Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV36211, Date: 2023-12-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV36211    Hearing Date: January 22, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOVING PAPERS

1.      Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities

2.      Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

3.      Separate Bound Volume of Evidence in Support

OPPOSITION PAPERS

1.      Plaintiff’s Opposition; Memorandum of Points and Authorities

2.      Plaintiff’s Separate Statement in Opposition

3.      Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections

4.      Plaintiff’s Separate Bound Volume of Evidence in Support

REPLY PAPERS

1.      Reply in support of Motion for Summary Judgment

2.      Objection to Plaintiff’s Evidence

SUR-REPLY PAPERS

1.      Plaintiff’s Opposition

2.      Defendant’s Sur-Reply

BACKGROUND

On October 1, 2021, Plaintiff Xochitl Alvarez Espindola (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants GetAround, Inc., Luke Mitchell Crawford, and Does 1 to 50 for negligence, negligence per se, and statutory liability surrounding a motor vehicle accident. On January 15, 2021, Plaintiff alleges she was injured in a motor vehicle accident by Defendant Luke Mitchell Crawford (Crawford), who was driving a vehicle procured through a rideshare program operated by Moving Defendant GetAround, Inc. (GetAround).

GetAround moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. GetAround argues it is in the business of renting vehicles, and thus not vicariously liable through the Federal Graves Amendment. It also argues it did not own or control the subject vehicle and is not liable for negligence entrustment. Plaintiff opposes.

At the hearing on the motion on December 6, 2023, Defendant raised an argument not addressed by the Plaintiff. The Court granted Plaintiff’s request for additional time to file a supplemental opposition. Plaintiff and Defendant filed supplemental papers.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) ¿“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)  Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise.  If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.) 

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)           

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The Court declines to rule on the evidentiary objections because they do not affect the ruling herein.

DISCUSSION

Negligence and Negligent Entrustment

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)

Generally, “one who places or entrusts his [or her] motor vehicle in the hands of one whom he [or she] knows, or from the circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver's disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness.” (Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063 [quoting Osborn v. Hertz Corp. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 708] [alteration in original; citation omitted].) However, “a rental car agency is not liable for negligent entrustment where the agency has fully complied with the requirements of [Vehicle Code] sections 14604 and 14608, and the customer does not appear impaired or otherwise unfit to drive at the time of rental.” (Flores, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at 1070.)

Vehicle Code Section 14608 provides that a “person shall not rent a motor vehicle to another person unless both of the following requirements have been met: (1) The person to whom the vehicle is rented is licensed under this code or is a nonresident who is licensed under the laws of the state or country of his or her residence. (2) The person renting to another person has inspected the driver’s license of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented and compared either the signature thereon with that of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented or the photograph thereon with the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented.” (Cal. Veh. Code § 14608 (a).)

Vehicle Code Section 14604 provides that “[n]o owner of a motor vehicle may knowingly allow another person to drive the vehicle upon a highway unless the owner determines that the person possesses a valid driver’s license that authorizes the person to operate the vehicle. …” (Cal. Veh. Code § 14604(a).) “A rental company is deemed to be in compliance with subdivision (a) if the company rents the vehicle in accordance with Sections 14608 and 14609.” (Cal. Veh. Code § 14604(b).)

The Graves Amendment provides in pertinent part:

“An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person … shall not be liable under the law of any State … by reason of being the owner of the vehicle … for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if— 

(1) the owner . . . is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and 

(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)”

(49 U.S.C. §30106 (a) [emphasis added].)

            There do not appear to be California authorities on whether “negligence,” as defined in the Graves Amendment, encompasses negligent entrustment, which itself is a form of vicarious liability. The Court finds Carton v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (8th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3d 451 to be instructive. There, applying the rules of statutory construction to the Graves Amendment, the court found “no statutory basis for narrowing the definition of the broad term ‘negligence’ or giving it any definition other than its ordinary meaning.” (Id. at 458.) The Court concludes that the Graves Amendment does not preempt a negligent entrustment claim.

