Judge Anne Hwang, Case Number: 22STCV02673, Date: 2024-06-17 Tentative Ruling

PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

1. Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Kimberly Morosi

2. Plaintiff’s Separate Statement in Opposition and Statement of Additional Undisputed Facts

On June 24, 2022, Plaintiff Miella Sneiderman (“Plaintiff”), a minor by and through her guardian ad litem, filed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants Beverly Hills Unified School District, Hawthorne Elementary School, and Does 1 to 100 for dangerous condition of public property and negligence.

Plaintiff alleges that on May 6, 2021, she fell over a retaining wall at Hawthorne Elementary School, which caused injuries. (FAC ¶ 10.) Plaintiff contends there were no barriers to prevent someone from falling over or adequate warnings. (Ibid.) Against Defendant Beverly Hills Unified School District (“Defendant”), Plaintiff asserts a single cause of action for dangerous condition of public property under Government Code section 835.

Defendant now moves for summary judgment arguing Plaintiff lacks evidence that she fell due to the retaining wall, the alleged condition was trivial or minor, the condition was not in a “dangerous condition” within the meaning of section 835, and the design immunity under Government Code section 830.6 applies.

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].) Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

“The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 855.) Alternatively, “[t]he defendant may […] present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admission by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Id.)¿This must be supported with evidence “including ‘affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’” (Id. at 854–55 [quoting Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(b)].)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

Objection No. 1: The Court sustains the objection as to Rosescu’s opinions that “on the date of the incident, the retaining wall at issue constituted a dangerous condition of the property,” and “[a] vertical fall of this magnitude onto concrete can cause serious injury or even death.”

Government Code section 835 states:¿“Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and either:¿¿

(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or¿¿¿

(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”¿¿¿

Government Code section 835 sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property. (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129, citing Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829; see also Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112.)

To hold a public entity liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the property was a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, (2) that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and (4) that either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition or the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. (Gov. Code § 835.)

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff cannot present evidence establishing how she fell, and therefore cannot establish a dangerous condition of public property.

Here, the following is undisputed. At Hawthorne Elementary School in Beverly Hills, there is a planter wall located in front of the school which is curved and situated on the northside of the campus. (UMF 56.) A mature tree sits in-between the wall and the street. To the right of the wall, the ground recedes as the tree and planter wall are on an obvious downward slope. (UMF 58.) The height of the wall from the ground at the bottom of the slope varies in height depending on the location. (UMF 59.) As such, the side of the planter wall that faces the street is over two feet, but because it was constructed on ground that is sloping downward, the backside of the wall is at a greater depth.

The incident took place on May 6, 2021, after school at Hawthorne Elementary. Plaintiff was in the second grade and was released directly to her mother, Ms. Sneiderman, who was waiting in the front of the school. (UMF 8, 12–13.) As they were walking to their car, Plaintiff and her mother stopped to chat with other parents and children from the school. (UMF 15.) While Ms. Sneiderman was talking to the other parents, Plaintiff walked over to several classmates standing on the grass, who asked her if she wanted to play tag. (UMF 17.) At some point after that, the adults were later taken to an area south of the tree and planter wall, where Plaintiff was found lying in the grass. (UMF 19.) Later, paramedics arrived and took Plaintiff to the hospital to treat her injuries. (UMF 22–23.)

- While Plaintiff and Ms. Sneiderman were talking to the other parents and children in front of the school, Ms. Sneiderman had her back to the school and was not paying attention to Miella. (UMF 16.)

- The parents did not notice what the children were doing as they were talking. (UMF 18.)

- No one observed Miella or any of the children on the wall prior to the accident. (UMF 25.)

- After breaking during the deposition, Miella was able to confirm that she was standing on the grass between the wall and the tree just before her accident. (UMF 31.)

- Miella could not recall how she fell or what caused her to fall down. (UMF 35.)

- Miella testified that she fell onto the grass on the opposite or backside of the wall, north of the tree. (UMF 36.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s deposition testimony does not fully describe how the injury took place. In her deposition, Plaintiff repeatedly testified that she did not know how she hurt herself. (Morosi Decl., Exh. A, Pl. Depo. 98:11–15; 99:4–16; 100:2–5.) She then stated she was near the wall before her accident but not on it. She agreed that she was running between the tree and the wall while playing tag, and then hurt her arm. (Id., 101:4–13.) However, later in the deposition she testified that she hurt her hand by falling off the wall. (Id., 104:5–10.) The following exchange then took place:

A. Because on one side, it's like, an inch or two and on the other side, it's a couple of feet. Q. Okay.

A. Just like I said, there's one inch – one side is only a couple of inches and the other side is six feet.”

“Q. Let me ask you another way. You describe for me how it was when you were running that you hurt your right hand.

