Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 21STCV45526, Date: 2023-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV45526    Hearing Date: December 15, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

Plaintiffs Henrietta Riojas and Sky Riojas, a minor, sued defendants Siesta Inn, Inc., Sunila Bhakta, Harry Bhakta, and Does 1 to 20 (Defendants) based on alleged Cimex lectularius (bed bug) injuries at a hotel, bringing seven causes of action.  Defendants’ demurrer to six causes of action was sustained with leave to amend. (Min. Order, 9/19/23.) On October 17, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint (FAC).

 Defendants now demur to the FAC arguing that Plaintiffs have again failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the following:

-          First Cause of Action for Battery

-          Third Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

-          Fourth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Concealment

-          Fifth Cause of Action for Private Nuisance

-          Sixth Cause of Action for Public Nuisance

-          Seventh Cause of Action for Breach of Contract

In addition, Defendants separately move to strike portions of the FAC alleging and praying for punitive damages. Plaintiffs oppose.  

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings.  It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint).  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true.  (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) 

On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

            Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).  

MEET AND CONFER

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).)

The Declaration of Geoffrey Bowen states that Defendants’ counsel met via telephone to discuss the FAC and this demurrer. (Bowen Decl. ¶ 3.) Therefore, the meet and confer requirement has been met.

ANALYSIS

First Cause of Action for Battery

“The essential elements of a cause of action for battery are: (1) defendant touched plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend plaintiff; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) plaintiff was harmed or offended by defendant’s conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would have been offended by the touching.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669.) 

Defendants argue the FAC does not allege that Defendants had any intent to harm or offend Plaintiffs. The FAC alleges that “[t]he intent of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, is satisfied and evident from Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, recklessly failing to warn Plaintiffs of the dangerous bedbug infestation in their room, given Defendants’, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, prior knowledge of an infestation. Plaintiffs did not receive any kind of warning or statement from Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, that the Subject Hotel had an infestation of bedbugs and did not regularly change the bedding, bed sheets, pillows, and skirts of the beds or thoroughly check and inspect them for infestations.” (FAC ¶ 44.) Plaintiffs continue to allege that Defendants failed to properly inspect or clean their room for bedbugs, failed to train staff, and chose to assign Plaintiffs a room containing bedbugs. (Id. ¶ 46.) They also allege that Defendants failed to follow Department of Health rules to ensure sanitary conditions at the hotel. (Id. ¶ 49–50.) However, these facts support negligence rather than battery.

The legal conclusion that Defendant “did the aforementioned acts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact” does not match the facts alleged in the previous paragraph. (See FAC ¶ 47.) Accordingly, although Plaintiffs are entitled to allege ultimate facts, here Plaintiffs have alleged specific facts that do not support the conclusion that Defendant acted with intent to cause a harmful contact with Plaintiffs.

Defendants’ demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained.

Third Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements for a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) an actual and proximate causal link between the tortious conduct and the emotional distress.¿ (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)¿¿ 

“A defendant’s conduct is outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1265 (internal citations and quotations omitted).) “Mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.” (Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 597 (internal citations and quotations omitted).) Rather, the requirements for satisfying the element of extreme and outrageous conduct are rigorous and difficult to satisfy. (Okorie, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at 597.) “On the spectrum of offensive conduct, outrageous conduct is that which is the most extremely offensive.” (Id.) (quoting Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1129).) “Depending on the idiosyncrasies of the plaintiff, offensive conduct which falls along the remainder of the spectrum may be irritating, insulting or even distressing but it is not actionable and must simply be endured without resort to legal redress.” (Ibid.)¿¿ 

            Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged material facts that are “extreme and outrageous.” Here, the FAC alleges the following:

“Defendants’, and DOES 1 through 20, willful disregard of a Cimex lectularius infestation that was either known or should have been known from prior infestations in the hotel and Plaintiffs’ room; (2) Defendants’, and DOES 1 through 20, deliberate and reckless choice to abstain from notifying Plaintiffs of a known presence of Cimex lectularius in Plaintiffs’ room, prior to Plaintiffs’ arrival; (3) Defendants’, and DOES 1 through 20, deliberate choice not to eradicate a bedbug infestation in Plaintiffs’ room, which was already known to Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20; (4) Defendants’, and DOES 1 through 20, deliberate and reckless choice not to require housekeeping staff to change the bed skirts regularly or not to inspect and ensure that the bed skirts are free from a Cimex lectularius infestation immediately prior to Plaintiffs’ stay; (5) Defendants’, and DOES 1 through 20, deliberate and reckless choice not to inspect or ensure that Plaintiffs’ room was free of Cimex lectularius immediately prior to Plaintiffs’ stay, willfully disregarding knowledge of the prior bedbug infestation in Plaintiffs’ room; (6) Defendants’, and DOES 1 through 20, routine practice of showing extreme indifference to the danger of bedbug infestations; (7) Defendants’, and DOES 1 through 20, failure to have adequate policies and procedures to properly train employees of the hotel to inspect rooms for bedbug infestations and to adequately protect hotel guests from an exposure to bedbug infestations; and (8) Defendants’, and DOES 1 through 20, failure to implement any new policies and procedures.”

