Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV20493, Date: 2024-01-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV20493    Hearing Date: January 9, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOVING PAPERS

1.      Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

2.      Memorandum of Points and Authorities

3.      Request for Judicial Notice

4.      Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

5.      Statement of Evidence in Support

OPPOSITION PAPERS

1.      Plaintiff’s Opposition

2.      Opposition to Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

3.      Plaintiff’s Index of Exhibits in Support

REPLY PAPERS

1.      Reply in Support of Motion

2.      Reply to Separate Statement

BACKGROUND

On June 1, 2021, Plaintiff Judicial Council of California (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendant County of Los Angeles (Defendant) for property damage after Defendant’s employee allegedly damaged Plaintiff’s property. On July 28, 2021, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint (FAC) alleging two causes of action for negligence and intentional tort.

Plaintiff alleges that on May 7, 2019, Defendant’s employee operated a motor vehicle while transporting individuals to the Edmund D. Edelman Children’s Court. The complaint alleges the employee drove the vehicle into a “Sally port roll-up door located at the exterior of the Courthouse” which Plaintiff manages, and caused damage. (FAC, 5–6.)

In the FAC, Plaintiff included attachment 1 which states the following:

“On November 1,2019, the Judicial Council of California presented a claim pursuant to Government Claims Act to the County of Los Angeles arising from damages related to the incident on May 7, 2019. The claim was presented upon a form provided by the County of Los Angeles and was presented to the Executive Officer, Board of Supervisors. On April 28, 2020, Nikita Gyawu, Claims Examiner for Carl Warren & Company, accepted the claim on behalf of the County of Los Angeles.”

Defendant now moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, arguing that the action is barred by the statute of limitations under Government Code section 945.6. Plaintiff opposes.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)  Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise.  If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)           

JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice of Plaintiff’s complaint, first amended complaint, and Defendant’s answer to the first amended complaint, filed November 1, 2021. (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

DISCUSSION

Government Claims Act

Pursuant to the Government Claims Act, a party with a claim for damages against a public entity must first timely present the claim directly with that entity.¿ The party may file a lawsuit only if the public entity denies or rejects the claim (either expressly or by operation of law). (Gov. Code §§ 905, 945.4; City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 894.)¿ The claims presentation requirement provides the public entity with an opportunity to evaluate the claim and decide whether to pay on the claim.¿ (Roberts v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 474.)¿

Government Code section 945.6 “provides two alternative statutes of limitation for causes of action under the Tort Claims Act where a claim filed with a public entity has been rejected.  If the public entity gives written notice of rejection of the claim in accordance with section 913, the statute of limitations is six months from the day such notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail. If such notice is not given in compliance with section 913, the statute of limitations is two years from accrual of the cause of action.”  (Dowell v. County of Contra Costa (1986) 173 Cal.App.3d 896, 900.) “[T]he mailed notices of rejection of claim … would trigger application of the six-month statute of limitations if the notices comply with the requirements of Government Code section 913 and they were mailed in the manner prescribed by section 915.2.” (Phay v. City and County of San Francisco (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 437, 443.) 

Section 913(a) provides written notice of rejection of a claim shall be given in the manner prescribed by Section 915.4.  (Govt. Code § 913(a).)  That section provides that notice shall be given by any of three methods, including by mail to “the address, if any, stated in the claim … as the address to which the person presenting the claim … desires notices to be sent…”  (Govt. Code § 915.4, subd. (a)(2).)  “The text is not ambiguous… .” (Cavey v. Tualla (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 310, 345 (finding the address stated on the claim was the plaintiff’s post office box address, and rejecting argument that notice had to be sent to attorney once counsel was retained notwithstanding plain meaning of statute).) 

“The two-year period of limitations obtains only when the notice was not served; the six-month rule applies if notice was served, even though not actually received by the claimant.” (Dowell, 173 Cal.App.3d at 901 (citation omitted.)  The court’s “focus is on the date of mailing, not the receipt of the notice.”  (Phay, 133 Cal.App.4th at 445.)  “[E]vidence of nonreceipt [may be] logically probative of nonmailing… absent contrary statutory authority…”  (Id.) 

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s action is barred by the statute of limitations because the complaint was filed beyond the six-month and two-year limits in section 945.6.

It is undisputed that on November 1, 2019, Plaintiff presented a government tort claim form and packet of documents to the County of Los Angeles. The tort claim form indicated that on May 7, 2019, a Los Angeles County Sheriff’s transportation bus hit and damaged the sally port roll up gate at Plaintiff’s facility, located at 201 Centre Plaza Drive, Monterey Park, CA. The tort claim form was signed by Maria Topete, a risk management analyst for Plaintiff. (UMF 1; Pl. Response.)

Defendant sets forth the following facts, which are disputed in part:

-          On March 13, 2020, Los Angeles County sent notice of its rejection of Plaintiff’s claim. (UMF 4.)

-          On September 4, 2020, County sent Plaintiff a Release and Settlement of Property Damage Claim. (UMF 5.)

