Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV01486, Date: 2023-08-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV01486    Hearing Date: March 18, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOVING PAPERS:

1. Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; and Declaration of Lisa Collinson
2. Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.
3. Request for Judicial Notice

OPPOSITION PAPERS:

1. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment; Declaration of Anthony M. Crisci; and Exhibits.
2. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement
3. Objections to Evidence Submitted in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition

REPLY PAPERS:

1. Defendant’s Reply
2. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement
3. Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement
4. Notice of Errata

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Januario Melchor Molina (“Plaintiff”) sued Defendants Pico Rivera Healthcare, Inc. and Alex Benites for negligence per se, negligence and premises liability based on an incident where Plaintiff fell on January 17, 2021 while attempting to trim a tree that was over 15 feet tall on the property belonging to Defendant Pico Rivera Healthcare. Inc. (“PRH”). (FAC ¶¶ 14-16.)

Defendant PRH previously moved for summary judgment/summary adjudication, as to every cause of action. The Court granted summary adjudication on the third cause of action for premises liability but denied summary adjudication as to the remaining causes of action. The Court found that PRH was presumed to be Plaintiff’s de facto employer under the Labor Code. (See Minute Order dated 8/25/23.)  

PRH now brings this second motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication, arguing that since the Court has ruled that Plaintiff is an “employee” under the Labor Code, that he is barred from this action by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. Plaintiff opposes and Defendant replies.

LEGAL STANDARD – SUMMARY JUDGMENT

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)  “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”  (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)  Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise.  If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.”  (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”  (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.”  (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].) 

JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Court takes judicial notice of PRH’s exhibit A, Notice of the Court’s August 25, 2023 order. (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

EVIDENCE

The Court declines to rule on Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections as they have no effect on the ruling herein.

DISCUSSION

            Defendant concedes that Plaintiff was a de facto employee at the time of the injury. (UMF 5.) Defendant offers the following facts:

-          At the time of Plaintiff’s injury, Defendant PICO RIVERA HEALTHCARE, INC. maintained workers’ compensation insurance coverage. (UMF 6.)

-          Plaintiff, through his counsel of record, sent a workers’ compensation claim form to counsel for PRH on November 13, 2023. (UMF 7.)

Under Labor Code section 3602, “[w]here the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to recover compensation is, except as specifically provided in this section and Sections 3706 and 4558, the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer.” (Lab. Code, § 3602, subd. (a).) Section 3602, subdivisions (b) and (c) set forth the exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision of subdivision (a).  

“Under the plain meaning of section 2750.5, any unlicensed subcontractor is the employee of the general contractor; consequently, as a matter of law, the employee of an unlicensed subcontractor is the employee of the principal contractor. . . . Since the employee of an unlicensed contractor is the employee of the principal contractor as a matter of law, workers' compensation is, with limited exceptions, this employee's exclusive remedy against the principal contractor when the employee is injured on the job.” (Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 330.) As the court further explained, section 2750.5 precludes a plaintiff’s right to sue in tort. (Id. at 334 [“we must conclude that the Legislature intended that the section's plain meaning apply to foreclose plaintiff's right to sue defendant in tort, for the language of the statute applies to any unlicensed contractor, whether or not insured for workers' compensation coverage. It is for the Legislature, not the courts, to pass upon the social wisdom of such an enactment. And, if there is a flaw in the statutory scheme, it is up to the Legislature, not the courts, to correct it.”].)

Plaintiff argues that summary judgment must be denied because Defendant has failed to establish that Plaintiff will receive workers’ compensation coverage. (Opposition at p. 7.) Plaintiff cites no authority for this proposition. As the court explained in Neighbours, the effect of this Court’s finding that Plaintiff was a de facto employee for purposes of section 2750.5 forecloses this suit in tort. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that Defendant had workers’ compensation insurance at the time of Plaintiff’s injury, but only asserts that there is no evidence that Plaintiff will receive benefits. (Pl. Resp. to Sep. St. UMF 6.) Plaintiff also does not assert any statutory exceptions apply to Plaintiff’s sole and exclusive remedy against Defendant, i.e., the right to recover workers’ compensation benefits. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff requests a continuance to provide evidence regarding whether Plaintiff will receive workers’ compensation coverage, such evidence would not impact the ruling herein and therefore a continuance is not warranted. Plaintiff only appears to argue that a continuance is warranted to determine whether Plaintiff will receive benefits; there is no argument presented that a continuance is necessary to determine whether workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy available, rather than a civil suit.[1]

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant PRH’s motion for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant PRH’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant shall file and serve a proposed judgment within 10 days.

Defendant PRH shall provide notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.