Judge Anne Hwang, Case Number: 21STCV24369, Date: 2024-11-25 Tentative Ruling

PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

1. Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative for Summary Adjudication; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Anthony S. Ortiz

1. Plaintiff’s Opposition; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of L. Dean Smith. Jr. with Exhibits in Support

3. Plaintiff’s Amended Separate Statement in Opposition (filed 11/13, along with Notice of Errata Re: Plaintiff’s Separate Statement in Support)

On July 1, 2021, Plaintiff Eric Schiffer (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants William Chaise as Trustee of the William and Wrenn Chaise 1994 Trust; and Wrenn Chaise, as Trustee of the William and Wrenn Chaise 1994 Trust (“Defendants”). The complaint asserts breach of contract, negligence, and premises liability causes of action.

Plaintiff alleges that he leased property from Defendants, and was injured on July 5, 2019 after an external staircase on said property collapsed.

Defendants now move for summary judgment arguing that: (1) Defendants exercised reasonable care in the maintenance of the property; (2) Defendants did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the defect; and (3) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply. Defendants also alternatively move for summary adjudication against the breach of contract cause of action, arguing that Plaintiffs do not have and cannot reasonably obtain admissible evidence that Defendants breached the terms of the lease or failed to exercise reasonable care.[1]

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].) Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

The Court rules as follows on Defendants’ objections to Plaintiff’s evidence:

The Court declines to rule on objections 12 to 19 as they have no effect on the ruling herein.

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of exhibits A to F. (See Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 [only relevant material is subject to judicial notice], overruled on other grounds by In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257.)

The Court grants Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of exhibit G, the complaint in this action.

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.) The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)

“The owner of premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm.” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619; see Civil Code § 1714.) Stated differently, because a property owner is not the insurer of the safety of its guests, the owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is key to establishing liability. (Hall v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1139-1140; Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206 [“to impose liability for injuries suffered by an invitee due to a defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises”] [cleaned up].)

“Historically, the public policy of this state generally has precluded a landlord's liability for injuries to his tenant or his tenant's invitees from a dangerous condition on the premises which comes into existence after the tenant has taken possession.”¿ (Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 510; Mora v. Baker Commodities, Inc. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 771, 778.)¿This policy is based on the principle that the landlord has surrendered possession and control of the land to the tenant and has no right to enter without permission. (Uccello, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at 511.)

A commercial landowner[3] “owed no duty to appellant for defective conditions which occurred after the property was transferred to its commercial tenant(s) if the premises were reasonably safe at the time the tenant(s) took possession.” (Mora, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at 781.) However, “[a]t the time the lease is executed and upon renewal a landlord has a right to reenter the property, has control of the property, and must inspect the premises to make the premises reasonably safe from dangerous conditions.” (Id.) “Even if the commercial landowner executes a contract which requires the tenant to maintain a property in a certain condition, the landlord is obligated at the time the lease is executed to take reasonable precautions to avoid unnecessary danger.” (Id.) The court has held that “when a landlord renews a lease or re-leases the premises to the same tenant, the very making of a new lease shows that at the time the landlord has a right of entry to the premises, and logically, having a right to enter the landlord must remedy the defect.” (Id. at 782 [citations and alterations omitted].) “However, the landlord’s responsibility to inspect is limited. Like a residential landlord, the duty to inspect charges the lessor ‘only with those matters which would have been disclosed by a reasonable inspection.” (Id. [citations omitted]; but see Garcia v. Holt (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 600, 605 [no duty to inspect for a month-to-month lease unless actual notice].)

“‘Breach of duty is usually a fact issue for the jury; if the circumstances permit a reasonable doubt whether the defendant’s conduct violates the standard of due care, the doubt must be resolved by the jury as an issue of fact rather than of law by the court. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Constance B. v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 200, 207 (“Constance”).)

The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff.” (Coles v. Glaser (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 384, 391, internal quotations omitted.) “Whether a breach is material is usually left to the trier of fact ‘to determine from all the facts and circumstances shown in evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Schellinger Brothers v. Cotter (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 984, 1002.)

The following relevant facts are undisputed. Defendants purchased the beachfront property located at 19232 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, California (the "Property") in February of 2018. (UMF 1.) In connection with the purchase of the Property, Defendants hired Elite Group Inspection Professionals (“Elite”) who conducted an inspection of the entire Property for conditions that can be a safety hazard or issues that required maintenance and repairs. (UMF 2.) Elite's employee, Chris Gilstrap, a certified home inspector, performed the home inspection of the Property on January 18, 2018 and prepared the Elite Inspection Report. (UMF 3.) Defendant Wrenn Chais was present on the Property during the Elite inspection. The Elite inspector who inspected the property did not verbally or otherwise communicate to Wrenn that he had discovered any defect in the Stairway or suspected or believed the Stairway was unsafe or required any repair. (UMF 6.) The Property is Defendants’ primary residence. (UMF 10.)

Defendants entered into a short term lease agreement with Plaintiff on June 19, 2019 for the lease of the Property for a term of 7 days from July 1, 2019 to July 8, 2019. Paragraph 28 of the Lease states that “if by no fault of Tenant, Premises are totally or partially uninhabitable, either Landlord or Tenant may terminate this Agreement by Giving the other written notice. Rent shall be abated as of the date the Premises become totally or partially uninhabitable.” (UMF 15.)

Chris Gilstrap does not know whether the staircase at issue in this case was in any way defective on the day of the inspection performed in connection with Defendants purchase of the property in 2018. (UMF 23.) Chris Gilstrap has no recollection of using the staircase at issue in this case during his home inspection in 2018 and does not recall how he got underneath the house to inspect the foundation. (UMF 24.)