(FAC ¶ 76.)

            Plaintiffs have not added additional facts in the FAC that allege the conduct of Defendants rose to “extreme and outrageous” conduct, or that it was directed at Plaintiffs, intended to cause (or with reckless disregard of the probability of causing) Plaintiffs severe emotional distress.  Again, the events they allege show at most that Defendants knew about the bedbugs but took no step to mitigate the risk. This by itself does not show conduct “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community,” (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 234, 257), or that it was intended to cause Plaintiffs severe emotional distress.

            Defendants’ demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained.

Fourth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Concealment

The elements of fraud are: “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 184.) In California, fraud, including negligent misrepresentation, must be pled with specificity. (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.)  “The particularity demands that a plaintiff plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.) 

“[T]o establish fraud through nondisclosure or concealment of facts, it is necessary to show the defendant ‘was under a legal duty to disclose them.’” (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 845.)  Nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud when: (1) there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties; (2) the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. (Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. Insomniac, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 803, 831.) 

            Here, the FAC alleges: “Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, were aware of the presence of insects, bed bugs, and the like, to be present in the rooms of their Subject Hotel as they were on notice of prior similar incidents. Defendants’, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, failure to implement policies and procedures, training, and proper cleaning processes of each and every room at the Subject Hotel—to prevent an incident such as this and the spread of insects, bed bugs, and the like—amounts to suppression and concealment of existing unsanitary and uninhabitable conditions occurring in the rooms of the Subject Hotel.” (FAC ¶ 89.)

“Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, had knowledge and were on notice of the existing bedbug infestation at the Subject Hotel as evidenced by the extensive online reviews by other prior guests which indicates presence of said infestation and conditions present at the Subject Hotel.” (FAC ¶ 90.)

“Front desk personnel, management, and housekeeping staff at the Subject Hotel were all aware of the bedbug infestation in the Subject Hotel and, specifically, Plaintiffs’ room.” (FAC ¶ 93.)

Here, Plaintiffs have not set forth facts with specificity, including the requisite intent. Because the allegations set forth are too conclusory, Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained.

Fifth Cause of Action for Private Nuisance

A nuisance is defined as follows: “[a]nything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway.” (Civ. Code § 3479.)

Private “[n]uisance liability arises from violation of a duty to another that interferes with the free use and enjoyment of his or her property.” (Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1373.) The elements of a private nuisance are: (1) “the plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property”; (2) “ ‘the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land [must be] substantial, i.e., that it cause[s] the plaintiff to suffer “substantial actual damage” ’ ”; and (3) “ ‘ “[t]he interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable” [citation], i.e., it must be “of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.” ’ [Citation.]” (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262-63.) The test for whether the conduct is unreasonable, is “whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively would consider [the interference] to be unreasonable.” (San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sup. Ct (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 938.) Additionally, the degree of harm is also an objective standard which asks, “what effect would the invasion have on persons of normal health and sensibilities living in the same community?” (Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 263, 303.) 

Here, Plaintiffs allege “[t]he unsanitary and uninhabitable conditions, including Cimex lectularius (bedbug) infestation, as described herein, constituted a nuisance within, but not limited to, Civil Code Section 3479 et seq. in that said conditions were injurious to the health and safety of the Plaintiff.” (FAC ¶ 111.) “Due to the extensiveness of the bedbug bites and the constant itching and pain she was experiencing from them, Plaintiff Henrietta Riojas and Plaintiff Sky Riojas decided to seek further medical attention. Plaintiffs still have physical scarring on their bodies and emotional scarring as a result of the bedbug bites.” (FAC ¶ 21.)

Plaintiffs have set forth facts to support a negligence cause of action. Plaintiffs have failed to allege additional facts that the alleged invasion of Plaintiffs’ interest caused them to suffer substantial actual damage or an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the room.

Therefore, Defendants’ demurrer to the fifth cause of action is sustained.

Sixth Cause of Action for Public Nuisance

A public nuisance is a nuisance that simultaneously affects some other larger group of individuals. (Civ. Code, § 3480.) “[W]hen the nuisance is a private as well as public one, there is no requirement the plaintiff suffer damages different in kind from that suffered by the general public.” (Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1551.) The necessary elements for public nuisance are: (1) the defendant, by acting or failing to act, created a condition that was (a) harmful to health or (b) obstructed the free use of the property so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property; (2) the condition affected a substantial number of people at the same time; (3) an ordinary person would be reasonably annoyed or disturbed by the condition; (4) the seriousness of the harm outweighs the social utility of the conduct; (5) the plaintiff did not consent to the conduct; (6) the plaintiff suffered harm that was different from the type of harm suffered by the general public; and (7) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.  (See Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1548; see Judicial Council Civ. Jury Instns. (2023) CACI No.2020.)

