Judge Anne Hwang, Case Number: 21STCV13545, Date: 2023-11-21 Tentative Ruling

PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

1. Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities

2. Plaintiff’s Response to City of Santa Clarita’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

On April 9, 2021, Plaintiff Mary Grady (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants City of Santa Clarita (City), Toro Enterprises, Inc., and Does 1 to 25. Plaintiff alleges that on May 13, 2020, she was “walking at the intersection of Fairview Dr. and Grandview Dr. in Valencia, CA 91355” when she tripped over the lip of a manhole cover. (Complaint, 4.) Plaintiff asserts a dangerous condition of public property cause of action against City.

City now moves for summary judgment, arguing that it does not own the subject manhole, that it constitutes a “trivial defect,” and that City had no prior notice of the condition.

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].) Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

The Court rules on Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to City’s evidence as follows:

The objections to the entire Declaration of Andrew Adams, including specifically paragraphs 4 to 9, are overruled.

The objections to the entire Declaration of Dan March, including specifically paragraphs 8 to 10, are overruled.

The Court declines to rule on Defendant’s evidentiary objections because consideration of the evidence does not change the Court’s rulings herein.

Government Code section 815 provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person” except as provided by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a); see Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932.) “[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.)

Government Code section 835 sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property. (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129, citing Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829; see also Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112.) A dangerous condition is “a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (Gov. Code § 830(a).)

To establish a claim of dangerous condition on public property, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant owned or controlled the property; (2) that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury; (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury that occurred; (4) that defendant had notice of the dangerous condition for a long enough time to have protected against it; (5) that plaintiff was harmed; and (6) that the dangerous condition was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (Gov. Code, § 835; CACI No. 1100.) Consequently, a public entity is only liable for a dangerous condition of property if it either creates the condition or has actual or constructive notice of the condition. (Gov Code §835(b).)

“Property owners are required to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition and to use due care to eliminate dangerous conditions on their property. But a property owner is not liable for damages caused by a minor, trivial, or insignificant defect on its property. The so-called ‘trivial defect doctrine’ recognizes that persons who maintain walkways, whether public or private, are not required to maintain them in an absolutely perfect condition. The duty of care imposed on a property owner, even one with actual notice, does not require the repair of minor defects.” (Fajardo v. Dailey (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 221, 226 [cleaned up].)

“In limited circumstances a court may determine a walkway defect is trivial as a matter of law. Where reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion—that there was no substantial risk of injury—the issue is a question of law, properly resolved by way of summary judgment. But where sufficient evidence has been presented so that reasonable minds may differ as to whether the defect is dangerous, summary judgment is inappropriate.” (Id. at p. 226.)

California Courts have developed two substantially similar tests to determine whether a sidewalk defect is trivial, i.e., not dangerous, as a matter of law. In Stathoulis v. City of Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 567-68, the Court of Appeal set out a two part test. “First, the court reviews evidence regarding the type and size of the defect. If that preliminary analysis reveals a trivial defect, the court considers evidence of any additional factors such as the weather, lighting and visibility conditions at the time of the accident, the existence of debris or obstructions, and plaintiff’s knowledge of the area. If these additional factors do not indicate the defect was sufficiently dangerous to a reasonably careful person, the court should deem the defect trivial as a matter of law ....” (See also Nunez v. City of Redondo Beach (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 749, 758 [adopting two-step framework]; Huckey v. City of Temecula (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1105 [same].)

More recently, in Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 102, 110, the Court of Appeal read Government Code section 830.2 to require a more “holistic” approach, stating, “[a]lthough we agree with the premise that the size of the defect is the primary determinant of triviality, as discussed below, we modify the prevailing two-step framework into a holistic, multi-factor analysis.”

“We begin with the most important factor: the defect’s size.” (Stack, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 110 [cleaned up].) “Sidewalk elevations ranging from three-quarters of an inch to one and one-half inches have generally been held trivial as a matter of law.” (Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107; see Stathoulis, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 568 [“Several decisions have found height differentials of up to one and one-half inches trivial as a matter of law.”]) A more “accurate encapsulation” of the law, according to Stack, is that “when the size of the depression begins to stretch beyond one inch the courts have been reluctant to find that the defect is not dangerous as a matter of law, i.e., that it is minor or trivial.” (Stack, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 112.) “That said, there is no firmly fixed arbitrary measurement in inches below which a defect is trivial as a matter of law and above which it becomes a question of fact whether or not the defect is dangerous. This is because a court should not rely solely upon the size of the defect ... although the defect’s size ‘may be one of the most relevant factors’ to the court’s decision.” (Id. at pp. 112–113 [cleaned up].)

