Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV26215, Date: 2024-03-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV26215    Hearing Date: March 18, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

            On July 16, 2021, Plaintiff Feliciano Sarabia (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Patricia Hernandez and Does 1 to 50 for negligence resulting from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on July 16, 2019.

            On October 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint, substituting Miguel Magallon as Doe 1.

Specially Appearing Defendant Miguel Magallon (“Magallon”) now moves to quash the Doe Amendment. No opposition has been filed.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes:¿ (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10(a).)¿The motion must be filed on or before the last day on which the defendant must plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow. (Id.)  

California Code of Civil Procedure section 474 permits the designation of a defendant by a fictitious name when the plaintiff is ignorant of the defendant’s name.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 474.)  “Section 474 allows a plaintiff in good faith to delay suing particular persons as named defendants until he has knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable person to believe liability is probable.” (Dieckmann v. Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 345, 363.) “Absent compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 474, service of a summons on a purported Doe defendant is ineffective.”  (Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145; see also McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.368, 375 [“‘[i]f the terms of . . .  section 474 have not been complied with, the purported defendant has not been named as such in the complaint.  A service upon one not named in a complaint does not confer jurisdiction to proceed upon the complaint against him, and a motion to quash is proper’”] [quoting Maier Brewing Co. v. Flora Crane Service, Inc. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 873, 875].)

“First, section 474 includes an implicit requirement that a plaintiff may not ‘unreasonably delay’ his or her filing of a Doe amendment after learning a defendant’s identity.  Second, a defendant named in an action by a Doe amendment under section 474 may challenge the amendment by way of an evidence-based motion, which argues that the plaintiff ‘unreasonably delayed’ his or her filing of the challenged amendment.  Third, ‘unreasonable delay’ within the meaning of ‘Barrows’ includes a prejudice element, which requires a showing by the defendant that he or she would suffer prejudice from plaintiff’s delay in filing the Doe amendment.”  (A.N. v. County of Los Angeles (2009), 171 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067 (citing Barrows v. American Motors [Corp.] (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 1, 9.)

“When a defendant is properly named under section 474, the amendment relates back to the filing date of the original complaint. [citation.] Section 474 provides a method for adding defendants after the statute of limitations has expired, but this procedure is available only when the plaintiff is actually ignorant of the facts establishing a cause of action against the party to be substituted for a Doe defendant.” (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 371–72.)

Section 474 allows a named defendant to be substituted for a fictitious defendant if, at the time of filing the complaint, the plaintiff was genuinely unaware of the named defendant’s identity or of facts giving rise to a cause of action against the named defendant who was otherwise known to the plaintiff. (San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coalition v California Coastal Com. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 563, 579.) The plaintiff’s lack of knowledge must be real and not feigned, but whether the plaintiff’s ignorance was due to misinformation or negligence is irrelevant. (Balon v Drost (1993) 20 CA4th 483, 488.) The relation back doctrine does not apply when a plaintiff had constructive notice of the identity of a fictitiously named defendant. (Organization Comunidad de Alviso v City of San Jose (2021) 60 CA5th 783, 795.) 

Code Civ. Procedure section 335.1 provides that the statute of limitations for personal injury and wrongful death actions is two years from the date of the injury. 

DISCUSSION

First, Magallon argues that Plaintiff unreasonably delayed in filing the amendment and Magallon is prejudiced. Magallon also argues section 474 and the relation back doctrine do not apply.

Here, Magallon asserts he was the driver of a vehicle in the subject motor vehicle accident. The named Defendant Patricia Hernandez was the policyholder for the vehicle Magallon was driving. (Deenihan Decl. ¶ 2–3.) Magallon provides a January 23, 2020 demand letter from Plaintiff’s attorney, directed to State Farm, which identifies Magallon as the driver of the vehicle in this incident. (Id. ¶ 5, Exh. B.) Therefore, Magallon has shown that Plaintiff had knowledge of Magallon and his role in this incident, at the time of filing the complaint on July 16, 2021. Since the incident occurred on July 16, 2019, the statute of limitations expired on July 16, 2021, when the complaint was filed. Plaintiff does not oppose this motion, and thus offers no contrary evidence.

Therefore, since the evidence shows that Plaintiff was aware of Magallon’s identity and the facts establishing his potential liability when the complaint was filed, the relation back doctrine does not apply and the action against Magallon is time barred. The motion to quash is granted. Because the motion is granted, the Court declines to address Magallon’s arguments regarding unreasonable delay and prejudice.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, the motion to quash service of the Doe Amendment is GRANTED.

            Magallon shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.