Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV01737, Date: 2024-08-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV01737 Hearing Date: August 2, 2024 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached.  If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the
Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent
authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  
TENTATIVE
RULING
| 
   DEPT:  | 
  
   32  | 
 
| 
   HEARING DATE:  | 
  
   August
  2, 2024  | 
 
| 
   CASE NUMBER:  | 
  
   22STCV01737  | 
 
| 
   MOTIONS:    | 
  
   Motion
  for Summary Judgment  | 
 
| 
   Defendant Hertz Vehicles, LLC  | 
  
 |
| 
   OPPOSING PARTY:  | 
  
   Plaintiff
  Wilbur Tomas Benitez Aleman   | 
 
MOVING PAPERS
1.     Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary
Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Shane L.
Wulterin; Declaration of Kirstie F. Hall in Support
2.     Separate Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts
3.     Appendix of Exhibits in Support 
OPPOSITION PAPERS
1.     Plaintiff’s Opposition[1]
2.     Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Disputed
and Undisputed Material Facts 
3.     Declaration of Melisa Arenas in Support
REPLY PAPERS
1.     Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition
2.     Defendant’s Reply to Response to Plaintiff’s
Separate Statement
BACKGROUND
On January 14, 2022, Plaintiff
Wilbur Tomas Benitez Aleman (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Michael
G. Prete, Hertz Vehicles LLC, and Does 1 to 100 for negligence surrounding a
motor vehicle accident that occurred on January 16, 2020. Plaintiff alleges
that Michael G. Prete (“Prete”) was driving the subject car, which Hertz
Vehicles LLC “owned, leased, managed, maintained, and/or entrusted” to Prete.
(Complaint ¶¶ 7, 11.) 
Moving Defendant Hertz
Vehicles LLC (“Defendant”) now moves
for summary judgment arguing liability is precluded by the Graves Amendment and
that Plaintiff has no evidence to establish the elements of breach and
causation. Plaintiff opposes and Defendant replies. 
LEGAL
STANDARD
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden
of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material
fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to
find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) ¿“[T]he party moving for summary
judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of
the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his
burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then
subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of
the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment
standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].) 
Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion
for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. 
If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of
action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the
motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior
Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.) 
 
“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore
consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably
draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court
must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than
to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the
court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the
factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court
may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose
version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary
judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at
p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of
Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for
summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must
instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)        
DISCUSSION
Negligence and
Negligent Entrustment 
The
elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of
defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm
to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.) 
Generally, “one who places or entrusts his [or her]
motor vehicle in the hands of one whom he [or she] knows, or from the
circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be
held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver,
provided the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was
proximately caused by the driver's disqualification, incompetency, inexperience
or recklessness.” ‘ [Citation.]” 
(Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063
quoting Osborn v. Hertz Corp. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 708.) However, “a rental
car agency is not liable for negligent entrustment where the agency has fully
complied with the requirements of [Vehicle Code] sections 14604 and 14608, and
the customer does not appear impaired or otherwise unfit to drive at the time
of rental.” (Flores, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at 1070.) Sections
14604 and 14608 require vehicle owners to determine that a driver has a valid
driver’s license before allowing them to drive their car. (See Veh. Code §§
14604, 14608.)[2]
Here, the following is undisputed. At the time of the Subject
Incident, Prete was renting an automobile from Hertz. (UMF 5.) Hertz was the
owner of the vehicle that Prete operated at the time of the Subject Incident.
(UMF 6.) Hertz was in the business of renting vehicles at the time of the
subject accident. (UMF 7.) 
Additionally, Defendant asserts in its separate statement: “Plaintiff
has no evidence that Hertz negligently entrusted the rental car to Prete.” (UMF
10.) In support of this, Defendant proffers the declaration of Kirstie F. Hall,
who states: “I am not aware of any evidence that The Hertz Corporation
negligently entrusted the rental vehicle to Prete.” (Hall Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant
also presents Plaintiff’s response to Special Interrogatories, Set One, number
14, which asked for all facts that Defendant was negligent. On March 17, 2023,
Plaintiff responded as follows: 
“Defendant struck
the vehicle driven by Nancy Emerson, causing it to be propelled into the rear of
Plaintiffs vehicle. Per CCP § 2030.230, please see the traffic collision report
of this incident, as attached to Plaintiffs responses to Requests for
Production, Set One. Investigation and discovery are continuing and as such,
Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement and amend this response as further
information becomes available, up to and including the time of trial.” (Wulterin
Decl., Exh. J.)
Here, Defendant provides no evidence it complied
with the
requirements of Vehicle Code sections 14604 and 14608 or that Prete did not
appear impaired at the time of rental.[3] Additionally, it only
provides one discovery response from March 2023 which is insufficient to show
that Plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence for negligent
entrustment. 
Therefore, Defendant has failed to meet its burden to
establish the absence of a triable issue of fact regarding negligent entrustment.
(See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 854 [a defendant moving for
summary judgment must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the
plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence”].) 
As a result, Defendant also fails to meet its burden
regarding the Graves Amendment because that statute provides in pertinent part:
“An owner
of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person … shall not be
liable under the law of any State … by reason of being the owner of the vehicle
… for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use,
operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or
lease, if— 
(1) the
owner . . . is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor
vehicles; and 
(2) there
is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an
affiliate of the owner)”
(49 U.S.C. §30106 (a) [emphasis added].) There do not appear to be California authorities on whether
“negligence,” as defined in the Graves Amendment, encompasses negligent
entrustment, which itself is a form of vicarious liability. The Court finds Carton
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (8th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3d 451 to be
instructive. There, applying the rules of statutory construction to the Graves
Amendment, the court found “no statutory basis for narrowing the definition of
the broad term ‘negligence’ or giving it any definition other than its ordinary
meaning.” (Id. at 458.) The Court concludes that the Graves Amendment
does not preempt liability on a negligent entrustment claim.
Therefore, since a triable
issue of fact remains regarding negligent entrustment, Defendant has not
established the absence of a triable issue of fact that the Graves Amendment
precludes liability. 
CONCLUSION AND
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Hertz Vehicles, LLC’s Motion
for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
            Defendant
is ordered to give notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such. 
[1] The
Court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition was due July 19, 2024, but was filed
July 24, 2024. Nevertheless, the Court exercises its discretion to consider
Plaintiff’s opposition, absent prejudice to Defendant, in light of the
court-wide connectivity issues experienced from July 19 through July 23.
[2] Though
Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege a negligent entrustment cause of action,
he alleges that Defendant negligently entrusted the vehicle to Prete.
(Complaint ¶ 11.) Additionally, Defendant does not assert that the negligent
entrustment cause of action is not “within the pleadings” for purposes of a
summary judgment motion. 
[3] While
Defendant asserts in reply that Prete had a drivers’ license, it presents no
evidence that it verified the license prior to renting the vehicle. (See Reply,
7-8.)