Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV34894, Date: 2023-11-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV34894 Hearing Date: November 7, 2023 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the
Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent
authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
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DEPT: |
32 |
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HEARING DATE: |
November
7, 2023 |
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CASE NUMBER: |
21STCV34894 |
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MOTIONS: |
Motion
for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication |
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Defendant Mark Mikhael, M.D. |
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OPPOSING PARTY: |
Plaintiff
Linda Van Cleave, in pro per |
MOVING PAPERS
1. Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary
Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication; Declaration of Scott
Forman, M.D. and Adam R. James in Support thereof
2. Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
3. Appendix of Exhibits of Defendant
OPPOSITION PAPERS
1. Plaintiff’s Response to Notice of Motion and
Motion of Defendant, Mark Mikhael, M.D., for Summary Judgment
2. Plaintiff’s Response to Undisputed Material
Facts and Evidence
3. Appendix of Exhibits of Plaintiff in Support
REPLY PAPERS
1.
Reply to
Plaintiff’s Opposition
BACKGROUND
On September 22, 2021, Plaintiff Linda Van
Cleave (Plaintiff) filed a complaint, in pro per, against Defendant Mark M.
Mikhael, M.D. (Defendant) for medical malpractice involving a surgery to repair
Plaintiff’s hammer toe.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative,
summary adjudication, arguing that (1) he did not breach the standard of care;
(2) Plaintiff cannot prove causation; and (3) the action is barred by the
statute of limitations.
LEGAL
STANDARD
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion
that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if,
and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the
underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with
the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment
bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the
nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of
production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie
showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.;
Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474
[summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary
adjudication motions].) Further, in line
with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary
adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as
to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable
issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise
Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)
“On a summary judgment motion, the
court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder
could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this
manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify
issues rather than to determine issues.
Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the
issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues
must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75
Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)
Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a
factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary
judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840
[cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or
summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the
light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party”].)
DISCUSSION
1.
LEGAL STANDARDDS – PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
“Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) establishes the general duty
of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the
safety of others. When applied to medical professionals, this duty of care
imposes a duty to use such skill, prudence and diligence as other members of
his profession commonly possess and exercise.” (Flores v. Liu (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 278, 290 [cleaned up].) To prevail on a claim for negligence
against a medical professional, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) a
medical professional had a duty to use the skill, prudence and diligence that
members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) breach of that
duty; (3) an injury that resulted from the breach of that duty; and (4) actual
loss or damage resulting from the breach of that duty. (Banerian v. O’Malley
(1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 604, 612.)
“[T]he legal standard of care required by doctors is the standard of
practice required by their own profession. The courts require only that
physicians and surgeons exercise in diagnosis and treatment that reasonable
degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by
members of the medical profession under similar circumstances. Thus, liability
is not found, and the label of malpractice is not placed upon a physician's
actions, unless some deviation by the physician from the standard of care that
his peers consider appropriate in the situation under review is proven.” (Burgess
v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1081 [cleaned up].)
Expert testimony is generally the only admissible and relevant
evidence on whether a medical professional has breached the standard of care. (Landeros
v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 410 [“ ‘The standard of care against which
the acts of a physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the
knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and
can only be proved by their testimony (citations), unless the conduct required
by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman’
”].) As the Court of Appeal has held, in reversing summary judgments for
medical professionals: “The standard of care against which the acts of a
physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of
experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be
proved by their testimony. California courts have incorporated the expert
evidence requirement into their standard for summary judgment in medical
malpractice cases. When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his
motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community
standard of care, defendant is entitled to summary judgment unless the
plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.” (Hanson v. Grode
(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 606-607 [cleaned up].) Further, a plaintiff “is
entitled to all favorable inferences that may reasonably be derived from” an
expert’s declaration which must be liberally construed. (See Fernandez v.
Alexander (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 770, 782.)
2. STANDARD
OF CARE – BREACH AND CAUSATION
Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant breached
the standard of care in his treatment and care of Plaintiff, nor that an act or
omission by Defendant caused or contributed to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.