Here, the FAC alleges: “[t]he unsanitary and uninhabitable conditions, specifically the infestation of bedbugs affects the community at large as this type of infestation is easily spread from (1) one motel room to another, (2) personal property of those occupying the motel rooms, including Plaintiffs’ luggage, clothing, shoes, and other tangible personal property that can be transported from the Subject Hotel room to Plaintiffs’ residence thereby creating a risk of bedbug infestation in Plaintiffs’ residence, (3) spread of bedbug infestation from the Subject Hotel room to the public and into their residence which can affect the community at large.” (FAC ¶ 121.)

            Here, there are no facts that the condition affected a substantial amount of people at the same time. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that the general characteristics of bedbugs allows them to spread to other guests. This does not mean that a substantial number of people were also affected during Plaintiffs’ stay.  

Therefore, Defendants’ demurrer to the sixth cause of action is sustained.

Seventh Cause of Action for Breach of Contract

“A written contract may be pleaded either by its terms—set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference—or by its legal effect. [Citation.] In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.”¿ (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 993, citations omitted.)¿ 

Here, the FAC states:

“Plaintiffs and Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, entered into a written contract for the rent of Plaintiffs’ room in compliance with California Health & Safety Code at the hotel. Plaintiffs did all of the significant things that the contract required them to do, most notably, payment of the rental price for Plaintiffs’ room. All conditions required by the contract for Defendants’ and DOES 1 through 20 performance had occurred.” (FAC ¶ 127–129.)

Here, again, Plaintiffs have failed to plead the terms or the legal effect of the terms of the contract. Plaintiff states conclusions that they performed “all of the significant things” and conditions in the contract, without stating what they were. Plaintiff only mentions that they paid the rental price of the room.

Therefore, Defendants demurrer to the seventh cause of action is sustained.

Therefore, Defendants’ demurrer is sustained. Plaintiffs fail to show in their opposition that the pleadings can be amended. Additionally, the Court finds that the FAC did not contain additional facts to cure the defects outlined in the first demurrer. Therefore, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend

Defendants’ Motion to Strike             

            Defendants also move to strike Plaintiffs’ demand for, and all references to, punitive damages, including in paragraphs 55, 73, 86, and 107. The motion to strike paragraphs 55, 86, and 107 are denied as moot because they were subject to the demurrer. Paragraph 73 pertains to the second cause of action for negligence.

California law authorizes a party’s motion to strike matter from an opposing party’s pleading if it is irrelevant, false, or improper.  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435; 436(a).)  Motions may also target pleadings or parts of pleadings which are not filed or drawn in conformity with applicable laws, rules or orders.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).)  A motion to strike is used to address defects that appear on the face of a pleading or from judicially noticed matter but that are not grounds for a demurrer.  (Pierson v Sharp Memorial Hospital (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342; see also City & County of San Francisco v Strahlendorf (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1913 (motion may not be based on a party's declaration or factual representations made by counsel in the motion papers).)  In particular, a motion to strike can be used to attack the entire pleading or any part thereof – in other words, a motion may target single words or phrases, unlike demurrers.  (Warren v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 24, 40.)  The Code of Civil Procedure also authorizes the Court to act on its own initiative to strike matters, empowering the Court to enter orders striking matter “at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 436.) 

Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)  “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)  “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’  [Citation.]”  (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)    

“As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests.  The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.”  (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) (emphasis added.)  The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”  (Ibid.)  Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.  Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’”  (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)  Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.”  (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.) 

A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)  “Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award” for punitive damages.  (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.) Moreover, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) 

Nonintentional conduct comes within the definition of malicious acts punishable by the assessment of punitive damages when a party intentionally performs an act from which he knows, or should know, it is highly probable that harm will result.” (Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co.¿(1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 374, 381.) A conscious disregard for the safety of others can constitute malice if the plaintiff establishes that “the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895–96.)

The FAC alleges: “Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that the aforesaid conduct of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, was carried out with a willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ right to be free from such tortious behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud or malice pursuant to California Civil Code Section 3294, and that an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, authorized or ratified the wrongful acts of the employees of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20, entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants, and DOES 1 through 20.” (FAC ¶ 73.)  

Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that support their conclusion regarding despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of Plaintiffs, by the individual defendants or by an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendant Siesta Inn. Accordingly, the motion to strike paragraph 73 and the prayer for punitive damages on page 29, is granted.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court sustains Defendants’ demurrer to the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, without leave to amend.

Defendants’ motion to strike is granted.

Defendants shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.