- Since purchasing the Property, Defendants inspected the subject staircase on a regular basis. (UMF 11.)

- Before the subject incident, Defendants regularly utilized the staircase without incident. Defendants, their family and guests, regularly used the Stairway to access the beach and never became aware that the stairs were loose, unstable or potentially unsafe. (UMF 12.)

- Defendants used the staircase to access the beach multiple times per week since purchasing the Property in February of 2018. (UMF 13.)

- Defendants were never notified by any of the inspectors, contractors or workmen that inspected or used the Stairway that it was potentially unsafe or required repair or upgrade. (UMF 14.)

- On June 30, 2019, one day prior to the commencement of the lease term, Wrenn Chais cleaned and inspected the entire Property, including the subject Stairway, to ensure everything was functioning and safe for Plaintiff’s tenancy. (UMF 16.)

- Wrenn Chais also walked up and down the Stairway thereby confirming that no steps were loose or broken on that day. (UMF 17.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the staircase was defective because it was attached to the landing without being anchored at the base. (See Pl. Resp. UMF 17.) A photograph of the stairs after the incident shows that the stairs were detached from the landing and laying on the ground below the landing. (See Smith Decl., Exh. A.) Plaintiff provides the declaration of Jeff Hughes, who after viewing the photographs of the stairs after the incident, opines the following:

“These images depict that the wood of the steps contain longitudinal cracks running with the wood grain along the length of the stair rendering the stair step unstable and dangerous to walk on. It is apparent from the photographs that the condition of the stairs is long standing, and predated Plaintiff’s fall by at least one year to six months. The significance of the cracks in the stairs is that it is clear that the stairs have not been adequately maintained for at least one year to six months.”

He further declares that the photographs show the stairs were improperly attached to the landing. Hughes declares in part:

“Those photographs demonstrate that the stairs were attached to the fascia of the landing by metal screws and wooden brackets. Stainless steel brackets and screws should have been used because they are more corrosion-resist, especially in marine environments like the subject property and stairs. It also appears that the stairs' base is only a few feet from the ocean and beach. It does not appear that the base of the stairs was attached or secured at that location, making it susceptible to wear and tear from the ebb and flow of the tide and storms. This is particularly problematic because the stairs are not correctly attached to the landing. The ebb and flow of the tide would put extreme pressure on the weakest link of the stairs increasing the likelihood they would fail and detach from the landing as they appear to have done in this matter.”

Plaintiff also argues there is a question of fact whether the inspection of the property was reasonable since the only professional inspection took place on January 18, 2018, about a year and a half before the incident. Plaintiff also contends there is a question of fact of whether the subject stairs were inspected. Chris Gilstrap (“Gilstrap”), who conducted the date inspection, testified that he could not recall whether he used the subject staircase. (Def. Exh. 5, Gilstrap Depo. 63:10-17.) Gilstrap also testified that he does not know if the staircase was defective on the date of the inspection. (Id., Gilstrap Depo. 65:10-17.)

Therefore, based on the above, even if Defendants met their initial burden, there is a triable issue of fact regarding whether a reasonable inspection could have revealed the defect. There is also an issue of fact whether the January 18, 2018 Elite inspection covered the subject staircase and, even if it did, whether Wrenn Chais’ June 30, 2019 inspection was reasonable. Therefore, there is a triable issue of fact regarding the negligence and premises liability causes of action.[4]

Turning to the breach of contract cause of action, on which Defendants seek summary adjudication, the Court first notes that the separate statement fails to separately identify this under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d). Next, Defendants seek adjudication on this cause of action by arguing that the stairs did not render the property totally or partially uninhabitable. (Motion, 17.) However, Defendants also rely on the argument that they lacked actual or constructive notice and did not fail to maintain the property. (Motion, 18.) Nevertheless, Defendants’ Lease Agreement in exhibit B appears to be Plaintiff’s application to rent the premises and does not contain the relevant terms. Therefore, Defendants fail to meet their initial burden to establish there was no breach of contract.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants William Chais and Wrenn Chais, as Trustees of the William and Wrenn Chais 1994 Trust’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication is DENIED.

Defendants shall provide notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.

[1] The hearing for this motion was originally scheduled for March 6, 2025. On March 7, 2024, Defendants filed and served notice that the hearing date was re-scheduled to the instant date: November 25, 2024.

[2] Plaintiff’s opposition was filed on November 12, 2024. In reply, Defendants argue it should be stricken since it was not timely filed. (Reply, 3-4.) The opposition must be filed and served at least fourteen days before the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(2).) Fourteen days before the present hearing was November 11, 2024, which was a Court holiday. Nevertheless, the Court exercises its discretion to consider the opposition papers. (See Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 765 [“A trial court has broad discretion under rule 3.1300(d) of the Rules of Court to refuse to consider papers served and filed beyond the deadline without a prior court order finding good cause for late submission.”].)

[3] Although Mora involved a commercial landowner, the same reasoning appears to apply to residential landowners. (See, e.g., Mora, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at 780 [discussing heightened responsibilities of residential landlords compared with commercial landlords].)

[4] Given this conclusion, the Court declines to address Defendants argument that res ipsa loquitur does not apply. (Motion, 16.)

DEPT:	32
HEARING DATE:	November 25, 2024
CASE NUMBER:	21STCV24369
MOTIONS:	Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative for Summary Adjudication
MOVING PARTY:	Defendants William Chais as Trustee of the William and Wrenn Chais 1994 Trust; and Wrenn Chais, as Trustee of the William and Wrenn Chais 1994 Trust
OPPOSING PARTY:	Plaintiff Eric Schiffer