Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV25206, Date: 2023-09-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV25206    Hearing Date: September 15, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Francisco Rodriguez filed this action against Francisco Cervantes Magana (Defendant) and Cervantes Trucking for damages resulting from a car accident. Plaintiff moves to quash Defendant’s subpoenas for Plaintiff’s employment records and seeks monetary sanctions. The motion is unopposed.

Plaintiff argues the subpoena for his employment records is (1) an invasion of his privacy; (2) or in the alternative, overly broad in scope.

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure § 1987.1(a) provides:

If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

[E]ven when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must then be a careful balancing of the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy.¿ . . . [I]f an intrusion on the right of privacy is deemed necessary under the circumstances of a particular case, any such intrusion should be the minimum intrusion necessary to achieve its objective . . . [meaning] the least intrusive means to satisfy the interest.¿ Mere convenience of means or cost will not satisfy that test for that would make expediency and not the compelling interest the overriding value.¿ (Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1854-1855 [internal quotes and citations omitted].) 

When evaluating invasions of the right to privacy in discovery, the party asserting a privacy right must establish “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865.) A responding party may prevail by negating any of these three elements “or by pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense, that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests.” (Id.) “[T]he party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 533.) A court then balances these competing considerations. (Id.) As guidance in balancing these competing considerations, it should be noted, “[o]nly obvious invasions of interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Id.) When lesser interests are at stake, “the strength of the countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information var[ies] according to the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and protective measures.” (Id.) 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 provides that “the court may in its discretion award the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing [a motion to quash], including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc. section 1987.2(a).)  

DISCUSSION

The subpoena at issue requests the following from Plaintiffs employer, In-Home Supportive Services:

All documents and records, including employment application, work absence records, medical reports, incident reports, pre-employment medical examination, employee progress reports and disciplinary actions pertaining to the employment of FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ from the first date to, and including, the present.

(Espinosa-Ulloa Decl., Exh. 1.)

Plaintiff argues the records are irrelevant since he is no longer seeking a loss of earning capacity claim. Even though the Complaint prays for lost earning and lost earning capacity, Plaintiff provides evidence that he offered to formally stipulate to opposing counsel he will not pursue that claim. (Espinosa-Ulloa Decl., Exh. 2.) Since Defendant has not opposed the motion, Defendant has not justified the subpoena. Therefore, the subpoena for records from In-Home Supportive Services is quashed.

Plaintiff also requests $2,060.00 in sanctions pursuant to CCP §§ 1987.1 and 2023.010 (a). Monetary sanctions are warranted because Defendant has not established substantial justification or that the award of sanctions would be unjust. However, the amount requested is excessive. The Court awards sanctions in the amount of $560, consisting of 2 hours of attorney time at $250 per hour plus the $60 filing fee.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to quash subpoena.

The Court orders Defendant and his counsel of record to pay sanctions in the amount of $560 to counsel for Plaintiff.

Plaintiff to provide notice and file a proof of service of such.