Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV42358, Date: 2024-02-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV42358 Hearing Date: February 27, 2024 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the
Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent
authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
DEPARTMENT |
32 |
|
HEARING DATE |
February
27, 2024 |
|
CASE NUMBER |
21STCV42358 |
|
MOTION |
Demurrer
to Plaintiff’s Complaint |
|
MOVING PARTY |
Defendant
Beverages & More, Inc. |
|
OPPOSING PARTY |
Plaintiff
Andre Cohen |
MOTION
On November 16, 2021, Plaintiff Andre Cohen (“Plaintiff”) filed a form
complaint against Defendants Bevmo Holdings, LLC, Beverages & More, Inc.,
Jeffrey A. Fischer and Hilary Fischer, Trustees of J&H Fischer Trust, and
Does 1 to 50 for negligence and premises liability.
Defendant Beverages & More, Inc. (“Defendant”) now demurs to the entire
complaint arguing that the causes of action fail since they are: (1) precluded
by the worker’s compensation exclusivity doctrine, (2) barred by res judicata,
and (3) uncertain. Plaintiff opposes and Defendant replies.
LEGAL
STANDARD
A demurrer is a pleading used to
test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings.
It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the
opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to
challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on
the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)
The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege
ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter
of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set
forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with
sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and
extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149,
156-157.)
On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to
“determine whether or not the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a
cause of action under any legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of America, N.A.
(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of
causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an
entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp.
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)
A
demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad
that the responding party cannot reasonably respond, i.e., he or she cannot
reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are
directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty,
the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is
uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to page and line
numbers. (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135
Cal.App.3d 797, 809.)
Where a demurrer is sustained, leave
to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful
amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976)
18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a
pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.;
Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f
there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause
of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist.
(1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
MEET
AND CONFER
Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this
chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone
with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the
purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve
the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd.
(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the
responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).)
Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing
their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).)
According to the Declaration of Kendall
Cole, it appears the parties have met and conferred by telephone prior to
bringing this demurrer. (See Cole Decl. ¶ 4–8.)
JUDICIAL
NOTICE
The
Court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the Order Approving
Joint Compromise and Release by the Workers Compensation Appeals Board (Case
Nos. ADJ12857158; ADJ13286557). (See Lake v. Lakewood Chiropractic Center
(1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 47, 53.)
ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that Plaintiff was injured within
the scope of employment with Defendant and filed a worker’s compensation claim.
A release was purportedly signed.
Defendant filed this demurrer on the
assumption that Plaintiff’s complaint pertains to same incident that was
settled though the worker’s compensation appeals board. (Demurrer at p. 2.)
Here, the complaint states that the incident took place on November 17, 2019 at
12123 Ventura Boulevard, Studio City, California. (Complaint at p. 4.) Plaintiff
does not allege he was Defendant’s employee. Additionally, exhibit 1 does not
show that Plaintiff was Defendant’s employee on that date, or that he was
working when the injury took place.
In opposition, Plaintiff admits his complaint
arises out of his employment with Defendant, but that Defendant may be liable
beyond worker’s compensation. (Opposition at p. 3.) Plaintiff alleges that the
ceiling at the subject property caved in, causing him injuries. Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant may have signed a lease agreement with the landlord, making it
responsible for the dangerous condition, and thus beyond the scope of worker’s
compensation. However, Plaintiff does not provide any authority for any
exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity.
Regardless, looking at the face of the
complaint and the judicially noticed exhibit 1, the Court cannot determine that
the claim is barred by worker’s compensation exclusivity or res judicata.
Exhibit 1 does not contain information that shows the compromise and release pertains
to the same facts in the complaint.
Lastly, Defendant argues the demurrer should
be sustained for uncertainty so that Defendant may ascertain if the claims
arise from the prior worker’s compensation claim. However, here, since
Plaintiff has alleged a date and location of the incident, and has alleged a
dangerous condition caused him injuries, there are enough facts for Defendant
to ascertain the claims against it.
Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Therefore, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint.
Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof
of service of such.