Judge Anne Hwang, Case Number: 21STCV20600, Date: 2024-06-14 Tentative Ruling

PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

1. Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment or Adjudication; Memorandum of Points and Authorities

1. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Adjudication

On June 2, 2021, Plaintiffs Dante Paul and Tumani Haskins (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants Slauson and Crenshaw Ventures, LLC, Domanique Blanton, and Does 1 to 100 for wrongful death. Plaintiffs allege that their son, Decedent Dominique Paul (“Decedent”) was stabbed on June 16, 2019, by Domanique Blanton (“Blanton”) on property owned by Defendant Slauson and Crenshaw Ventures, LLC (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “owned, operated, controlled, maintained and/or leased the real property commonly known as 3420 W. Slauson Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90043” which is a commercial shopping center. (Complaint ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs allege the former owner of this property received notice from the City of Los Angeles that the property was a site of gang activity and was ordered to abate the nuisance. (Complaint ¶ 10–11.) The former owner requested the tenants of the property to take measures to reduce the gang activity.

Plaintiffs allege that some tenants refused to reduce the gang activity and became “the incorporators, members, and/or managers” of Defendant in order to purchase the property to avoid eviction. (Complaint ¶ ¶ 14–15.) The complaint alleges these tenants were affiliated with the gang activity on the property “and/or benefited financially from the gang related activity.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs allege that on February 13, 2019, after Defendant purchased the property, the City of Los Angeles sent another letter informing Defendant, as the new owner, that the gang activity on the premises was a nuisance. (Id. ¶ 15.)

As to moving Defendant, Plaintiffs assert a single cause of action for “Negligence- Wrongful Death”. Plaintiffs allege that on June 16, 2019, Defendant

“so negligently, carelessly, and unlawfully owned, possessed, maintained, operated, supervised, managed, controlled, leased, and serviced the Property as follows: Defendants knowingly maintained a public nuisance on the Property as more specifically described in Paragraphs 11 and 15, all the while knowing that the Property and the unlawful criminal street gang element allowed to hangout at the Property posed a risk of danger to members of the public and interfered with the public’s safe and quiet use and enjoyment of the Property. Defendants also encouraged gang presence on the Property as it was a form of security to protect Defendants’ leasehold interests at the Property by offering a level of protection to shop owners without Defendants ever actually having to pay out of pocket for such services. Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein, by empowering gang members to control, govern, monitor or hangout and occupy the Property and by knowingly maintaining a public nuisance, created an environment that made decedent’s position worse by exposing him to the risk of confrontation by gang members with known criminal and violent propensities.”

Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant “knew or should have known that the conditions existing on the Property on June 16, 2019, could expose members to the public, like decedent herein, to an increased risk of harm, injury or death.” (Complaint ¶ 27.)

Defendant now moves for summary judgment, or alternatively for summary adjudication, arguing the following: (1) Defendant owed no duty because the incident did not occur on Defendant’s property; (2) Defendant owed no duty because there was no special relationship between Defendant and Decedent; (3) Defendant owed no duty because the criminal conduct was not sufficiently foreseeable; (4) Defendant did not cause the incident; and (5) the punitive damages claim is without merit.

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Id.)

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].) Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

The Court denies Plaintiffs’ requests for judicial notice as they have no effect on the ruling herein.

The Court declines to rule on the evidentiary objections brought by Plaintiffs and Defendant on the basis that they have no effect on the ruling herein.

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)

In general, “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714.) Section 1714 “establishes the default rule that each person has a duty to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 214.) “[T]he law imposes a general duty of care on a defendant only when it is the defendant who has created a risk of harm to the plaintiff, including when the defendant is responsible for making the plaintiff's position worse. [Citation.]” (Id. [internal quotation marks omitted].)

“The first element, duty, may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.” (Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1128, internal quotations omitted.) “Because a landlord has relinquished possessory interest in the land, his or her duty of care to third parties injured on the land is attenuated as compared with the tenant who enjoys possession and control. Thus, before liability may be thrust on a landlord for a third party's injury due to a dangerous condition on the land, the plaintiff must show that the landlord had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition in question, plus the right and ability to cure the condition. (Mata v. Mata (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1131–32.)

