Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 20STCV35766, Date: 2023-08-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV35766    Hearing Date: August 15, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

This personal injury case stems from an automobile accident that occurred on September 27, 2018 when Dora Griselda Portillo (“Plaintiff”) alleges she was hit by Sophia Ingrid Santalucia (“Defendant Santalucia”) while driving. Defendant Santalucia was driving a rental car from Hertz Vehicles LLC (“Defendant” or “Defendant Hertz”) when the collision occurred. Plaintiff filed her Complaint on September 18, 2022.

Plaintiff filed four discovery motions: (1) Motion to Deem RFAs Admitted, (2) Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories, (3) Motion to Compel Responses to Special Interrogatories, and (4) Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production (“Motions”) all on July 20, 2022. Defendant filed their Opposition Papers on August 1, 2023. Plaintiff then filed Reply Papers on August 8, 2023. 

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards –

Legal Standard for Deeming Requests for Admissions Admitted –

Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.250, provides, in pertinent part, that “[w]ithin 30 days after service of the request for admissions . . . the party to whom the requests are directed shall serve the original of the response to them on the requesting party.” A motion to deem admitted requests for admissions lies based upon a showing of failure to respond timely. (CCP §2033.280(b); Demyer v. Costa Mesa Mobile Home Estates (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 393, 395, disapproved on other grounds by Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 983.) Requests for admissions must be deemed admitted where no responses in substantial compliance was served before the hearing. (CCP §2033.280(c).) As to motions to deem matters admitted, no meet and confer is required. (Demyer v. Costa Mesa Mobile Home Estates (1995) 36 Cal. App. 4th 393, 395, overruled on other grounds by Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 973, 983. Also see Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 904–906, 169 Cal.Rptr. 42 [rejecting argument that state rule of court requiring informal meet and confer applied to motion where no response at all had been made to interrogatory requests, reasoning that because objections had been waived for failure to timely answer, there was “nothing to ‘resolve’ with the meaning” of the rule)].)

“[A] motion to have admission requests deemed admitted may not be granted where the record establishes ... that (1) proposed responses to the requests have been served prior to the hearing on the motion and (2) such responses are in substantial compliance with the provisions of section 2033, subdivision (f)(1).” (Tobin v. Oris (1992) 3 Cal. App. 4th 814, 828, overruled on other grounds by Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 973, 983 n.12.) Courts evaluate tardy responses to requests for admissions, in toto, to determine whether they substantially comply with the code, and do not evaluate each individual response. (St. Mary v. Sup. Ct. (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 779-80.)

Legal Standard for Motion to Compel the Production of Documents –

“If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the following rules shall apply: (a) The party to whom the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed waives any objection to the demand, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4…(b) The party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand. (c) Except as provided in subdivision (d), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (CCP § 2031.300)

            “The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (CCP § 2023.030(a).)

“Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following: (d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery.” (CCP § 2023.010)

Legal Standard for Compelling Initial Responses to Interrogatories -  

            The propounding party may bring motions to compel further responses to interrogatories or requests for production if it believes (1) the responses received are evasive, or (2) incomplete, or (3) if the objections raised are meritless or too general. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300(a), 2031.310(a).) A respondent has the burden to justify objections in response to a motion filed to compel further responses. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)  

            If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses and for a monetary sanction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subds. (b), (c).) Failure to timely respond waives all objections, including privilege and work product, unless “[t]he party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance” and “[t]he party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subds. (a)(1), (a)(2).) The statute contains no time limit for a motion to compel where no responses have been served and no meet and confer is required when a party does not respond to discovery requests. All that need be shown in the moving papers is that a set of interrogatories was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. (Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 905-906.)

If a motion to compel responses to interrogatories is filed, the Court may impose a monetary sanction against the losing party “unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

Analysis -

Here, in all four instant Motions, Plaintiff provides the Declaration of Jonathan P. Garcia (“Garcia Dec.”) which states that the first set of discovery for Request for Admissions, Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Requests for Production were all propounded on June 7, 2023. (Garcia Dec., ¶ 5.) Responses were due on July 11, 2023. (Id.) When responses were not received by the deadline, Plaintiff granted an extension, with the new deadline being July 19, 2023, however no responses were ever received. (Garcia Dec., ¶ 6 and ¶ 7.)

Defendant counters, arguing that the instant Motions are defective because the Motions were never served on Defendant Santalucia, who is a citizen and resident of Germany, a signatory to the Hague Service Convention, which requires service under specific parameters. Neither party has been able to ascertain Defendant Santalucia’s whereabouts. (Opposition Papers, Declaration of Stuart J. Liebman, ¶ 7.)

In Reply, Plaintiff argues that (1) Defendant did not accept service of process but instead answered the complaint to avoid default, (2) Defendants have not set forth evidence that Santalucia lives, operates, or is based in another country and the Court has already determined the Hague Service Convention does not apply here, and (3) Civil Code section 1939.33 puts the burden on the renter to prove the rentee is a resident of another country by sending the summons and complaint return receipt requested, and counsel has not provided the return receipt.

The Court agrees that Civil Code section 1939.33 does not provide Defendant with authority to refuse to respond to discovery.  That section provides that the rental company “shall be authorized to accept, and, if served as set forth in this section, shall accept, service of a summons and complaint and other required documents against the foreign renter for any accident or collision resulting from the operation of the rental vehicle within the state during the rental period.”  (Civ. Code § 1939.33(a).)  After acceptance of service of process, “the rental company shall provide a copy of the summons and complaint and any other required documents served in accordance with this section to the foreign renter by first-class mail, return receipt requested.”  (Civ. Code § 1939.33(b).)

Here, however, counsel apparently did not provide the documents to Santalucia by first-class mail, return receipt requested.[1] Rather, counsel simply filed and served an answer on behalf of Santalucia (“Served on Hertz Vehicles LLC, Inc. on behalf of Renters under the Provisions of California Civil Code § 1939.33”.) Nothing in that section authorizes Hertz or counsel for Hertz to file an answer on behalf of Santalucia. However, now having done so, Santalucia has appeared in the action and has provided no legal basis to refuse to continue with the litigation.[2]

It is undisputed that Santalucia has not responded to requests for admission, form and special interrogatories, and requests for production of documents.  Accordingly, the Court grants the motions to compel and to deem admitted the matters in the requests for admission.

However, the Court denies both parties’ requests for sanctions as it appears that there is a legitimate dispute and the parties therefore acted with substantial justification.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s (1) Motion to Deem RFAs Admitted, (2) Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories, (3) Motion to Compel Responses to Special Interrogatories, and (4) Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production are all GRANTED. The requests for sanctions are denied.

Plaintiff shall give notice of the Court’s order and file a proof of service of such.