The Court next considers additional factors. “Beyond size, additional factors courts typically consider in assessing a sidewalk condition’s triviality as a matter of law are: the nature and quality of the defect (including whether it has jagged breaks or cracks); whether anything was obstructing or concealing the defect (for instance, an object, debris, or other substance); the lighting and weather conditions at the time of the incident; whether the defect has caused other accidents; and plaintiff's familiarity with the area.” (Stack, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 115.) With respect to the various foregoing factors, Stack held that “individual familiarity is not a proper factor for consideration within the trivial defect doctrine.” (Id. at p. 120.)

- While walking on a warm, sunny day on August 13, 2020, at approximately 10:20 a.m., Plaintiff tripped and fell over a manhole cover located in the road at the intersection of Grandview Drive and Fairview Drive in Santa Clarita. (UMF 2.)

- Measurements taken by City of Santa Clarita Public Works on August 26, 2020, show that the differential between the manhole cover and its concrete ring was approximately one inch at its highest point. (UMF 5.)

- The photographs taken by both the City on August 26, 2020 and by Plaintiff show a contrast between the dark asphalt and the lighter concrete ring around the manhole. (UMF 6.)

- Plaintiff walked the route that came across the specific corner of the intersection at Grandview Drive and Fairview Drive where the incident occurred about 10 to 20 times previously. (UMF 8.)

- Despite the number of times Plaintiff walked that specific location, she never reported had any prior incidents to the City. (UMF 9.)

- The City did not receive any prior Complaints nor Claims for Damages for any other incident that occurred at the subject location. (UMF 13.)

City has met its burden to show an absence of a triable issue of fact. City has established that the height difference was approximately one inch at the highest point. In addition, the color differential highlights the defect. It is also undisputed that it was a sunny day, at about 10:20 a.m.

- The deterioration of the roadway adjacent to the manhole cover is evident in images that date to December 2011. (PAMF 16.)

- The City of Santa Clarita repaired the roadway adjacent to the manhole cover so that it was no longer a trip hazard. (PAMF 17.)

- Unlike a typical sidewalk defect, the subject defect is not something commonly encountered by pedestrians, making it less likely to be noticed and recognized as a tripping hazard. (PAMF 18.)

- Unlike a typical sidewalk defect, the subject defect exists in a location where pedestrians would be expected to be directing both visual gaze and visual attention toward monitoring vehicular traffic, resulting in diminished resources to monitor the walking surface. (PAMF 19.)

- The position of the sun at the time of the subject incident was in the southeastern sky (Exhibit 6). There are large trees at the southeast corner of the intersection that likely would have been casting shadows over the manhole cover and surrounding area. Such shadows would have increased the difficulty of the visual discrimination task required to notice the subject defect. (PAMF 20.)

- As testified to in her deposition, Ms. Grady’s working knowledge of the intersection was “It’s a very busy intersection, and people have been known to not fully stop at that intersection.” This would naturally make her devote extra visual attention and gaze toward monitoring approaching vehicles.” (PAMF 21.)

- At testified to in her deposition, at the time of Ms. Grady’s fall, she was monitoring traffic approaching the intersection, as would be expected by a pedestrian crossing a road at a relatively busy intersection.” (PAMF 22.)

- In the area where Ms. Grady fell, a large section of asphalt surrounding the manhole cover was missing (Exhibit 2). This resulted in a significant height differential between the street surface exposed underneath the asphalt layer and the manhole cover. (PAMF 23.)

- The height differential between the exposed street surface and the manhole cover was measured by City of Santa Clarita Public Works, two weeks after the subject incident, and was determined to be approximately 1 inch. This is more than sufficient to cause a pedestrian to trip. Studies of human gait indicate that the toe often gets within ½ inch of the walking surface during the swing phase of gait, with most foot swings having a minimum toe clearance of ¾ inch or less. (PAMF 24.)

- The manhole cover and surrounding area are directly within an intended path of pedestrian travel across, the street, to and from the southeastern corner. While there is not a traditionally marked crosswalk in this location, the stop sign limit line clearly indicates a boundary to where pedestrians are intended to cross the street. (PAMF 27.)