Here, Defendant argues three grounds for why it did not owe a duty to Decedent: it did not own the land where Decedent was stabbed, no special relationship existed, and the criminal conduct was not foreseeable. A motion for summary adjudication can only be granted if it completely disposes of an issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f)(1); see Catalano v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 91, 97 [“The purpose of the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f) was to stop the practice of piecemeal adjudication of facts that did not completely dispose of a substantive area.”].)

However, Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges a separate ground for imposing a duty that is not addressed in this motion. The complaint alleges that Defendant “knowingly maintained a public nuisance on the Property as more specifically described in Paragraphs 11 and 15, all the while knowing that the Property and the unlawful criminal street gang element allowed to hangout at the Property posed a risk of danger to members of the public and interfered with the public’s safe and quiet use and enjoyment of the Property.” (Complaint ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant encouraged the gang presence on the property. (Id.) Plaintiffs further allege that “Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein, by empowering gang members to control, govern, monitor or hangout and occupy the Property and by knowingly maintaining a public nuisance, created an environment that made decedent’s position worse by exposing him to the risk of confrontation by gang members with known criminal and violent propensities.” (Id.)

Therefore, the complaint sets forth an allegation that Defendant increased the risk of injury to Decedent and therefore owed a general duty of care. As a result, it was necessary to address this allegation in the motion and show that there was no triable issue of fact. (Lyons v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1018 [“In a motion for summary judgment, the issues are framed by the pleadings.”].) Defendant’s arguments regarding ownership of the property and a special relationship do not completely dispose of the issue of duty, and Defendant has not set forth the absence of a triable issue of fact regarding Plaintiff’s theory that Defendant encouraged and maintained gang activity, thereby creating or increasing a risk of harm.

Moreover, Plaintiffs have set forth triable issues of fact regarding Defendant’s ownership/ control. (See Plaintiff’s Resp. to UMF 11; PUMF 25, 27, 28.) Defendant relies heavily on the assertions that the stabbing occurred in the alley, which it did not own, and that decedent was not a patron of any store on June 16, 2019. Plaintiff, on the other hand, sets forth evidence that Decedent was on the property when the dispute which escalated into the stabbing occurred. (See PUMF 35-39.) Plaintiff further provides evidence that Defendant employed an individual to supervise the property, including the alley, and Defendant controlled who could access the alley.[1] (PUMF 25, 27, 33.)

Liability in a premises liability action is based not on responsibility for the conduct of others, but on the failure of the landowner or occupier to act reasonably under the circumstances when he or she has reason to anticipate the probability of injury and has an opportunity to prevent the injury or warn of the peril (Cody F. v. Falleti (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1242, Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 676 [a landowner’s duty to take steps to prevent the wrongful acts of a third party is imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated].) ¿

Traditionally, foreseeability of the risk does not necessarily turn on whether the same type of activity or event already occurred on the premises.¿ Rather, the issue is whether, in light of all the facts and circumstances (including the nature, condition and location of the premises, as well as the landlord's prior experience), the owner had reason to anticipate the general character of the event or harm, not its precise nature or manner of occurrence.¿ (Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 129.)¿ However, where a “burdensome” duty is to be imposed on the landowner (e.g., requiring private security guards or other heightened security measures), a “high degree of foreseeability” is required. And “the requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the landowner's premises.”¿ (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 679.)¿¿

Here, Defendant provides no facts in its separate statement regarding the foreseeability of criminal conduct. The Defendant therefore fails to meet its initial burden.

Accordingly, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds there are triable issues of fact regarding the existence of a duty of care.

“ ‘[T]he decision whether that breach caused the damage (that is, causation in fact) is again within the jury’s domain; but where reasonable men will not dispute the absence of causality, the court may take the decision from the jury and treat the question as one of law. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Constance B. v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 200, 207 (“Constance”) [italics in original].)¿Causation is established by showing that a defendant’s breach of duty was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff’s injury, and there is no legal rule relieving defendant from liability. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.) Defendant’s negligence is the actual cause, or cause in fact, of plaintiff’s injury if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. (Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1052.) “In other words, [the] plaintiff must show some substantial link or nexus between omission and injury.” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 778.)

