Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV08174, Date: 2024-03-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV08174 Hearing Date: March 19, 2024 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the
Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent
authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
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DEPT: |
32 |
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HEARING DATE: |
March
18, 2024 |
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CASE NUMBER: |
21STCV08174 |
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MOTIONS: |
Motion
for Leave to file a First Amended Complaint |
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Plaintiff Matthew Jacobs |
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OPPOSING PARTY: |
Defendant
Grandview Inn, LLC |
BACKGROUND
On
March 1, 2021, Plaintiff Matthew Jacobs (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against
Defendants Grandview Inn LLC and Does 1 to 50 for negligence and premises
liability. Plaintiff alleges that he was injured on premises owned by
Defendants and that Defendants negligently hired, trained, supervised its
employees.
On
August 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint, substituting
Krishan Patel (“Patel”) as Doe 1.
On February 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to
file an amended complaint to add a cause of action for intentional tort
(assault and battery) against Patel and to allege gross negligence and a prayer
for punitive damages against Defendants Grandview Inn, LLC and Does 1 to 100.
Defendant Grandview Inn, LLC (“Defendant”) opposes and Plaintiff replies.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Amendment
to Pleadings: General Provisions
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 576, “[a]ny judge, at any time before or
after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms
as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial
conference order.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1) provides, in
relevant part: “[t]he court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as
may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or
striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a
party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the
time for answer or demurrer.¿ The court may likewise, in its discretion, after
notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment
to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms
allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.”¿
“This discretion should be exercised liberally in favor of amendments,
for judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters in the same
lawsuit.”¿(Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court¿(1989) 213 Cal.App.3d
1045, 1047.)¿ The Court of Appeal in Morgan v. Superior Court held: “If
the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not
prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and
where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert
a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error
but an abuse of discretion.” (Morgan
v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530, citations omitted.) Moreover, “it is an abuse of discretion for
the court to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or
prejudiced by the amendment.” (Kittredge
Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [opposing
party did not establish harm by the delay in moving to amend the complaint].)
“The court may grant leave to amend the pleadings at any stage of the
action.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial
(The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 6:636 (hereafter Weil & Brown).) Denial of a motion to amend is rarely
justified if the motion is timely made and granting the motion will not
prejudice the opposing party. (Id. at ¶ 6:639, citations omitted.) However, if the party seeking the amendment
has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the judge
has discretion to deny leave to amend. (Id. at ¶ 6:655, citations
omitted. Absent prejudice, any claimed delay alone is not grounds for denial.
“If the delay in seeking the amendment has not misled or prejudiced the other
side, the liberal policy of allowing amendments prevails. Indeed, it is an
abuse of discretion to deny leave in such a case even if sought as late as the
time of trial. (Id. at ¶ 6:653 (citing Higgins v. Del Faro (1981)
123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565).)
“Prejudice exists where the amendment would result in a delay of trial,
along with loss of critical evidence, added costs of preparation, increased
burden of discovery, etc. . . . But the fact that the amendment involves a
change in legal theory which would make admissible evidence damaging to the
opposing party is not the kind of prejudice the court will consider.” (Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 6:656,
citations omitted.)
“Even if some prejudice is shown, the judge may still permit the
amendment but impose conditions, as the Court is authorized to grant leave ‘on
such terms as may be proper.’” (Weil
& Brown, supra, at ¶ 6:663, citation omitted.) For example, the court may cause the party
seeking the amendment to pay the costs and fees incurred in preparing for
trial. (Id. at ¶ 6:664 (citing Fuller v. Vista Del Arroyo Hotel,
42 Cal.App.2d 400, 404).)
California
Rules of Court, rule 3.1324: Procedural
Requirements
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a), a motion to
amend a pleading before trial must:
“(1) Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleadings,
which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or
amendments;
(2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be
deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted
allegations are located; and
(3) State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous
pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the
additional allegations are located.”
In addition, under Rule 3.1324(b), a motion to amend a pleading before
trial must be accompanied by a separate declaration that specifies the
following:
“(1) the effect of the amendment;
(2) why the amendment is
necessary and proper;
(3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were
discovered; and
(4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”
Punitive Damages
To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a
plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute,
Civil Code section 3294. (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) Punitive damages may be imposed where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice.¿ (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)¿ “Malice” is
conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or
despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard
of the rights or safety of others.¿ (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)¿
“‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of
extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens
should not have to tolerate.’¿ [Citation.]”¿ (Lackner v. North (2006)
135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)¿¿¿¿
“As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section
3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’
requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’
interests.¿ The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.”¿ (College
Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) (emphasis
added.)¿ The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new
substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”¿ (Ibid.)¿ Despicable
conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched
or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent
people.¿ Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage
frequently associated with crime.’”¿ (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co.
(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)¿ Further, “[t]here must be evidence that
defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to
plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.”¿ (Flyer’s
Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
1149, 1155.)¿
Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to
support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or
malice. To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a
claim for punitive damages. (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10
Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)
Moreover, “[a]n employer shall not be liable for damages
pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer,
unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and
employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are
awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect
to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard,
authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on
the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has satisfied the procedural
requirements under rule 3.1324. (Maryanski Decl., Exh. 1.)
As to Patel, Plaintiff argues that deposition testimony by Patel
revealed for the first time that he punched Plaintiff. (Exh. 3., Patel Depo.
27:16–17; 30:13–31:4.)
As to Defendant, Plaintiff alleges that Patel was manager of the
Grandview Inn (“Inn”) when the incident occurred on March 1, 2019. Plaintiff’s
apartment complex is located directed across an alley from the Inn. Eileen
Glynn is the property manager of Plaintiff’s apartment complex and testified
that in 2018 she received a complaint from a tenant that a “maintenance man”
for the Inn was being loud at night. When the tenant asked him to be quiet, the
man threatened to beat him up and kill him. (Maryanski Decl., Exh. 2, Glynn
Depo. 19:16–20:5.) After receiving this information, Ms. Glynn told the owner
of the Inn, Amish Desai, that the man had threatened her tenant. Mr. Desai told
Ms. Glynn he would let the employee go and there would be no problem. Then, after the incident with Plaintiff, Ms.
Glynn spoke to Mr. Desai who revealed that the man had asked for a “another
chance” and said he had “nowhere else to go.” Mr. Desai then told Ms. Glynn
that the man would be fired after the incident with Plaintiff. (Glynn Depo.
21:3-19, 31:14-24, 31:25-32:2.)
In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff delayed in bringing
this motion and that it will cause prejudice. Defendant contends that in
October 2022, it informed Plaintiff that Patel was its manager. However, the
depositions which form the basis for the allegations were conducted in June and
July 2023. Still, even if there was some delay, Defendant fails to articulate
how it would be prejudiced.
Moreover, as to punitive damages, Plaintiff has alleged, among other
things, that Defendant knew or should have known of the “violent propensities
of its manager prior to this incident and with a conscious disregard for the
safety of persons entering the premises continued to employ Krishan Patel.” Plaintiff
has sufficiently alleged punitive damages, and Defendant’s arguments in
opposition merely dispute the factual allegations. (Opposition at p. 6.)
Therefore, the motion for leave to amend is granted.
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his complaint is granted.
Plaintiff shall file and serve the amended complaint within 10 days.
Plaintiff to provide notice and file a proof of service of such.