Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 20STCV44397, Date: 2023-08-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV44397    Hearing Date: August 17, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING  

MOVING PAPERS:

1.      Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed 4/20/23

2.      Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ISO Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 4/20/23

3.      Index of Documentary Evidence ISO Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 4/20/23

OPPOSITION PAPERS (Plaintiff):

1.      Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 6/21/23

2.      Separate Statement of Material Facts in Opposition filed on 6/21/23

3.      Evidence and Appendix of Exhibits ISO Opposition filed on 6/21/23

4.      Objections to Defendant’s Evidence ISO its Motion filed on 6/21/23

OPPOSITION PAPERS (Defendant Iles):

1.      Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 6/23/23

2.      Separate Statement in Opposition filed on 6/23/23

3.      Objections to Defendant’s Evidence ISO its Motion filed on 6/23/23

4.      Request for Judicial Notice filed on 6/23/23

REPLY PAPERS:

1.      Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition filed on 8/10/23

2.      Brief Response to Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection filed on 8/10/23

3.      Reply to Defendant Iles’ Opposition filed on 8/10/23

4.      Brief Response to Defendant Iles’ Evidentiary Objection filed on 8/10/23

BACKGROUND

On November 19, 2020, Plaintiff Alfonso Herrerra (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Knight Transportation, Inc. (“Knight Transportation”) and James A. Iles (“Iles”) for general negligence (negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress) and intentional tort (assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress) arising out of a physical confrontation that occurred at the Pacific Container Terminal (“PCT”)  on April 30, 2020.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Iles assaulted and battered Plaintiff.  Plaintiff alleges that, at the time of the underlying incident, Plaintiff was working as a security guard at the PCT, and Defendant Iles was driving a tractor trailer for Defendant Knight Transportation. 

Defendant Knight Transportation moves for summary judgment against Plaintiff’s Complaint or, in the alternative, summary adjudication pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437(c). 

Plaintiff and Defendant Iles opposed the motion, and Defendant Knight Transportation replied.

LEGAL STANDARD—SUMMARY JUDGMENT

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]  There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)  Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied.  If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.  While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.  If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”  (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.”  (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].

JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant Iles requests that the Court take judicial notice of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70103 and 70105 pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(b). The request is unopposed. The Court grants the request.

Defendant Iles requests that the Court take judicial notice of a webpage from the TSA website regarding who may confiscate a Transportation Worker Identification Credential pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(h). The request is unopposed. The Court grants the request, but not as to the truth of the matters asserted.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to Defendant Knight Transportation’s Exhibit “E” Nos. 1-6 are overruled.  Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to Defendant Knight Transportation’s Exhibit “C” No. 1 is sustained.

Defendant Iles’ evidentiary objections to Defendant Knight Transportation’s Exhibit “E” Nos. 1-6 are overruled. Defendant Iles’ evidentiary objections to Defendant Knight Transportation’s Exhibit “C” Nos. 1-3 are sustained.

DISCUSSION

Defendant Knight Transportation moves for summary judgment against Plaintiff’s Complaint or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.  Defendant Knight Transportation argues that Plaintiff’s causes of action fail under the doctrine of respondeat superior because there was no causal nexus between Defendant Iles’ wrongful conduct and his duties of employment.  Further, Knight Transportation argues Plaintiff’s negligence causes of action fail because there are no facts sufficient to raise a triable issue as to its negligence.

