Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 20STCV47618, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV47618    Hearing Date: March 12, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

On December 14, 2020, Plaintiff Kristine Louise Delgado (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Jerome Lee Brandehoff, The Hertz Corporation, and Does 1 to 25 for negligence related to a motor vehicle accident that occurred on February 22, 2019.

On November 8, 2023, Defendants Jerome Lee Brandehoff and The Hertz Corporation (“Defendants”) issued a subpoena for records to T-Mobile USA, Inc., seeking Plaintiff’s phone records for the entire day of the incident.

 Plaintiff now moves to quash the subpoena, arguing that it is irrelevant, overly board, violates her right of privacy, and not compliant with the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions.  Defendants oppose and Plaintiff replies.

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure § 1987.1(a) states:

If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

“The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. [Citation omitted.] In Hill, [the California Supreme Court] established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation omitted.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. [citation omitted].” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 533 (citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)

“[Prior] cases correctly recognize that when a discovery request seeks information implicating the constitutional right of privacy, to order discovery simply upon a showing that the Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 test for relevance has been met is an abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.] But they also stand for the proposition that whenever discovery of facially private information is sought, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate a “ ‘compelling state interest’ ” [citation omitted] or “compelling need” [citation omitted]. Although in this they are not alone [citation omitted], they nevertheless are incorrect.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) “To the extent prior cases require a party seeking discovery of private information to always establish a compelling interest or compelling need, without regard to the other considerations articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., [citation omitted], they are disapproved.” (Id. at 557.)

“Only obvious invasions of interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) When lesser interests are at stake, “the strength of the countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information var[ies] according to the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and protective measures.” (Id.) “The trial courts in exercising their discretion should keep in mind that the Legislature has suggested that, where possible, the court should impose partial limitations rather than outright denial of discovery.” (Id. at 559 [quotation omitted].)

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 provides that “the court may in its discretion award the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing [a motion to quash], including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc. section 1987.2(a).)

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.)

DISCUSSION

The subject subpoena seeks the following information:

“Any and all documents, billing records and phone records pertaining to Kristine Louise Delgado (DOB: 02/18/1970) from 2/22/2019, regarding cell phone number 323-356-6398.” (Ahn Decl., Exh. 2.)

Plaintiff first contends the phone records are irrelevant since Defendants have admitted liability. Defendants do not address the issue of liability in the opposition. However, the only evidence Plaintiff shows in support of this assertion is an email from a representative from Defendants’ insurer. There is no signed stipulation by the parties regarding the issue of liability. Instead, Defendants argue the information is relevant since they contend that Plaintiff was distracted by her phone before the incident. (Opp., 3.)

Plaintiff indicates that she offered to limit the scope of the phone records to 20 minutes before and after the incident. Since the exact time of the incident is unknown, Plaintiff offered records between 3:10 p.m. and 4:20 p.m. on the day of the incident. (Motion, 5.) In response, Defendants argue that since the time of the incident is disputed, they require a larger window. However, they do not offer a potential window of time when the incident occurred. (See Opp., 4.) Based on this information, the Court finds that the records for a short period of time are relevant, but seeking records for an entire day is overly broad. Defendant does not explain why records from 3:10 p.m. to 4:20 p.m. are insufficient.

Next, Plaintiff argues that the subpoena is invalid since it does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3(f).

Section 1985.3(f) states:

“A subpoena duces tecum for personal records maintained by a telephone corporation which is a public utility, as defined in Section 216 of the Public Utilities Code, shall not be valid or effective unless it includes a consent to release, signed by the consumer whose records are requested, as required by Section 2891 of the Public Utilities Code.”

A “public utility is defined as “every . . . telephone corporation . . . where the service is performed for, or the commodity is delivered to, the public or any portion thereof.” (Pub. Util. Code § 216(a)(1).) Public Utilities Code section 2891 requires written consent before a telephone corporation may provide any of the following information: “The subscriber's personal calling patterns, including any listing of the telephone or other access numbers called by the subscriber, but excluding the identification to the person called of the person calling and the telephone number from which the call was placed”; “The residential subscriber's credit or other personal financial information.” (Pub. Util. Code § 2891(a).)

Here, Plaintiff contends that Defendants did not obtain her signed consent to these records. Defendants do not address this argument in opposition. The Court further grants the motion to quash on the basis that Defendants did not comply with section 1985.3(f).

Plaintiff seeks $3,311.65 in monetary sanctions representing a $500 hourly rate and $61.65 for the filing fee. The Court finds sanctions are warranted, but the amount requested is excessive. Therefore, the Court reduces the award of sanctions to $2,061.65 (four hours of attorney time plus the filing fee).

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to quash Defendants’ subpoena.

The Court further grants Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions against Defendants and their counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the reduced amount of $2,061.65. Said monetary sanctions are to be paid to counsel for Plaintiff within 30 days of this order.

Plaintiff to provide notice and file a proof of service of such.