Plaintiff does not offer competing evidence of a contrary measurement, the appearance of the manhole cover including the color differential, or the conditions of the day. Plaintiff primarily argues the Court should not rely on cases describing sidewalk defects since this incident occurred on the street. According to Plaintiff’s evidence, the area at issue is “directly within an intended path of pedestrian travel across the street.” (PUMF 27.) The court in Stathoulis v. City of Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 566 addressed shallow holes in a residential city street and noted that “[t]he question is not the location of the defect, per se, but whether it may reasonably be anticipated pedestrians will use the surface as a public walkway.” (Stathoulis, 164 Cal.App.4th at 566 fn. 2 [“Most cases address defects in sidewalks. In its motion, the City argued the standard for what constitutes a dangerous condition is more stringent for a pothole than a crack or other defect in a sidewalk. We agree with the trial court that, under the circumstances of this case, this is a distinction without a difference.”].) In light of Plaintiff’s evidence that the area was used as a path of pedestrian travel, the Court finds the sidewalk cases to be instructive. The only relevant conflicting evidence offered by Plaintiff is that she was monitoring traffic at a busy intersection.[1] (PUMF 22.) However, this does not change the character of the alleged defect. Whether or not Plaintiff was looking at the manhole cover because of other conditions in the area does not create a triable issue of fact.

Plaintiff’s only other argument is that the City subsequently repaired the manhole cover. (PUMF 17.) Notwithstanding Evidence Code section 1151, the fact of subsequent repair does not change the City’s evidence of the character of the defect at the time of the incident, nor does it create a triable issue of fact regarding the objectively trivial nature of the defect.

Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that there are no triable issues of fact that the defect is not trivial, and grants City’s motion for summary judgment.[2]

Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that there are no triable issues of material fact and therefore grants City’s motion for summary judgment.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of Santa Clarita’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Defendant shall file and serve a proposed judgment within 10 days.

Defendant shall provide notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.

1. Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Anastasia K. Olano

On May 26, 2021, City filed a Cross-Complaint against County of Los Angeles (County) and Roes 1 to 50 for implied equitable indemnity, contribution/apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief.

County now moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, arguing that City’s causes of action lack any merit since County is not liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. City opposes.

In light of the Court’s ruling on City’s motion for summary judgment, this motion appears to be moot. The Court nonetheless addresses the motion because there is a currently pending cross-complaint.

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Id.) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].) Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

“Traditional equitable indemnity and implied contractual indemnity share a key feature that distinguishes them from express indemnity: unlike express indemnity, neither traditional equitable indemnity nor implied contractual indemnity is available “in the absence of a joint legal obligation to the injured party.” (Id. at pp. 1160–1161, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 732, 202 P.3d 1115.) Under this principle, “ ‘ “there can be no indemnity without liability,” ’ ” that is, the indemnitee and the indemnitor must share liability for the injury. [citations omitted.].” (Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v. Price (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 559, 573.)

“Section 1431.2, subdivision (a) provides that, in actions for wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage based on comparative fault, “the liability of each defendant for non-economic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount.” (Taylor v. John Crane, Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1068.) “[F]ault will be allocated to an entity that is immune from paying for its tortious acts, but will not be allocated to an entity that is not a tortfeasor, that is, one whose actions have been declared not to be tortious.” (Id. at 1071.)

To hold a public entity liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the property was a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, (2) that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and (4) that either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition or the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. (Gov. Code § 835.) Consequently, a public entity is only liable for a dangerous condition of property if it either creates the condition or has actual or constructive notice of the condition. (Gov Code §835(b).)

A public entity has actual notice of a dangerous condition if it had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character. (Gov. Code § 835.2(a).) “To establish actual notice, ‘[t]here must be some evidence that the employees had knowledge of the particular dangerous condition in question’; ‘it is not enough to show that the [public entity's] employees had a general knowledge’ that the condition can sometimes occur. [Citation.]” (Martinez v. City of Beverly Hills (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 508, 519.)

A public entity has constructive notice of a dangerous condition only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. (Gov. Code § 835.2 (b).) On the issue of due care, admissible evidence includes, but is not limited to evidence of whether the condition and its dangerous character would have been discovered by an inspection system that was reasonably adequate or whether the public entity maintained and operated an inspection system with due care and did not discover the condition. (Gov. Code § 835.2 (b)(1)-(2).) “Whether the dangerous condition was obvious and whether it existed for a sufficient period of time are threshold elements to establish a claim of constructive notice.” (Heskel v. City of San Diego (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 313, 317.) “Where the plaintiff fails to present direct or circumstantial evidence as to either element, his claim is deficient as a matter of law.” (Ibid.)

