Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV37861, Date: 2024-05-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV37861 Hearing Date: May 14, 2024 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the
Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent
authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
DEPARTMENT |
32 |
|
HEARING DATE |
May
14, 2024 |
|
CASE NUMBER |
21STCV37861 |
|
MOTION |
Demurrer
to Complaint |
|
MOVING PARTY |
Defendant
Salvador Munoz, as Trustee of the Ana Maria Hernandez Trust Dated 1/10/1994 |
|
OPPOSING PARTY |
Plaintiff Teodoro Cruz |
MOTION
On October 14, 2021, Plaintiff Teodoro Cruz (“Plaintiff”) filed a
complaint against Defendants City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles,
California Department of Transportation, Ana Maria Hernandez Trust, Munoz
Salvador, and Does 1 to 50 for negligence and premises liability related to a
trip and fall on a sidewalk.
On February 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint
substituting Salvador Munoz, Trustee of Ana Maria Hernandez Trust as Doe 1.
Defendant Salvador Munoz, as Trustee of the Ana Maria Hernandez Trust
Dated 1/10/1994 (“Defendant”) now demurs to the complaint for failing to state
facts to constitute a cause of action and for uncertainty. Plaintiff opposes
and Defendant replies.
LEGAL
STANDARD
A demurrer is a pleading used to
test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings.
It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the
opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to
challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on
the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)
The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege
ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter
of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set
forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with
sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and
extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149,
156-157.)
On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to
“determine whether or not the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a
cause of action under any legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of America, N.A.
(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of
causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an
entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp.
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)
A
demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad
that the responding party cannot reasonably respond, i.e., he or she cannot
reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are
directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty,
the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is
uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to page and line
numbers. (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135
Cal.App.3d 797, 809.)
Where a demurrer is sustained, leave
to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful
amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976)
18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a
pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.;
Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f
there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause
of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969)
70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
MEET
AND CONFER
Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this
chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone
with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the
purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve
the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd.
(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the
responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).)
Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing
their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).)
The Declaration of Andrew Attia,
Defendant’s counsel, states that he sent a meet and confer letter to Plaintiff’s
counsel on April 10, 2024, regarding this demurrer. (Attia Decl. ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff did not respond. (Id. ¶ 7.)
ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the Court finds that the complaint is
not so vague or ambiguous to warrant sustaining the demurrer based on
uncertainty. The allegations are clear enough for Defendant to ascertain what
legal theories are being asserted. The Court now turns to whether the
allegations state enough facts to constitute causes of action.
Negligence
and Premises Liability
The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a
duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that
duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v.
Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.) The elements of a cause
of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty,
breach, causation, and damages. (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) Therefore, to prevail on a claim for premises liability,
Plaintiff must prove: (1) defendant owned or controlled the subject property;
(2) defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property; (3)
plaintiff was harmed; and (4) defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor
in causing plaintiff’s harm. (See Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d
108.)
“While negligence is ordinarily a question of
fact, the existence of a duty is generally a question of law that may be
addressed by demurrer.” (Paul v. Patton (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1088,
1095.)
A. Duty
A “general duty to maintain the property one
owns or occupies [generally does not] extend to abutting property that is owned
by others – and, in particular, to abutting property owned by public entities.”
(Lopez v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 244, 255.)
“That is because, for more than 150 years, the ‘general rule’ has been that,
‘in the absence of a statute[,] a landowner is under no duty to maintain in a
safe condition a public street’ or ‘sidewalk’ ‘abutting upon his property.’” (Id.)
“This general rule has one notable exception: A person who
owns or occupies land will owe a duty to maintain abutting, publicly owned
property in a reasonably safe condition if that person has ‘exercise[d] control
over th[at] property.’” (Lopez, 55 Cal.App.5th at 255.) An owner of
private property exerts control of abutting, publicly owned property either
“(1) when the owner or occupier has created that hazard [citation
omitted], or (2) if the hazard was created by a third party, when the owner or
occupier has ‘dramatically asserted’ dominion and control over the abutting
publicly owned property by effectively treating the property as its own.” (Id.
at 256 [emphasis in original, alteration omitted].)
B.
Analysis
Here, the
complaint asserts the following for both causes of action:
“Defendants negligently, recklessly
and/or wantonly owned, maintained, managed, operated controlled and safeguarded
the premises at and/or near 1441 W 59th St, Los Angeles, CA 90047, such that an
uneven and/or raised and/or broken and/or deteriorating sidewalk was allowed to
exist and be left in disrepair. Defendants failed to barricade the area and/or
to warn of the dangerous condition, rendering the area on said premises
dangerous and resulting in serious bodily injury to the Plaintiff in the
following manner: Plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk near 1441 W 59th St.
when all of a sudden Plaintiff tripped and fell on an uneven and/or raised and/or
broken and/or deteriorating area of the sidewalk. This caused Plaintiff to fall
and sustain serious injuries and damages. The actions of the Defendants and/or
it's employees were below the standard of care and was the cause of Plaintiffs
injuries.”
(Complaint, p. 6.)
Defendant
argues that the allegations that Plaintiff was walking on a sidewalk “near” 1441
W 59th St. are insufficient because they do not show that the injury occurred
on Defendant’s property. However, on demurrer, the Court must treat all
allegations within the complaint as true. Defendant correctly notes that
generally there is no duty for a private landowner to maintain a public
sidewalk abutting private property. Nevertheless, the complaint also alleges
that Defendants (including Does) “negligently, recklessly and/or wantonly owned,
maintained, managed, operated controlled and safeguarded the premises at and/or
near 1441 W 59th St, Los Angeles, CA 90047.” Therefore, since Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant owned and controlled the area at and/or near 1441 W 59th St
where the fall occurred, he sufficiently states a cause of action.
Therefore, the demurrer is overruled.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Therefore, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to the complaint.
Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof
of service of such.