            Respondeat Superior

An employer is vicariously liable for an employee’s tort under the doctrine of respondeat superior if the tort was committed within the scope of the employment.  (See Montague v. AMN Healthcare, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1515, 1520; Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296.)  For the employer to be liable for an intentional tort, the employee’s act must have a “causal nexus to the employee’s work,” i.e., “inherent in the working environment” or “typical” to the employer’s business.  (See Montague, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at 1521; Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 298-99.)  “The nexus required for respondeat superior liability—that the tort be engendered by or arise from the work—is to be distinguished from ‘but for’ causation.  That the employment brought tortfeasor and victim together in time and place is not enough. . . . [T]he incident leading to injury must be an ‘outgrowth’ of the employment; the risk of tortious injury must be ‘inherent in the working environment’ or ‘typical of or broadly incidental to the enterprise [the employer] has undertaken.’”  (Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at 298 [citations omitted].)  “California courts have also asked whether the tort was, in a general way, foreseeable from the employee's duties.   Respondeat superior liability should apply only to the types of injuries that ‘as a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise.’  The employment, in other words, must be such as predictably to create the risk employees will commit intentional torts of the type for which liability is sought.”  (Id. at 299.)  The determination of whether an employee was acting within the scope of their employment is a question of fact to be decided by a jury.  However, when the facts are undisputed, it becomes a question of law.  (Ibid.; see also Flores v. AutoZone West, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 373, 381 (regarding altercation between store employee and customer after work-related interaction completed, “the anger generated during the interaction … cannot be so tidily compartmentalized – at least not as a matter of law.”).)                                        

An employer may also be liable for an employee’s acts where the employer either authorized the tortious act or subsequently ratified an originally unauthorized tort.  (Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 151, 169.)  “The failure to discharge an employee who has committed misconduct may be evidence of ratification.”  (Ibid.)  “The theory of ratification is generally applied where an employer fails to investigate or respond to charges that an employee committed an intentional tort, such as assault or battery.”  (Ibid.) 

Here, Defendant Knight Transportation argues that it cannot be vicariously liable for Defendant Iles’ actions because there was no causal nexus between Defendant Iles’ wrongful conduct and his duties of employment.  (Mtn. at pp. 7-15.)  Defendant Knight Transportation’s undisputed material facts establish the following.  At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was working as a uniformed security guard at the PCT, and Defendant Iles was employed by Defendant Knight Transportation.  (UMF No. 2.)  Plaintiff informed Defendant Iles that he was not at the correct gate and would not be provided access through that gate.  (UMF No. 3.)  Plaintiff took possession of Defendant Iles’ security clearance card, Transportation Worker Identification Credential (“TWIC”) card, and directed Defendant Iles to access the correct gate.  (UMF No. 4.)  Defendant Iles ignored Plaintiff’s instructions, exited his work vehicle, pursued Plaintiff on foot, and then proceeded to commit a battery against Plaintiff, shoving him to the ground.  (UMF No. 5.)  After the incident, Defendant Iles did not inform Defendant Knight Transportation that anything had occurred.  (UMF No. 9.)  Defendant Knight Transportation learned about the incident on or about May 7, 2020, and immediately terminated Defendant Iles the same day.  (UMF No. 10.)  Defendants Iles’s conduct was not generally foreseeable in Knight’s business, and Plaintiff’s injury was not the type of injury “sure to occur” in Knight’s enterprise. (UMF No. 13.)

