Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV06432, Date: 2023-09-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV06432    Hearing Date: September 27, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOVING PAPERS:

1. Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities

2. Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

3. Declaration of Regina Peralta

4. Declaration of John T. Tsai

5. Volume of Evidence

OPPOSITION PAPERS:

1. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition  

2. Plaintiff’s Separate Statement in Opposition

3. Declaration of Eric A. Forstrom in Support of Plaintiff’s in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

REPLY PAPERS:

1. Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sanjuanita Rios (Plaintiff) sued 1815 E. Workman, LLC. and John T. Tsai (“Defendants”) for negligence and premises liability. Plaintiff alleges she tripped over a concealed speedbump on property “owned, maintained, managed and operated” by Defendants, and was injured. (Complaint, 4.)

Moving Defendant John T. Tsai (Tsai) now moves for summary judgment arguing there are no triable issues of fact since he does not own the subject property. Tsai also seeks sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. Plaintiff opposes and Tsai replies.

LEGAL STANDARD – SUMMARY JUDGMENT

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)  Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise.  If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.”  (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”  (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.”  (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].) 

DISCUSSION

Negligence and Premises Liability

“The elements of a negligence cause of action are the existence of a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury. The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998, citation omitted.) “Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm.” (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.)

            The “crucial element for imposing a duty in such circumstances is control,” “the rationale being that whoever has the means to control the property can take steps to prevent the harm.” (Soto v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 168, 177.) As a result, premises liability is not limited to the person or entity that holds title to the land. In Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, the plaintiff was injured on a strip of land owned by the city but sued the landlord of the adjacent property. Summary judgment for the landlord was reversed because the court found there was a triable issue of fact whether the landlord exercised control over the strip. (Id. at 1152, 1157.) “A defendant need not own, possess and control property in order to be held liable; control alone is sufficient.” (Id. at 1162.)

“A defendant cannot be held liable for the defective or dangerous condition of property which it did not own, possess, or control. Where the absence of ownership, possession, or control has been unequivocally established, summary judgment is proper.” (Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 134.)

Here, Tsai sets forth the following facts:

-          The alleged slip/trip and fall incident occurred on March 28, 2019 at 1815 E. Workman Avenue, West Covina, CA 91791. (UMF 1.)

-          Defendant 1815 E. Workman, LLC is the owner of the subject premises located at 1815 E. Workman Avenue, West Covina, CA 91791. (UMF 3.)

-          Defendant John T Tsai is the LLC Manager of Defendant 1815 E. Workman, LLC. (UMF 4.)

Tsai argues he is entitled to summary judgment because he did not own the property where Plaintiff was allegedly injured. However, Tsai has presented no evidence regarding a lack of control over the property. As discussed above, control of the property is a separate basis for liability than ownership or possession. Because Tsai has failed to meet his burden to establish that there are no triable issues of material fact, the Court denies the motion for summary judgment.

Because the motion for summary judgment is denied, the Court denies Tsai’s request for sanctions.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant John T. Tsai’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Defendant shall provide notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.