Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV08174, Date: 2024-03-19 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 21STCV08174    Hearing Date: March 19, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPT:

32

HEARING DATE:

March 18, 2024

CASE NUMBER:

21STCV08174

MOTIONS: 

Motion for Leave to file a First Amended Complaint

MOVING PARTY:

Plaintiff Matthew Jacobs

OPPOSING PARTY:

Defendant Grandview Inn, LLC

 

 

BACKGROUND

 

On March 1, 2021, Plaintiff Matthew Jacobs (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Grandview Inn LLC and Does 1 to 50 for negligence and premises liability. Plaintiff alleges that he was injured on premises owned by Defendants and that Defendants negligently hired, trained, supervised its employees.  

 

On August 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint, substituting Krishan Patel (“Patel”) as Doe 1.

 

On February 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to file an amended complaint to add a cause of action for intentional tort (assault and battery) against Patel and to allege gross negligence and a prayer for punitive damages against Defendants Grandview Inn, LLC and Does 1 to 100. Defendant Grandview Inn, LLC (“Defendant”) opposes and Plaintiff replies.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

Amendment to Pleadings: General Provisions

 

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 576, “[a]ny judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.”

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1) provides, in relevant part: “[t]he court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer.¿ The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.”¿ 

 

“This discretion should be exercised liberally in favor of amendments, for judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters in the same lawsuit.”¿(Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court¿(1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1047.)¿ The Court of Appeal in Morgan v. Superior Court held: “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.”  (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530, citations omitted.)  Moreover, “it is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment.”  (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [opposing party did not establish harm by the delay in moving to amend the complaint].)

 

“The court may grant leave to amend the pleadings at any stage of the action.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 6:636 (hereafter Weil & Brown).)  Denial of a motion to amend is rarely justified if the motion is timely made and granting the motion will not prejudice the opposing party. (Id. at ¶ 6:639, citations omitted.)  However, if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the judge has discretion to deny leave to amend. (Id. at ¶ 6:655, citations omitted. Absent prejudice, any claimed delay alone is not grounds for denial. “If the delay in seeking the amendment has not misled or prejudiced the other side, the liberal policy of allowing amendments prevails. Indeed, it is an abuse of discretion to deny leave in such a case even if sought as late as the time of trial. (Id. at ¶ 6:653 (citing Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565).)  “Prejudice exists where the amendment would result in a delay of trial, along with loss of critical evidence, added costs of preparation, increased burden of discovery, etc.  . . .  But the fact that the amendment involves a change in legal theory which would make admissible evidence damaging to the opposing party is not the kind of prejudice the court will consider.”  (Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 6:656, citations omitted.)

 

“Even if some prejudice is shown, the judge may still permit the amendment but impose conditions, as the Court is authorized to grant leave ‘on such terms as may be proper.’”  (Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 6:663, citation omitted.)  For example, the court may cause the party seeking the amendment to pay the costs and fees incurred in preparing for trial. (Id. at ¶ 6:664 (citing Fuller v. Vista Del Arroyo Hotel, 42 Cal.App.2d 400, 404).)

 

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324:  Procedural Requirements

 

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a), a motion to amend a pleading before trial must:

 

“(1) Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleadings, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments;

 

(2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and

 

(3) State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.”

 

In addition, under Rule 3.1324(b), a motion to amend a pleading before trial must be accompanied by a separate declaration that specifies the following:

 

“(1) the effect of the amendment;

 

 (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper;

 

(3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and

 

(4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

 

Punitive Damages 

 

To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294.  (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.¿ (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)¿ “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.¿ (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)¿ “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’¿ [Citation.]”¿ (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)¿¿¿¿ 

 

“As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests.¿ The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.”¿ (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) (emphasis added.)¿ The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”¿ (Ibid.)¿ Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.¿ Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’”¿ (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)¿ Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.”¿ (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.)¿ 

 

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice.  To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.  (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.) 

 

Moreover, “[a]n employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) 

 

DISCUSSION

 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has satisfied the procedural requirements under rule 3.1324. (Maryanski Decl., Exh. 1.)

 

As to Patel, Plaintiff argues that deposition testimony by Patel revealed for the first time that he punched Plaintiff. (Exh. 3., Patel Depo. 27:16–17; 30:13–31:4.)

 

As to Defendant, Plaintiff alleges that Patel was manager of the Grandview Inn (“Inn”) when the incident occurred on March 1, 2019. Plaintiff’s apartment complex is located directed across an alley from the Inn. Eileen Glynn is the property manager of Plaintiff’s apartment complex and testified that in 2018 she received a complaint from a tenant that a “maintenance man” for the Inn was being loud at night. When the tenant asked him to be quiet, the man threatened to beat him up and kill him. (Maryanski Decl., Exh. 2, Glynn Depo. 19:16–20:5.) After receiving this information, Ms. Glynn told the owner of the Inn, Amish Desai, that the man had threatened her tenant. Mr. Desai told Ms. Glynn he would let the employee go and there would be no problem.  Then, after the incident with Plaintiff, Ms. Glynn spoke to Mr. Desai who revealed that the man had asked for a “another chance” and said he had “nowhere else to go.” Mr. Desai then told Ms. Glynn that the man would be fired after the incident with Plaintiff. (Glynn Depo. 21:3-19, 31:14-24, 31:25-32:2.)

 

In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff delayed in bringing this motion and that it will cause prejudice. Defendant contends that in October 2022, it informed Plaintiff that Patel was its manager. However, the depositions which form the basis for the allegations were conducted in June and July 2023. Still, even if there was some delay, Defendant fails to articulate how it would be prejudiced.

 

Moreover, as to punitive damages, Plaintiff has alleged, among other things, that Defendant knew or should have known of the “violent propensities of its manager prior to this incident and with a conscious disregard for the safety of persons entering the premises continued to employ Krishan Patel.” Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged punitive damages, and Defendant’s arguments in opposition merely dispute the factual allegations. (Opposition at p. 6.)

 

Therefore, the motion for leave to amend is granted.

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his complaint is granted. Plaintiff shall file and serve the amended complaint within 10 days.

 

Plaintiff to provide notice and file a proof of service of such.