As set forth above, Defendant Knight Transportation has provided evidence that Defendant Iles (1) ignored a uniformed security guard’s instruction; (2) exited his truck; (3) pursued Plaintiff with the intention to commit a criminal battery; and (4) committed that battery.  Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant Knight Transportation has met its initial burden of production, and, as such, the burden shifts to the opposing party to raise a triable issue of material fact under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Both Plaintiff and Defendant Iles filed an opposition to Defendant Knight Transportation’s motion for summary judgment/adjudication.  Plaintiff presents the following evidence that Iles’ conduct was typical of and broadly incidental to his duties as an employee of Defendant Knight Transportation.  Entry and exit from the PCT was a foreseeable, regular, and integral part of that which Defendant Knight Transportation reasonably expected its employee drivers to accomplish as part of the ordinary scope of their employment.  (Plaintiff’s Opp. at p. 17; Plaintiff’s DF Nos. 1-5, 10, 11, 13; Plaintiff’s Fact Nos. 6-17.)  Drivers operating and transporting Defendant Knight Transportation’s tractors, trailers, and its container loads are necessarily required to go in and out of the PCT as part of their jobs for the benefit of their employer.  (Plaintiff’s Opp. at p. 17; Plaintiff’s DF Nos. 1-4, 10, 11, 13; Plaintiff’s Fact Nos. 6-14.)  At the time of the incident, Defendant Iles was not deviating from his regular duties for a purely personal purpose.  (Plaintiff’s Opp. at p. 17; Plaintiff’s Fact Nos. 1-4, 6-15, 18-22.)  Rather, at the time of the incident, Defendant Iles was involved in performing one of the duties that was integral to the functioning of his employer’s business enterprise, and a duty that he was expected to normally perform as part of the hauling and transportation of the containers.  (Plaintiff’s Opp. at p. 17; Plaintiff’s DF Fact Nos. 1-5, 10, 11, 13; Plaintiff’s Fact Nos. 1, 2, 5-14, 18-22.)  Defendant Iles’ assault and battery of Plaintiff was not of a “personal nature” entirely unrelated to either his employment or the performance of his employment duties.  (Plaintiff’s Opp. at p. 18; Plaintiff’s DF Nos. 1-5; Plaintiff’s Fact Nos. 1-4, 10, 11, 17-22.)  The injury inflicted by Defendant Iles on Plaintiff was an outgrowth of Iles’ employment as a truck driver.  (Plaintiff’s Opp. at pp. 19-20; Plaintiff’s DF Nos. 1-6, 10, 11; Plaintiff’s Fact Nos. 1, 2, 5-14, 18-22.)  Further, Defendant Iles provides that the TWIC card was necessary for him to perform his job duties as a driver for his employer, and Defendant Iles exited his employer’s tractor to physically retrieve the TWIC card that Plaintiff confiscated.  (Iles’ Opp. at pp. 3-4; Declaration of Iles. ¶ 10; Iles’ Fact Nos. 1-3 ) 

In viewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing parties, the Court finds that the opposing parties have met their burden of production to show a triable issue of material fact under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In particular, Plaintiff and Defendant Iles have shown a triable issue of material fact exists as to the causal nexus between the employment and the battery, and the foreseeability of the battery arising from Defendant Iles’s duties.  Accordingly, the determination of whether Defendant Iles was acting within the scope of his employment with Defendant Knight Transportation is a question of fact. 

Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant Knight Transportation’s motion for summary judgment under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 

Negligence

The elements of negligence are: (1) a duty to exercise ordinary care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages.  (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.) “California case law recognizes the theory that an employer can be liable to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee.”  (Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054.)  “Negligence liability will be imposed on an employer if it ‘knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.’”  (Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139.) Negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort, but rather a species of negligence that relies on the same elements.  (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 983.)

In the context of negligence, the duty refers to the degree of care expected of a reasonable person in a given circumstance.  (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112.)  “In determining whether one has a duty to prevent injury that is the result of third party conduct, the touchstone of the analysis is the foreseeability of that intervening conduct.”  (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1148.)

Here, as provided above, Defendant Iles did not inform Defendant Knight Transportation after the incident that anything had occurred.  (UMF No. 9.)  When Defendant Knight Transportation learned about the incident, it immediately terminated Defendant Iles the same day.  (UMF No. 10.)  Defendant Knight Transportation did not know or had any reason to know prior to the incident that Defendant Iles has any propensity for such conduct.  (UMF No. 12.)  In opposition, Plaintiff states, “[a]fter investigation and discovery, Plaintiff Herrera is not opposing summary adjudication as it pertains to Defendant Knight on the cause of action of its negligent hiring, management, supervision, retainment, and/or training of Defendant Iles.”  (Plaintiff’s Opps., ¶4; pp. 2-3.) 

The opposition has not shown the existence of a disputed material fact as to negligence. Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s negligence causes of action. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Defendant Knight Transportation, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

The Court GRANTS summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s negligence causes of action.

Defendant Knight Transportation, Inc. is ordered to give notice of this ruling and file proof of service with the Court within five days.