Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV37861, Date: 2024-05-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV37861    Hearing Date: May 14, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

 

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPARTMENT

32

HEARING DATE

May 14, 2024

CASE NUMBER

21STCV37861

MOTION

Demurrer to Complaint

MOVING PARTY

Defendant Salvador Munoz, as Trustee of the Ana Maria Hernandez Trust Dated 1/10/1994

OPPOSING PARTY

 Plaintiff Teodoro Cruz

 

MOTION

 

On October 14, 2021, Plaintiff Teodoro Cruz (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, California Department of Transportation, Ana Maria Hernandez Trust, Munoz Salvador, and Does 1 to 50 for negligence and premises liability related to a trip and fall on a sidewalk.

 

On February 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint substituting Salvador Munoz, Trustee of Ana Maria Hernandez Trust as Doe 1.

 

Defendant Salvador Munoz, as Trustee of the Ana Maria Hernandez Trust Dated 1/10/1994 (“Defendant”) now demurs to the complaint for failing to state facts to constitute a cause of action and for uncertainty. Plaintiff opposes and Defendant replies.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings.  It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint).  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true.  (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)

 

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) 

 

On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

 

A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad that the responding party cannot reasonably respond, i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to page and line numbers. (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.)

 

            Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).  

 

MEET AND CONFER

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that [b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).)

 

The Declaration of Andrew Attia, Defendant’s counsel, states that he sent a meet and confer letter to Plaintiff’s counsel on April 10, 2024, regarding this demurrer. (Attia Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff did not respond. (Id. ¶ 7.)

 

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, the Court finds that the complaint is not so vague or ambiguous to warrant sustaining the demurrer based on uncertainty. The allegations are clear enough for Defendant to ascertain what legal theories are being asserted. The Court now turns to whether the allegations state enough facts to constitute causes of action.

Negligence and Premises Liability

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.) The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)  Therefore, to prevail on a claim for premises liability, Plaintiff must prove: (1) defendant owned or controlled the subject property; (2) defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property; (3) plaintiff was harmed; and (4) defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (See Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108.)

 “While negligence is ordinarily a question of fact, the existence of a duty is generally a question of law that may be addressed by demurrer.” (Paul v. Patton (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1095.)

A. Duty  

A “general duty to maintain the property one owns or occupies [generally does not] extend to abutting property that is owned by others – and, in particular, to abutting property owned by public entities.” (Lopez v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 244, 255.) “That is because, for more than 150 years, the ‘general rule’ has been that, ‘in the absence of a statute[,] a landowner is under no duty to maintain in a safe condition a public street’ or ‘sidewalk’ ‘abutting upon his property.’” (Id.) 

“This general rule has one notable exception: A person who owns or occupies land will owe a duty to maintain abutting, publicly owned property in a reasonably safe condition if that person has ‘exercise[d] control over th[at] property.’” (Lopez, 55 Cal.App.5th at 255.) An owner of private property exerts control of abutting, publicly owned property either “(1) when the owner or occupier has created that hazard [citation omitted], or (2) if the hazard was created by a third party, when the owner or occupier has ‘dramatically asserted’ dominion and control over the abutting publicly owned property by effectively treating the property as its own.” (Id. at 256 [emphasis in original, alteration omitted].)

B. Analysis

Here, the complaint asserts the following for both causes of action:

“Defendants negligently, recklessly and/or wantonly owned, maintained, managed, operated controlled and safeguarded the premises at and/or near 1441 W 59th St, Los Angeles, CA 90047, such that an uneven and/or raised and/or broken and/or deteriorating sidewalk was allowed to exist and be left in disrepair. Defendants failed to barricade the area and/or to warn of the dangerous condition, rendering the area on said premises dangerous and resulting in serious bodily injury to the Plaintiff in the following manner: Plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk near 1441 W 59th St. when all of a sudden Plaintiff tripped and fell on an uneven and/or raised and/or broken and/or deteriorating area of the sidewalk. This caused Plaintiff to fall and sustain serious injuries and damages. The actions of the Defendants and/or it's employees were below the standard of care and was the cause of Plaintiffs injuries.”

(Complaint, p. 6.)

Defendant argues that the allegations that Plaintiff was walking on a sidewalk “near” 1441 W 59th St. are insufficient because they do not show that the injury occurred on Defendant’s property. However, on demurrer, the Court must treat all allegations within the complaint as true. Defendant correctly notes that generally there is no duty for a private landowner to maintain a public sidewalk abutting private property. Nevertheless, the complaint also alleges that Defendants (including Does) “negligently, recklessly and/or wantonly owned, maintained, managed, operated controlled and safeguarded the premises at and/or near 1441 W 59th St, Los Angeles, CA 90047.” Therefore, since Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owned and controlled the area at and/or near 1441 W 59th St where the fall occurred, he sufficiently states a cause of action.

Therefore, the demurrer is overruled.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

Therefore, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to the complaint.

 

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.