Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV35189, Date: 2023-10-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV35189    Hearing Date: March 21, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

On September 24, 2021 Plaintiff Elia Rosa Mercado Leiva (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Mickey Vasquez (“Vasquez”), Red Bull North America, Inc., and Does 1 to 50 for negligence resulting from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 30, 2021. Vasquez was allegedly operating a vehicle while in the scope of employment with Red Bull. Plaintiff also alleges that Red Bull negligently “operated, owned, entrusted, managed, maintained, and/or repaired the subject motor vehicle.” (Complaint, 6.) On August 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed amendments to the complaint, substituting Red Bull Distribution Company, Inc. as Does 1, 11, 21, and 31.

On December 4, 2023, Plaintiff served an amended deposition notice on Red Bull Distribution Company’s person most qualified (“PMQ”) for five topics (25 to 29) related to Defendant Vasquez’s pay, incentives and Red Bull sales quotas.  (Vargas Decl., Exh E.) Defendants served objections on January 5, 2024. (Vargas Decl. ¶ 10, Exh. F, G.)

Defendants Red Bull North America, Inc., Red Bull Distribution Company, Inc., and Mickey Vasquez (“Defendants”) now move to quash the Notice of taking the deposition of Red Bull’s PMQ as to topics 25 to 29, to stay taking the deposition as to topics 25 to 29, and for a protective order excusing Defendants from responding to further discovery requests on these topics. Plaintiff opposes and Defendant replies.

LEGAL STANDARD

In response to a deposition notice, “[i]n addition to serving [a] written objection, a party may also move for an order staying the taking of the deposition and quashing the deposition notice. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. The taking of the deposition is stayed pending the determination of this motion.

The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to quash a deposition notice, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

(Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.410(c), (d).)

Additionally, before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025. 420(a).)

The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.420(b).)

Similarly, courts must restrict the frequency or extent of a discovery method such as oral depositions or inspection of documents if it determines either of the following:

“(1) The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.

(2) The selected method of discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2019.030.) This can be done by moving for a protective order.

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.)  

MEET AND CONFER

The declaration of Susan Vargas states that on January 8, 2024, the parties met and conferred by telephone but could not reach an agreement. Therefore, it appears the meet and confer requirement has been met. (Vargas Decl. ¶ 10.)

DISCUSSION

When the accident occurred, Vasquez was working as a Red Bull Account Sales Manager. The amended deposition notice sought testimony regarding Vasquez’s commission and incentives offered to him on the date of the incident, as well as the “monthly key performance indicator volume target” for April 2021. Defendants argue that the information is irrelevant because the evidence shows that Vasquez was not speeding. Plaintiff argues this information is relevant to whether Vasquez was distracted on the day of the incident due to unreasonable delivery expectations from Red Bull. (Opp., 2.) Plaintiff sets forth Vasquez’s testimony that he was aware of incentive and bonus programs, but he did not know about his overtime. (Opp., pp 4-5.)

In reply, Defendants state that two days prior to filing the opposition, Plaintiff served an amended deposition notice which renders the motion to quash and stay moot. (Reply, 1.) However, Defendants argue the new notice requests information on the same topics and ask the Court to grant a protective order based on discovery requests in the prior notice.[1] (Reply, 2.)

Plaintiff’s argument apparently is not that Vasquez’s compensation structure incentivized speeding, but rather that it led to Vasquez’s failure to exercise due care in driving more generally. The Court cannot find that such evidence is not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.

The Court agrees, however, that such requests should be narrowly tailored to the purpose for which they are sought. Specifically, as indicated in Plaintiff’s opposition, the following demands appear to be discoverable: (1) what commission Vasquez was to earn for his work on April 30, 2021 and what he did earn for that day from his employer, (2) the monthly key performance indicator for Vasquez for the month of April 2021, from his employer, and (3) what incentives were offered to Vasquez for his work on April 30, 2021, from his employer. (Opposition at p. 8.)

As narrowed to these topics, the Court overrules Defendant’s privacy objection.  “The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. [Citation omitted.] In Hill, [the California Supreme Court] established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation omitted.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. [citation omitted].” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 533 (citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)  

“[Prior] cases correctly recognize that when a discovery request seeks information implicating the constitutional right of privacy, to order discovery simply upon a showing that the Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 test for relevance has been met is an abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.] But they also stand for the proposition that whenever discovery of facially private information is sought, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate a “ ‘compelling state interest’ ” [citation omitted] or “compelling need” [citation omitted]. Although in this they are not alone [citation omitted], they nevertheless are incorrect.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) “To the extent prior cases require a party seeking discovery of private information to always establish a compelling interest or compelling need, without regard to the other considerations articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., [citation omitted], they are disapproved.” (Id. at 557.) 

“Only obvious invasions of interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) When lesser interests are at stake, “the strength of the countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information var[ies] according to the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and protective measures.” (Id.) “The trial courts in exercising their discretion should keep in mind that the Legislature has suggested that, where possible, the court should impose partial limitations rather than outright denial of discovery.” (Id. at 559 [quotation omitted].) 

Here, though Defendants articulate a privacy interest in confidential financial information, they fail to show a threatened intrusion that is serious, considering that the Court will limit the discovery to the day of the incident.

Therefore, Defendants’ motion to quash and stay is denied as moot. Defendants’ motion for a protective order is denied in part and granted to the extent that Plaintiff seeks discovery beyond the topics set forth above.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to quash and stay the Notice of taking the deposition of Red Bull’s PMQ as to topics 25 to 29 is denied as moot. Defendants’ motion for a protective order is denied in part and granted in part.

Defendants shall give notice and file a proof of service of such.