Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV15870, Date: 2023-09-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV15870    Hearing Date: September 28, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

Plaintiff Maria Susana Gallegos sued defendant Los Angeles County Development Authority (Defendant), along with other defendants, for negligence and premises liability asserting it is responsible for a flood in her residence. Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s complaint in that (1) it fails to assert a statutory basis for negligence and premises liability since Defendant is a public entity; (2) fails to identity any defective aspect of the physical condition on the property; and (3) fails to allege notice.  No opposition was filed.

LEGAL STANDARD

The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.) “A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint).  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true.  (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)  No other extrinsic evidence can be considered.  (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862 [disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287] [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].) A demurrer can be utilized where the “face of the complaint” itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery.  (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-72.) 

MEET AND CONFER

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).)

Defendant’s counsel, Caroline Park, submits a proper declaration that a meet and confer took place by telephone. (Park Decl. ¶ 3–5.) Therefore, the meet and confer requirement is satisfied.

ANALYSIS

Government Code section 815 provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person” except as provided by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a); see Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932.) “[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.) Consequently, “public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable.”  (Tuthill v. City of San Buenaventura (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1088 (emphasis in the original). It has been recognized that it is impermissible to sue a public entity for common law negligence. (Torres v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850.)   

Moreover, to state a cause of action [for government tort liability] every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty.”  (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.)  

 As an initial matter, the Court on its own motion takes judicial notice that Defendant is a public entity as defined by the California Government Code.  (Gov. Code § 811.2 [“’Public entity includes . . . a county city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State.”].)

Here, the complaint alleges that on May 16, 2020, Plaintiff was ordered by a firefighter to evacuate her unit because of a water flood. She describes that as she was evacuating, she slipped and fell, causing injuries. Then, she alleges: “[a]s for Defendant Los Angeles County Development Authority and Foothill Villa Management Office, they failed to properly maintain the property that caused the pipes to leak and cause a flood. Plaintiff suffered injuries to her head, legs, hips, feet, aims and buttocks. Plaintiff is still undergoing treatment for her injuries.” (Complaint, 5, 6.)

Here, the complaint alleges causes of action for general negligence and premises liability without stating a specific statutory basis. Since Defendant is a public entity, all tort claims must be based on statute.

Additionally, if Plaintiff were to assert a claim under Government Code section 835, the Complaint pleads insufficient facts. Government Code section 835 states:¿“Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and either:¿ 

(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or¿¿ 

(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”¿¿ 

Here, the Complaint generally alleges that Defendant failed to properly manage its property. However, it does not plead the necessary elements with particularity.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend.

 Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 30 days.

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.