Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV01737, Date: 2024-08-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV01737    Hearing Date: August 2, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPT:

32

HEARING DATE:

August 2, 2024

CASE NUMBER:

22STCV01737

MOTIONS: 

Motion for Summary Judgment

MOVING PARTY:

Defendant Hertz Vehicles, LLC

OPPOSING PARTY:

Plaintiff Wilbur Tomas Benitez Aleman

 

MOVING PAPERS

 

1.     Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Shane L. Wulterin; Declaration of Kirstie F. Hall in Support

2.     Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

3.     Appendix of Exhibits in Support

 

OPPOSITION PAPERS

1.     Plaintiff’s Opposition[1]

2.     Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Material Facts

3.     Declaration of Melisa Arenas in Support

 

REPLY PAPERS

1.     Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition

2.     Defendant’s Reply to Response to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement

 

BACKGROUND

 

On January 14, 2022, Plaintiff Wilbur Tomas Benitez Aleman (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Michael G. Prete, Hertz Vehicles LLC, and Does 1 to 100 for negligence surrounding a motor vehicle accident that occurred on January 16, 2020. Plaintiff alleges that Michael G. Prete (“Prete”) was driving the subject car, which Hertz Vehicles LLC “owned, leased, managed, maintained, and/or entrusted” to Prete. (Complaint ¶¶ 7, 11.)

 

Moving Defendant Hertz Vehicles LLC (“Defendant”) now moves for summary judgment arguing liability is precluded by the Graves Amendment and that Plaintiff has no evidence to establish the elements of breach and causation. Plaintiff opposes and Defendant replies.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) ¿“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)  Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise.  If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.) 

 

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)       

 

 

DISCUSSION

Negligence and Negligent Entrustment

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)

Generally, “one who places or entrusts his [or her] motor vehicle in the hands of one whom he [or she] knows, or from the circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver's disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness.” ‘ [Citation.]”  (Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063 quoting Osborn v. Hertz Corp. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 708.) However, “a rental car agency is not liable for negligent entrustment where the agency has fully complied with the requirements of [Vehicle Code] sections 14604 and 14608, and the customer does not appear impaired or otherwise unfit to drive at the time of rental.” (Flores, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at 1070.) Sections 14604 and 14608 require vehicle owners to determine that a driver has a valid driver’s license before allowing them to drive their car. (See Veh. Code §§ 14604, 14608.)[2]

Here, the following is undisputed. At the time of the Subject Incident, Prete was renting an automobile from Hertz. (UMF 5.) Hertz was the owner of the vehicle that Prete operated at the time of the Subject Incident. (UMF 6.) Hertz was in the business of renting vehicles at the time of the subject accident. (UMF 7.)

Additionally, Defendant asserts in its separate statement: “Plaintiff has no evidence that Hertz negligently entrusted the rental car to Prete.” (UMF 10.) In support of this, Defendant proffers the declaration of Kirstie F. Hall, who states: “I am not aware of any evidence that The Hertz Corporation negligently entrusted the rental vehicle to Prete.” (Hall Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant also presents Plaintiff’s response to Special Interrogatories, Set One, number 14, which asked for all facts that Defendant was negligent. On March 17, 2023, Plaintiff responded as follows:

“Defendant struck the vehicle driven by Nancy Emerson, causing it to be propelled into the rear of Plaintiffs vehicle. Per CCP § 2030.230, please see the traffic collision report of this incident, as attached to Plaintiffs responses to Requests for Production, Set One. Investigation and discovery are continuing and as such, Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement and amend this response as further information becomes available, up to and including the time of trial.” (Wulterin Decl., Exh. J.)

Here, Defendant provides no evidence it complied with the requirements of Vehicle Code sections 14604 and 14608 or that Prete did not appear impaired at the time of rental.[3] Additionally, it only provides one discovery response from March 2023 which is insufficient to show that Plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence for negligent entrustment.

Therefore, Defendant has failed to meet its burden to establish the absence of a triable issue of fact regarding negligent entrustment. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 854 [a defendant moving for summary judgment must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence”].)

As a result, Defendant also fails to meet its burden regarding the Graves Amendment because that statute provides in pertinent part:

“An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person … shall not be liable under the law of any State … by reason of being the owner of the vehicle … for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if— 

(1) the owner . . . is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and 

(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)

 

(49 U.S.C. §30106 (a) [emphasis added].) There do not appear to be California authorities on whether “negligence,” as defined in the Graves Amendment, encompasses negligent entrustment, which itself is a form of vicarious liability. The Court finds Carton v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (8th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3d 451 to be instructive. There, applying the rules of statutory construction to the Graves Amendment, the court found “no statutory basis for narrowing the definition of the broad term ‘negligence’ or giving it any definition other than its ordinary meaning.” (Id. at 458.) The Court concludes that the Graves Amendment does not preempt liability on a negligent entrustment claim.

 

Therefore, since a triable issue of fact remains regarding negligent entrustment, Defendant has not established the absence of a triable issue of fact that the Graves Amendment precludes liability.

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

Based on the foregoing, Defendant Hertz Vehicles, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

 

            Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.

 

 



[1] The Court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition was due July 19, 2024, but was filed July 24, 2024. Nevertheless, the Court exercises its discretion to consider Plaintiff’s opposition, absent prejudice to Defendant, in light of the court-wide connectivity issues experienced from July 19 through July 23.

[2] Though Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege a negligent entrustment cause of action, he alleges that Defendant negligently entrusted the vehicle to Prete. (Complaint ¶ 11.) Additionally, Defendant does not assert that the negligent entrustment cause of action is not “within the pleadings” for purposes of a summary judgment motion.

[3] While Defendant asserts in reply that Prete had a drivers’ license, it presents no evidence that it verified the license prior to renting the vehicle. (See Reply, 7-8.)