-          At no time after sending the March 13, 2020 notice of rejection (SOE Exhibit 2) was there ever any agreement or representation by the County to Plaintiff that further contact between them would extend or alter in any way the meaning of the rejection letter or the six month statute of limitations that began to run on March 13, 2020. (UMF 6.)

-          Plaintiff filed its complaint on June 1, 2021 against County and DOES 1-100, alleging causes of action for Motor Vehicle negligence, and Intentional tort. (UMF 7.)

-          On August 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed its first amended complaint, containing the same causes of action against County as was in its original complaint. (UMF 8.)

Defendant does not provide evidence regarding the manner of service of the March 13, 2020 letter. The letter dated March 13, 2020 states: “As you know, your claim against the County of Los Angeles was rejected on March 13, 2020.” (SOE Ex. 2.) No other document is attached. There is no proof of service attached, nor does the declaration specify the manner in which this letter was sent. (Gyawu Dec. ¶ 4.) Assuming this letter constitutes a notice of rejection, even though it references another rejection on the same date which is not provided by Defendant,[1] without information regarding the manner of service, the Court cannot conclude based on the moving papers that the six-month limitation period applies.[2] However, Defendant alternatively argues that the two-year period applies if the rejection was not properly made. The complaint was filed on June 1, 2021, more that two years after the incident date of May 7, 2019.

In opposition, Plaintiff appears to assume that the six-month limitations period applies. Plaintiff contends that Ms. Topete did not see a letter purporting to reject the Plaintiff’s claim until December 2, 2020. In addition, the parties do not dispute that on April 28, 2020, Nikita Gyawu told Maria Topete that the County accepted its claim and asked for supporting invoices. (PAMF 1-2.) As a result, Plaintiff argues it relied on this assertion by Defendant’s agent and has thus raised issues of fact surrounding equitable estoppel.  

Equitable Estoppel

A public entity “may be estopped from asserting the limitations of the claims statute where its agents or employees have prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act.”  (Santos v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1075.)  “ ‘Estoppel most commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim.’ [Citation.] However, ‘[e]quitable estoppel does not require factually misleading statements.’ [Citations.] ‘[A]ctual fraud or the intent to mislead is not essential.’ ”  (Id. at 1075-76.)  However, “[r]eliance by the party asserting the estoppel on the conduct of the party to be estopped must have been reasonable under the circumstances.”  (Id. at 1076.)  

“Estoppel as a bar to a public entity’s assertion of the defense of noncompliance arises when the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the public entity was apprised of the facts, (2) it intended its conduct to be acted upon, (3) plaintiff was ignorant of the true state of facts, and (4) [the plaintiff] relied upon the conduct to his detriment.”  (Santos, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at 1076.)

“Whether equitable estoppel applies is normally a question of fact for the court to determine. [citations.] However, when the undisputed evidence is susceptible of only one reasonable inference, the existence of an estoppel is a question of law.” (Santos, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at 1076.)

Here, Plaintiff offers the following facts, which are not factually disputed:

-          Nikita Gyawu told Maria Topete on April 28, 2020, that the County accepted the JCC’s claim. (PAMF 1.)

-          On April 28, 2020, in connection with communicating that the County accepted the JCC’s claim, Mr. Gyawu asked Mr. Topete to forward invoices for repairs in the amount of $104,507.17. (PAMF 2.)

-          The JCC relied on Mr. Gyawu’s statement that the County accepted the JCC’s claim in delaying litigation. (PAMF 3.)

-          Maria Topete did not have knowledge of the March 13, 2020 letter attached to the County’s Statement of Evidence as Exhibit 2 until she saw it as part of the County’s motion for summary judgment on December 15, 2023. (PAMF 4.)

-          Maria Topete did not have knowledge of the March 13, 2020 letter sent by Stacy Luster on December 2, 2020, until Ms. Luster forwarded it on December 2, 2020. (PAMF 5.)

-          Maria Topete did not recommend that the JCC commence litigation until after Ms. Luster sent her a notice of rejection on December 2, 2020. (PAMF 6.)

Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact that Defendant should be estopped from asserting the limitations of the claims statute. In reply, Defendant argues that the rejection was effective the date it was mailed. (Reply at p. 2.) This argument, however, does not address whether there is a triable issue of fact regarding equitable estoppel, but rather relates to the applicable limitations period. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff did not act promptly when it received the notice of rejection in December of 2020. (Reply at pp. 2-3.) This argument does not establish the absence of a triable issue of fact regarding equitable estoppel. Finally, Defendant argues that equitable estoppel does not apply to the two-year limitations period, arguing that Defendant “did nothing to prevent Plaintiff from meeting this deadline.” (Reply at p. 3.) However, because Plaintiff argues that Defendant accepted the claim in April 2020, the same estoppel arguments apply regardless of which limitations period applies. Moreover, there remain triable issues as to which limitations period applies.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant County of Los Angeles’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication is DENIED.

            Defendant shall provide notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.