Although the conspicuousness of the condition and the length of time it existed are normally questions of fact for resolution by the jury, they may be resolved as matter of law where the plaintiff's evidence as to either element is legally insufficient. (Kotronakis v. City & County of San Francisco (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 624, 629 [jury verdict for plaintiff reversed where there was no evidence the puddle of vomit in which plaintiff slipped had been on the sidewalk longer than overnight]; Heskel v. City of San Diego (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 313, 318-319, 321 [summary judgment proper where plaintiff failed to provide evidence to rebut the City's showing the condition was not obvious].)

County argues that the causes of action for implied equitable indemnity and contribution lack merit because County is not liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. County argues it is not liable because: (1) it conducted regular inspections of the manhole and reported no deficiencies; (2) it never received an alert about the defect before Plaintiff’s injury; and (3) the County had no notice of a pavement project occurring on the date of the incident. While County does not deeply discuss all the elements of Plaintiff’s dangerous condition of public property cause of action, it offers the following facts:

- On August 13, 2020, Plaintiff was walking at the intersection of Fairview Drive and Grandview Drive in Santa Clarita, California. She claims her foot became caught on the “lip” of an exposed manhole cover, causing her to fall and sustain injuries. She testified in her deposition that the pavement at the intersection’s asphalt was removed for what Plaintiff believed was resurfacing. (UMF 1.)

- Plaintiff filed a Claim for Damages Form with the City of Santa Clarita on December 19, 2020. In an attached summary of the event, Plaintiff stated that “the City of Santa Clarita had torn up the street surface of Fairview Dr., from Grandview to McBean Pkwy, for street maintenance/repair.” She then stated she proceeded to cross Grandview Drive and was “tripped up” by the exposed lip of a manhole cover. She further claimed she then fell and hit her head on the pavement, causing confusion, nausea, dizziness, trouble seeing, and bleeding. (UMF 2.)

- The County of Los Angeles Department of Public Works conducts regular inspections of the subject stormwater drain every six years. (UMF 5.)

- The subject stormwater drain, including the manhole, was last inspected prior to the alleged incident on November 13, 2018 by Stormwater Maintenance Division of the Department of Public Works via Work Order No. 6036675. (UMF 6.)

- Between November 13, 2018 and August 13, 2020, the date of the alleged incident, the County of Los Angeles Public Works Department was not alerted by the City of Santa Clarita or any other entity or individual regarding any issue related to the subject stormwater drain, the manhole, or the pavement surrounding it. (UMF 7.)

- The County of Los Angeles Department of Public Works had no knowledge or notice of any pavement project underway at this location on or around August 13, 2020, the date of the alleged incident. (UMF 8.)

- On May 13, 2021, the City of Santa Clarita contacted the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Works regarding failing pavement around the subject stormwater drain. Work Order No. 7232973 was crated shortly thereafter to investigate the area. However, upon arrival by agents of the Department of Public Works, it was concluded that the failing pavement had been resolved. (UMF 9.)

Here, County argues that City was responsible for the subject defect since it was resurfacing the street at the time Plaintiff was injured. However, to prove this, County only offers Plaintiff’s Claim for Damages Form. (Olano Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. F.) City disputes this by offering a declaration from its Special Districts Manager, who confirms there was no road work on the day of the incident. (Adams Decl. ¶ 7.) There remains a triable issue of fact regarding the creation of the dangerous condition.

County primarily argues it had no notice of the defect. However, the issue of notice is not dispositive. (See Gov Code §835 [a public entity is only liable for a dangerous condition of property if it either creates the condition or has actual or constructive notice of the condition.].).

Based on the foregoing, Cross-Defendant County of Los Angeles’ Motion for Summary Judgment or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication, is denied.

Defendant shall provide notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.

[1] Plaintiff also argues that there are large trees “that likely” would have been casting shadows.” (PUMF 20.) This allegation is speculative, and not supported by sufficient evidence.

[2] In light of the Court’s ruling, the Court declines to reach the City’s alternative arguments.

DEPT:	32
HEARING DATE:	November 21, 2023
CASE NUMBER:	21STCV13545
MOTIONS:	Motion for Summary Judgment
MOVING PARTY:	Defendant City of Santa Clarita
OPPOSING PARTY:	Plaintiff Mary Grady

DEPT:	32
HEARING DATE:	November 21, 2023
CASE NUMBER:	21STCV13545
MOTIONS:	Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication
MOVING PARTY:	Cross-Defendant County of Los Angeles
OPPOSING PARTY:	Cross-Complainant/Defendant City of Santa Clarita