Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV16764, Date: 2023-08-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV16764    Hearing Date: August 21, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of an incident where Shaun Hampton (“Plaintiff”) visited a Subway restaurant on October 7, 2019, where he sat down on a chair which broke, causing him to fall and sustain injury. (First Amended Complaint, hereinafter, “FAC”, ¶ Prem.L-1.) As to Doctor’s Associates LLC dba Subway (“Defendant”), the FAC alleges one cause of action of premises liability.  

Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) on June 30, 2023. No opposition briefs were filed by any party.

LEGAL STANDARD – SUMMARY JUDGMENT

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]  There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)  Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied.  If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.  While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.  If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”  (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.”  (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].

DISCUSSION

            Defendant moves for summary judgment against Plaintiff on the grounds that it did not owe a duty to Plaintiff and it is not vicariously liable for Plaintiff’s injuries.

“The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) “Premises liability is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158, quotation marks omitted.) “The threshold element of a cause of action for negligence is the existence of a duty to use due care toward an interest of another that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion.” (Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com. v. Insomniac, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 803, 830.)

“The general rule is where a franchise agreement gives the franchisor the right of complete or substantial control over the franchisee, an agency relationship exists. ‘[I]t is the right to control the means and manner in which the result is achieved that is significant in determining whether a principal-agency relationship exists.’ ‘In the field of franchise agreements, the question of whether the franchisee is an independent contractor or an agent is ordinarily one of fact, depending on whether the franchisor exercises complete or substantial control over the franchisee.’” (Cislaw v. Southland Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1288 (alterations and emphasis in original, citations omitted).) “The answer [to whether a franchisor stands in an employment or agency relationship with the franchisee and its employees for purposes of holding it vicariously liable for workplace injuries] lies in the inherent nature of the franchise relationship itself.” (Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 478.)

In support of its arguments, Defendants offers the following facts:

-          Defendant Artashes Grigoryan is the Franchisee/ Independent Contractor and Owner of the Subway Franchise where the incident occurred. (UMF 4; Volume of Evidence (“VOE”) Exhs. B and C.)

-          Doctor’s Associates LLC dba Subway is the Subway Franchisor. (UMF 5; VOE Exh. C.)

-          Each Subway restaurant is independently owned and operated under a franchise agreement. (UMF 6; VOE Exh. D ¶ 6.)

-          Doctor’s Associates did not own, lease, occupy, control, operate, and/or maintain the premises of the Restaurant. (UMF 7; VOE Exh. D ¶ 9.)

-          The franchisee that owned, lease, occupied, controlled, operated and/or maintained the Restaurant was Artashes Grigoryan and the relationship was established by the Franchise Agreement between the franchisees and Doctor’s Associates. (UMF 8; VOE Exh. C; VOE Exh. D ¶ 7.)

-          Under the terms of the Franchise Agreement, the franchisees are “solely response for all costs of building and operating the Restaurant, including, but not limited to … furniture…” (UMF 11; VOE Exh. C, VOE Exh. D ¶ 7.)

-          The Franchise Agreement makes clear that Grigoryan must “always indicate his status as an independent franchised operator and franchisee to others and on any documents or information released by him in connection with the Restaurant.” (UMF 13; VOE Exh. C.)

-          The Franchise Agreement states that Artashes Grigoryan is not an agent, partner, or employee of Doctor’s Associates and the agreement does not create a partnership, joint venture, agency or fiduciary relationship and Doctor’s Associates is not responsible, jointly or severally, for any encumbrances undertaken by Artashes Grigoryan in relation to the franchise business. (UMF 14; VOE Exh. C.)

Defendant has set forth sufficient evidence that there is no triable issue of material fact that it owed a duty to Plaintiff or is vicariously liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. Defendant has established that it does not own, lease, control, operate, or maintain the premises of the subject location and that Grigoryan is solely responsible for all costs of building and operating the Restaurant. In addition, the agreement between the parties is that the sale of the franchise to Grigoryan does not create a partnership, joint venture, or any fiduciary relationship.

Neither Plaintiff nor Grigoryan have set forth evidence to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

CONCLUSION

            In considering the competent evidence proffered by Defendant, and viewing such evidence most favorably to Plaintiff, the Court finds that there are no triable issues of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action (premises liability) as to Defendant Doctor’s Associates LLC dba Subway.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Defendant shall give notice of the Court’s order and file a proof of service of such.