The doctrine of proximate cause relieves defendants from liability for injuries they, in fact, caused, based on considerations of policy and justice. (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1205.) But proximate cause only becomes relevant after it has first been determined that defendant’s conduct was the cause in fact of plaintiff’s injury. (See Rest.2d Torts, § 431, subd. (a).)

Here, Defendant provides no facts in its separate statement regarding the absence of causation. Therefore, Defendant fails to meet its burden.[2]

Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.¿ (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)¿ “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.¿ (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)¿ “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’¿ [Citation.]”¿ (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)¿¿¿¿¿

“As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests.¿ The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.”¿ (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) (emphasis added.)¿ The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”¿ (Ibid.)¿ Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.¿ Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’”¿ (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)¿ Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.”¿ (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.)¿¿

“[M]alice is the basis for assessing punitive damages for nonintentional conduct; that is, acts performed without intent to harm. [Citation omitted.] Nonintentional conduct comes within the definition of malicious acts punishable by the assessment of punitive damages when a party intentionally performs an act from which he knows, or should know, it is highly probable that harm will result.” (Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co.¿(1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 374, 381.)¿A conscious disregard for the safety of others can constitute malice if the plaintiff establishes that “the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court¿(1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895–96.)

“[A]lthough the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard is a stringent one, it does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to “prove” a case for punitive damages at summary judgment. [Citation omitted.] However, where the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proof will be by clear and convincing evidence, the higher standard of proof must be taken into account in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, since if a plaintiff is to prevail on a claim for punitive damages, it will be necessary that the evidence presented meet the higher evidentiary standard.” (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton¿(2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1049.) “Summary judgment or summary adjudication on the issue of punitive damages is proper only when no reasonable jury could find the plaintiff's evidence to be clear and convincing proof of malice, fraud or oppression.” (Butte Fire Cases¿(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159) (internal quotations omitted.)¿¿

“When the defendant is a corporation, ‘[a]n award of punitive damages against a corporation ... must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees. But the law does not impute every employee's malice to the corporation.’ [Citation.] Instead, the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) ‘ “[M]anaging agent” ... include[s] only those corporate employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decisionmaking so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.’” (Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164.)

Here, the complaint does not allege a claim for punitive damages as to the first cause of action. Punitive damages are alleged as to the third cause of action, for intentional tort against defendant Blanton. (Complaint ¶ 43.)

Based on the foregoing, Defendant Slauson and Crenshaw Ventures, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication is DENIED.

[1] Defendant disputes the characterization of the testimony, but in this proceeding, the Court must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. (Reply at p. 7.) Defendant further argues that Herman Douglas was not employed by defendant at the time decedent was stabbed. (Reply at p. 12.) However, Douglas testified that Sam was his boss and paid him. (Pl. Exh. F. at 2179:28-2180:3.) Again, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff for purposes of summary judgment.

[2] The California Rules of Court states that the Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in support of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication must separately identify: each cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion; and each supporting material fact claimed to be without dispute with respect to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion. (Cal. Rules Court, rule 3.1350(d)(1).) “[A]ll material facts must be set forth in the separate statement. ‘This is the Golden Rule of Summary Adjudication: if it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist. Both the court and the opposing party are entitled to have all the facts upon which the moving party bases its motion plainly set forth in the separate statement.’” (United Community Church v. Garcin (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 337 [emphasis in original, citation omitted] [superseded by statute on other grounds] [“it is no answer to say the facts set out in the supporting evidence or memoranda of points and authorities are sufficient”].).

DEPT:	32
HEARING DATE:	June 14, 2024
CASE NUMBER:	21STCV20600
MOTIONS:	Motion for Summary Judgment or Adjudication
MOVING PARTY:	Defendant Slauson and Crenshaw Ventures, LLC
OPPOSING PARTY:	Plaintiffs Dante Paul and Tumani Haskins