Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV45452, Date: 2024-10-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV45452    Hearing Date: October 18, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOVING PAPERS

1.     Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of John W. Ranucci

2.     Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

3.     Declaration of Dennis McGinley in Support

4.     Evidence in Support of Motion

OPPOSITION PAPERS

1.     None.

REPLY PAPERS

1.     None.

BACKGROUND

On December 14, 2021, Plaintiff Rodney Ficklin (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Danielle M. Edler, The Hertz Corporation, Allstate Insurance Company, and Does 1 to 100 for negligence related to a motor vehicle accident, and for breach of contract.

Plaintiff alleges that on December 19, 2019, at Woodley Avenue near Stagg Street in Los Angeles, Defendant Danielle M. Edler (“Edler”) operated a vehicle negligently, causing damage to Plaintiff. (Complaint, 4.) Plaintiff alleges that The Hertz Corporation employed Edler, owned the vehicle, and entrusted the vehicle. The breach of contract cause of action is only asserted against Allstate Insurance Company.

Moving Defendant The Hertz Corporation (“Defendant”) now moves for summary judgment, or alternatively, for summary adjudication, arguing: (1) Defendant never hired Edler; (2) Defendant never permitted Edler to operate the vehicle; and (3) liability is precluded by the Graves Amendment.

Plaintiff is self-represented and notice of this motion was delivered by overnight mail to Plaintiff’s address. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) ¿“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)  Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise.  If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.) 

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)              

DISCUSSION

Negligence and Negligent Entrustment

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)

Generally, “one who places or entrusts his [or her] motor vehicle in the hands of one whom he [or she] knows, or from the circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver's disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness.” (Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063 [quoting Osborn v. Hertz Corp. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 708] [alteration in original; citation omitted].) However, “a rental car agency is not liable for negligent entrustment where the agency has fully complied with the requirements of [Vehicle Code] sections 14604 and 14608, and the customer does not appear impaired or otherwise unfit to drive at the time of rental.” (Flores, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at 1070.)

Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention 

“[A]n employer can be liable to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee.” (Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054.) To establish a cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision, a plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm occurs. (See Z.V. v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 889, 902; see also Doe, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054.) To be liable for negligent supervision and hiring, there must be a connection between the employment and injury. (Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1341.) “Liability for negligent hiring and supervision is based upon the reasoning that if an enterprise hires individuals with characteristics which might pose a danger to customers or other employees, the enterprise should bear the loss caused by the wrongdoing of its incompetent or unfit employees. (Id. at 1339.) “The tort has developed in California in factual settings where the plaintiff’s injury occurred in the workplace, or the contact between the plaintiff and the employee was generated by the employment relationship.” (Id. at pp. 1339-1340.)

Graves Amendment

            The Graves Amendment provides in pertinent part:

“An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person … shall not be liable under the law of any State … by reason of being the owner of the vehicle … for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if— 

(1) the owner . . . is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and 

(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)”

(49 U.S.C. §30106 (a) [emphasis added].)

The Graves Amendment also contains the following “savings clause”: 

“Nothing in this section supersedes the law of any State or political subdivision thereof— 

(1) imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle; or 

(2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law.”

(49 U.S.C. § 30106 (b).)

The Court finds the case of Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. (11th Cir. 2008) 540 F.3d 1242 to be instructive. There, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Graves Amendment preempts Florida’s tort liability law, which “imposes strict vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to another.” (Garcia, supra, 540 F.3d at 1245 [citation omitted].) Similar to California Vehicle Code section 17151, Florida’s legislature also imposed statutory caps on the amount of vicarious liability a rental car company could face. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that this statutory cap was a “financial responsibility” law within the meaning of the savings clause. (Id. at 1247.) Rather, the court found that “financial responsibility is closely linked to insurance requirements.” (Id.) The court concluded that “neither the common law imposition of vicarious liability on rental car companies, nor the Florida legislature’s endorsement of and limitations on such vicarious liability, constitutes a 'financial responsibility' requirement. … [States] simply may not impose such judgments against rental car companies based on the negligence of their lessees. [citation omitted.]” (Id. at 1249.)

Analysis

Here, Defendant sets forth the following facts:

-        On November 12, 2019, Inga Astsaturyan rented a 2020 Kia Optima (“Subject Vehicle”) from Defendant (collectively referred to as the “Rental Agreement”). (UMF 3.)

-        The Rental Agreement stated that the Subject Vehicle was to be rented from November 12, 2019 through November 19, 2019 (“Rental Period”). (UMF 4.)

-        On November 19, 2019, at the close of the Rental Period, the Subject Vehicle failed to be returned to The Hertz Corporation in accordance with the Rental Agreement, and therefore, from November 20, 2019, up and through the time of the Subject Incident, no one was authorized to operate the Subject Vehicle. (UMF 5.)

-        On or about December 19, 2021, Defendant Danielle M. Elder was operating the Subject Vehicle when she struck Plaintiff Rodney Ficklin at or around the Woodley Avenue and Stagg Street intersection, Los Angeles, CA 91406.

-        At the time of the Subject Incident, Elder was not an employee of Defendant and was not operating the Subject Vehicle in the course and scope of employment with Defendant at the time of the Subject Incident. (UMF 8.)

-        Defendant was the owner of the Subject Vehicle that Elder operated at the time of the Subject Incident. (UMF 9.)

-        Defendant was in the business of renting vehicles at the time of the Subject Incident. (UMF 11.)

-        The Rental Agreement states that there shall be “No ‘Additional Authorized Operators’ Without Our Prior Written Approval,” indicating that Inga Astsaturyan was the only person permitted and authorized to operate the Subject Vehicle unless Inga Astsaturyan received prior written approval from The Hertz Corporation. (UMF 15.)

-        Defendant had no actual or constructive knowledge that Elder was operating the Subject Vehicle, and there was never any rental agreement for the Subject Vehicle between Elder and Defendant at the time of the Subject Incident. (UMF 16.)

Here, Defendant meets its burden. Defendant sets forth evidence that the vehicle involved in Plaintiff’s incident was owned by Defendant but had been rented the month prior to Inga Astsaturyan. (McGinley Decl. ¶ 5.) The vehicle was never returned; therefore, no one had permission to use the vehicle when the incident occurred on December 19, 2019. Additionally, Edler was not an agent or employee of Hertz at the time. As a result, there is an absence of a triable issue of fact regarding Defendant’s individual negligence. Defendant has established the absence of a triable issue of fact that the Graves Amendment applies and precludes liability based on Defendant’s ownership of the vehicle.

The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff. Since Plaintiff has not opposed this motion, he fails to meet his burden. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Defendant The Hertz Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant shall file and serve a proposed judgment within 10 days.

            Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.