Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV37503, Date: 2023-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV37503    Hearing Date: September 19, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOVING PAPERS

1.      Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declarations of Bryan C. Zaverl and Farreborz Anaraki

2.      Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts

3.      Appendix of Evidence in Support

OPPOSITION PAPERS

1.      Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

2.      Declaration of David K. Dorenfeld and Exhibits

3.      Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Genuine Issues of Disputed Material Facts

REPLY PAPERS

1.      Reply Brief

2.      Evidentiary Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence

3.      Reply to Opposition to Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and Supporting Evidence; Response to Plaintiff’s Additional Facts

BACKGROUND

On October 12, 2021, Plaintiff Clayton Hosmann filed a complaint against Defendant Mat Group, LLC and Does 1-20 for injuries allegedly caused by fellow tenants at a residential apartment building on January 27, 2021. (Complaint ¶ 9.) Defendant Mat Group, LLC (Defendant) owns the property at 2000 Arlington Avenue, Los Angeles, California, where the alleged attack occurred. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence and premises liability.

Defendant now moves for summary judgment arguing that no triable issue of material fact exists. Plaintiff opposes.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)  Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise.  If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)           

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

            Defendant objects to the Declaration of David K. Dorenfeld and the attached exhibit in its entirety. The Court declines to rule on the objections because consideration of the evidence does not change the Court’s ruling herein.

DISCUSSION

Negligence­–Premises Liability

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.) The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)

Liability in a premises liability action is based not on responsibility for the conduct of others, but on the failure of the landowner or occupier to act reasonably under the circumstances when he or she has reason to anticipate the probability of injury and has an opportunity to prevent the injury or warn of the peril (Cody F. v. Falleti (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1242, see Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 676 [a landowner’s duty to take steps to prevent the wrongful acts of a third party is imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated].) Accordingly, premises liability alleges a defendant property owner either (1) allowed a dangerous condition on its property or (2) failed to take reasonable steps to secure its property against criminal acts by third parties. (Delgado v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1406.)

            The key issue when deciding a landlord’s liability for criminal acts by third persons is the foreseeability of the harm. (Madhani v. Cooper (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 412, 415; see Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 595.)  Madhani involved a physical battery between two tenants. There, the plaintiff had reported several instances to the building managers where the abusive tenant bumped into her and directed aggressive, intimidating conduct towards her. (Id. at 416–17.) The court held there was a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the landlord breached their duty. (Id.) (“[w]e do not believe a reasonably thoughtful landlord would accept as commonplace the repeated verbal and physical abuse of one tenant by another, but would act to put an end to such occurrences.”)  

In contrast, Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578 involved a battery action against two neighbors in a mobile home park. The neighbors had a history of animosity; between February 2000 and August 2002, approximately fifty calls were made to the police by either neighbor. (Id. at 584.) The park manager had received several “resident objection forms” from the plaintiffs alleging that the abusive neighbor had splashed mud on their cars and directed racial epithets towards them. However, there, the court upheld summary judgment for the defendant landlord because none of the incident reports involved an assault or battery. Therefore, there was not enough evidence to put defendants on notice of the perpetrator’s “propensity for violence.” (Id. at 596.)

            Plaintiff alleges that the assault was perpetrated by two other tenants, but Plaintiff does not identify the individuals. Defendant argues it had no duty to protect Plaintiff since it had no prior notice of any other tenants showing violent propensities. Plaintiff’s perpetrators are referred to by the parties as “Tenant #1” and “Tenant #2.”

            Here, Defendant sets forth the following facts:

-          Prior to January 27, 2021, Mat Group had never observed Tenant #1 or Tenant #2 acting in a dangerous or violent manner. (UMF 5.)

-          Prior to January 27, 2021, Mat Group was not aware of anything to suggest that Tenant #1 or Tenant #2 had ever engaged in dangerous or violent conduct. (UMF 6.)

-          Prior to January 27, 2021, Mat Group had never received any complaints concerning dangerous or violent behavior of Tenant #1 or Tenant #2. (UMF 7.)

-          Prior to January 27, 2021, Mat Group had never been informed by anyone about any dangerous or violent incidents involving Tenant #1 or Tenant #2. (UMF 8.)

-          Prior to January 27, 2021, plaintiff had never been involved in any altercations with either Tenant #1 or Tenant #2. (UMF 9.)

These facts are supported by the Declaration of Farreborz Anaraki, Defendant’s manager and sole member who has lived and worked on the subject property since 1999. (Anaraki Decl. ¶ 5.) Anaraki declared that prior to January 27, 2021, he never observed a tenant acting in a dangerous or violent manner. (Id. ¶ 6.) He also never received any complaints concerning dangerous or violent behavior by any tenant at the property. (Id. ¶ 8.) Therefore, Defendant has met its burden to establish that there are no facts that Defendant was on notice of the violent propensity of its tenants toward Plaintiff. As a result, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiff offers the following facts:

-          Public Records from the City of Los Angeles related to Police Calls for Service to the Subject Property evidence no fewer than thirteen calls to authorities for dangerous and /or violent activity taking place at the Subject Property. (PUMF 1; Pl. Resp. to UMF 5-8.)

Plaintiff argues the attack was foreseeable due to evidence of criminal episodes on the premises. Notably, Plaintiff presents no evidence that he had any altercation or incident with any other tenant in the past. Even if the Court were to consider evidence of calls for service on the property generally, and construing it in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has failed to present a triable issue of material fact that Defendant knew or should have known about the violent propensities of its tenants. The calls for service document does not establish that Defendant knew or was on notice of these purported events; rather, it suggests that certain individuals reported or received assistance from law enforcement at the property. The document does not detail who was involved (including whether Tenant 1 or Tenant 2 was a perpetrator), or what took place during each incident, including, for example, whether the incident involved a violent act by a tenant or third party and whether the acts were similar.

Plaintiff cites to Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, arguing that the evidence here is even more compelling because there are more incidents. The Court disagrees. Ann M. involved a commercial landlord and employee of a commercial tenant. The plaintiff presented evidence that employees and tenants were concerned about their safety due to the presence of persons described as transients, and during periodic meetings, tenants voiced complaints about the lack of security. (Id. at 671-72.) There was no evidence to indicate “that Ann M.’s rapist was one of the loitering transients or that the presence of the transients contributed in any way to Ann M.’s attack.” (Id. at 672.) The court held that “a high degree of foreseeability is required in order to find that the scope of a landlord’s duty of care includes the hiring of security guards. [The court] further conclude[d] that the requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the landowner’s premises.” (Id. at 679.) There, as here, the court concluded that the facts were not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty upon the landowner because the plaintiff offered no evidence that Defendant had notice of prior similar incidents occurring on the premises. Moreover, there, the incidents were not similar in nature to the violent assault that Plaintiff suffered. (Id. at 680.) Here, there is no specificity regarding the nature of the calls for service.

            Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing a triable issue of material fact that Defendant owed him a duty of care. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant Mat Group, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

            Defendant shall provide notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.