Here, it is undisputed that Getaround operates a car sharing program that allows private automobile owners to rent their personal vehicles to potential renters for compensation. Getaround takes a commission for this service. (UMF 1.) Vehicles can be rented using the Getaround App. (UMF 2.)

The following are also undisputed:

-          On or about March 11, 2019, Defendant Luke Mitchell Crawford (“Crawford”) began the sign-up process, Crawford was required to pass a driving record check, which Crawford passed on March 14, 2019, which also confirmed Crawford possessed a valid driver’s license. (UMF 5.)

-          On January 15, 2021, Crawford booked a trip on the Getaround platform, and successfully rented a 2013 Ford F-150, California license plate number 8TPD368 (the “Vehicle”). (UMF 7.)

-          The Vehicle had previously been boarded onto the Getaround platform on July 10, 2020, and was one of the vehicles that Getaround had authority to book for rental via the Getaround platform. The vehicle had a Connect device installed, and could be remotely accessed via the Connect device and Getaround App. (UMF 8.)

-          As part of that rental, Getaround kept a record of the registration number of the motor vehicle rented, the name and address of the person to whom the vehicle was rented, his driver’s license number, the jurisdiction that issued the driver’s license, and the expiration date of the driver’s license. (UMF 10.)

-          At the time of the collision, Crawford was driving the Vehicle during the rental period. (UMF 14.)

The parties dispute whether the Graves Amendment applies to Getaround. However, even if it did apply to Getaround, by its terms the Graves Amendment does not apply unless there is no negligence on the part of the owner. Here, Getaround has not established the absence of a triable issue of fact regarding negligent entrustment under its theory that it is a rental car company. Accordingly, the Court does not reach the question of whether Getaround falls within the protection of the Graves Amendment.[1]

As set forth above, Vehicle Code Section 14608 requires that the driver’s license be inspected and the signature or photograph verified. (Flores, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at 1069.) In addition, a rental car agency may be liable for negligently entrusting a car to an unlicensed driver and for entrusting a car “to a customer known to the agency to be intoxicated at the time of the rental.” (Osborn, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at 709.) Accordingly, a rental car agency is not liable for negligent entrustment as a matter of law where the agency has both fully complied with the requirements of Vehicle Code sections 14604 and 14608 “and the customer does not appear impaired or otherwise unfit to drive at the time of rental.” (Flores, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at 1070 [emphasis added]; see also Lindstrom v. Hertz Corp. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 644, 649 [“In addition to its statutory duty, a rental car company has a duty not to rent a car to a person who appears to be mentally or physically impaired or shows other signs of incompetence at the time the vehicle is rented”].) Here, Getaround does not set forth undisputed facts that it verified Crawford’s signature or photograph as required by Vehicle Code section 14608.[2] Accordingly, Getaround has not met its initial burden.[3]

At the initial hearing on the motion, Getaround argued that Flores was decided before the Legislature enacted Civil Code section 1939.37, and therefore the holding in Flores regarding a common law duty, to ensure that the customer does not appear unfit to drive at the time of rental, cannot stand. However, even if Getaround is correct, it still has not set forth undisputed facts that it verified Crawford’s signature. Accordingly, it has not established the absence of a triable issue of fact that it has complied with the requirements of Vehicle Code section 14608. Moreover, to the extent Getaround argues separately that it complied with Civil Code section 1939.37, that section provides that a “rental company” is not subject to the requirements of Vehicle Code section 14608 if certain requirements have been established. However, Getaround is not a “rental company” under Civil Code section 1939.37. (See Turo Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 517 [analyzing a nearly identical Government Code provision as Civil Code section 1939.01(a), and finding dispositive that Turo does not own or control the vehicles].) In any event, Getaround has not set forth the absence of a triable issue of fact that it qualifies as a “membership program” pursuant to Civil Code section 1939.01(k).

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Defendant GetAround, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication is DENIED.

            Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.