test) requires finding that “(1) the act performed was either required or incident to his duties or (2) the employee's misconduct could be reasonably foreseen by the employer in any event. [citation.]  In this test, foreseeability means that in the context of the particular enterprise, an employee's conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among the costs of the employer's business. [citation.]” (Marez, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 577.) 

Apart from these rules, the “going and coming rule” holds that “an employee going to or from work ordinarily is considered outside the scope of employment and, therefore, the employer is not liable for torts committed during the commute.” (Marez, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 577-78.)

In Marez, a plaintiff was injured by a Lyft driver who was driving a vehicle rented through Lyft. (Id. at 572–73.) However, when the accident occurred, the driver was driving home to “eat and sleep.” (Id. at 574.) The court first held under the Halliburton test that the driver was not within the scope of employment with Lyft because he did not work for Lyft on the subject day and his drive home was not related to his work for Lyft. (Id. at 581–82.) Also, his conduct was not foreseeable because the driver had been driving purely for his own personal purposes. (Id. at 582.) The court also held for similar reasons that under the Purton test, Lyft did not receive a benefit for the driver’s conduct. (Id. at 586.)

Lyft sets forth the following facts:

-          Lyft is a Transportation Network Company that operates the Lyft application website and technology platform (the “Lyft platform”). (UMF 1.)

-          Participating drivers, like Schroeder, who are approved to use the Lyft platform may use the platform whenever and wherever they choose. (UMF 2.)

-          To access the platform, drivers must open the Lyft app on their smartphones and then log on to the platform. (UMF 4.)

-          Only once drivers log on to the Lyft platform do drivers become available to receive ride requests from prospective passengers, which drivers may accept or decline at their discretion. (UMF 5.)

-          Once drivers log off the Lyft platform, they are no longer available to receive ride requests from prospective passengers. (UMF 6.)

-          On September 17, 2018, a motor vehicle accident occurred between Plaintiff and Schroeder on Alvarado Street near Beverly Boulevard in Los Angeles, California. (UMF 7.)

-          At the time of the accident, Schroeder was driving alone in his vehicle, with no passengers. (UMF 9.)

-          Schroeder was on his way home from downtown Los Angeles to Hollywood. (UMF 10.)

-          Schroeder had been providing rides via the Lyft platform earlier in the day, he stopped giving rides, and then eventually he was heading home from downtown. (UMF 11.)

-          Defendant Schroeder was not logged on to the Lyft platform at the time of the accident. (UMF 12.)

-          Defendant Schroeder was not on his way to pick up any Lyft passenger at the time of the accident. (UMF 13.)

-          Defendant Schroeder owned the vehicle he was driving that was involved in the accident. (UMF 14.)

Here, Lyft has met its burden to establish there is no triable issue of fact. The deposition of Kyle Schroeder shows that he was not using the Lyft application, not driving a Lyft passenger, or on his way to pick up a passenger. (Fiola Decl., Exh. 3, Schroeder Depo. 22:4–5, 28:15–17, 29:19–22, 37:9–10.) Instead, Schroeder was driving home. (Schroeder Depo. 9:8–10.) Therefore, there are no facts that Schroeder was engaged in conduct related to his work for Lyft, and therefore his misconduct was not foreseeable by Lyft. Also, similar to the driver in Marez, there are not facts that Schroeder’s drive home conferred any benefit to Lyft. Lastly, Lyft shows evidence that Schroeder owned the car he was driving. Therefore, since there is evidence Lyft did not own the subject vehicle, it has met its burden regarding Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment allegation.

The burden now shifts to Plaintiff. Since Plaintiff does not oppose this motion, her burden is not met.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant shall file a proposed judgment within 10 days.

            Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.