Here, Defendant offers the
following facts, based on the declaration of Dr. Scott K. Forman, M.D.:
-
MARK MIKHAEL, M.D. complied with the applicable
standard of care in the care and treatment of LINDA VAN CLEAVE. (UMF 5.)
-
There were appropriate indications for surgery for Ms.
Van Cleave. Dr. Mikhael properly performed the bunionectomy and correction of
the left second hammertoe using the appropriate medical judgment in performing
the surgery. Based on the subsequent imaging studies, Dr. Mikhael obtained the
proper result. This was confirmed at the December 27, 2019, post-operative
visit when the x-rays showed proper alignment. Further, when the patient
returned on January 10, 2020, the x-rays again looked “good”, showed the proper
alignment and there was no interval change. On January 17, 2020, Ms. Van Cleave
stated that she noticed that the toes were starting to drift and she expressed
some concern. Dr. Mikhael’s examination noted that alignment is satisfactory.
Dr. Mikhael complied with the standard of care as he advised her to return in
two weeks for follow-up care. When Ms. Van Cleave returned on January 31, 2020,
x-rays revealed that the screw in the second metatarsal had failed. This
resulted in the toe drifting laterally. Dr. Mikhael acted appropriately in
recommending that she weight bear with a supportive shoe. Further, it was
appropriate to advise her that if the toe became painful, she would be
candidate for another surgery. Ms. Van Cleave was advised to follow up in two
months but did not do so. Thus, MARK MIKHAEL, M.D., complied with the standard
of care in his treatment of Linda Van Cleave. (UMF 6.)
-
No act or omission by MARK MIKHAEL, M.D., caused or
contributed to the injuries alleged by LINDA VAN CLEAVE. (UMF 7.)
-
The procedure was properly performed and resulted in
appropriate anatomical alignment. Plaintiff suffered a known complication from
foot surgery which required a second surgery. Plaintiff signed the informed
consent, and this complication occurs in 10-20% of these surgeries and occurred
in the absence of negligence. Ms. Van Cleave was at an increased risk for the
complication due to her pre-existing neuropathy. When Ms. Van Cleave initially
presented to Dr. Hirschbein, he proceeded with the same plan as Dr. Mikhael:
i.e. to continue to provide supportive wide toe box shoes and taping of the
second toe. Dr. Hirschbein provided a cortisone shot due to arthritis and sent
her for nerve conduction studies due to her neuropathy. Conservative treatment
occurred for another year until Dr. Hirschbein performed surgery on July 21,
2021. Further, even if plaintiff proceeded to surgery in February of 2020 (with
Dr. Mikhael), she more likely than not, would have had the same outcome. There
was no reason to perform surgery in February of 2020 or July of 2020. Surgery
is only required when the patient has pain; crooked/ugly toes are not a reason
to perform surgery. Thus, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, no act
or omission by MARK MIKHAEL, M.D., caused or contributed to the alleged
injuries in this case. (UMF 8.)
Defendant has met his initial
burden of showing that Plaintiff will be unable to establish that Defendant
breached the standard of care with respect to the treatment and care of
Plaintiff, or that Defendant’s breach of the standard of care caused or
contributed to Plaintiff’s claimed injuries. Defendant has presented expert
testimony by Dr. Forman, who is board certified in orthopedics and has
specialized in foot and ankle injuries since 1992. (Forman Decl. ¶ 2, 8.) Therefore,
the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish a triable issue of fact.
Plaintiff does not set forth expert
testimony rebutting Defendant’s evidence. Instead, Plaintiff argues that her
expert, Dr. Hirschbein, who performed Plaintiff’s subsequent surgery, is
willing to testify in the future. (See Opp., 34.) However, because this medical
issue is outside the knowledge of laypersons, Plaintiff must present expert
testimony to meet her burden. Because no conflicting expert evidence has been
presented to oppose the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff fails to meet
her burden to raise a triable issue of material fact.
Accordingly, the Court grants the
motion for summary judgment.[1]
CONCLUSION AND
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Mark
Mikhael, M.D.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant shall file a
proposed judgment within 10 days.
Defendant shall
provide notice of the Court’s order and file a proof of service of such.
[1] In light
of the Court’s ruling, the Court declines to reach Defendant’s alternative
argument regarding the statute of limitations.