A. Because -- I might have been on the wall, but I think it might be that I tried to, like, put my foot -- I think I tried to get over it and then not knowing the other side was so tall (indicating).

Q. Okay. What makes you think that you were on the wall before you hurt your right hand?

THE WITNESS: I might have been on the wall because I know that I went -- I know that I fell head first and I tried to protect myself with my arm.

BY MR. DUMONT: Q. Right. You fell off the wall and you put your hands out to try to break your fall?

In this summary judgment proceeding, the Court does not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Here, although Defendant argues Plaintiff’s testimony does not show how the injury took place, she did testify that she fell over the wall. She also testified she hurt herself due to the discrepancy in depth on either side of the wall. Therefore, Defendant fails to meet its burden that Plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence about how the injury took place or that the wall caused her injury.

A public entity is only liable for a dangerous condition of property if it either creates the condition or has actual or constructive notice of the condition. (See Gov Code §835(a),(b).)

A public entity had actual notice of a dangerous condition if it had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character. (Gov. Code § 835.2(a).) “To establish actual notice, ‘[t]here must be some evidence that the employees had knowledge of the particular dangerous condition in question’; ‘it is not enough to show that the [public entity's] employees had a general knowledge’ that the condition can sometimes occur. [Citation.]” (Martinez v. City of Beverly Hills (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 508, 519.)

- There have been no prior accidents that have occurred on Hawthorne’s campus that are of a similar nature to the accident reported by Plaintiff in the operative complaint. (UMF 43.)

- Prior to Plaintiff’s accident, no one had contacted Principal Sarah Kaber or the PTA expressing concern about the area in front of the school by the tree and planter wall. (UMF 44.)

- Ms. Sneiderman and two of the parents on scene at the time of Miella’s accident did not make any complaints about the planter wall posing a danger to students prior to the incident. (UMF 45.)

- Jessica Gusow, a parent of a student at Hawthorne Elementary, was deposed and testified that she saw kids sitting and standing on the retaining wall every day of the school year, mostly after school. She also observed people including Lashanda (the school security guard) telling kids to get off of the wall. Prior to the date of Plaintiff’s fall, Ms. Gusow also observed kids playing behind the retaining wall and she observed adults telling kids that were behind the retaining wall not to go into that area. (PAMF 6–11.)

- Sometimes Ms. Gusow observed the principal Ms. Kaber telling kids to get off the wall. (PAMF 16.)

- Ms. Ucer recalls seeing the security guard Lashonda or Mr. Painter around the kids near the wall and the adults would tell the kids to stay away from the wall or “stay off the wall.” The children were also instructed not to be behind the wall. (PAMF 24.)

- Ms. Ucer recalls seeing the “NO SEATING” writing on the top of the wall prior to Miella’s accident. (PAMF 29.)

Considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has established a triable issue of fact that Defendant knew or should have known that the wall was a dangerous condition.

The term “dangerous condition” means a “condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor,¿trivial¿or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it¿will be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (a).)¿ “A condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830.2.)

“Thus, even though it is foreseeable that persons may use public property without due care, a public entity may not be held liable for failing to take precautions to protect such persons.”¿(Mathews v. City of Cerritos¿(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1384.)¿“The condition of the property involved should create a ‘substantial risk’ of injury, for an undue burden would be placed upon public entities if they were responsible for the repair of all conditions creating any possibility of injury however remote that possibility might be.”¿(Fredette¿v. City of Long Beach¿(1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 122, 130, fn. 5.) “The statutory definition of reasonably foreseeable persons using the property with due care takes into consideration the lower standard of care which is expected of children.” (Mathews, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at 1385.) Children are “only required to exercise that degree of care expected of children of like age, experience and intelligence.” (Cummings v. Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 258, 263.)

“The existence of a dangerous condition ordinarily is a question of fact, but the issue may be resolved as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion.”¿(Peterson v. San Francisco Comm. College Dist.¿(1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 810.)¿

To determine whether a condition is¿trivial¿as a matter of law, “[t]he legal analysis involves several steps. First, the court reviews evidence regarding the type and size of the defect. If that preliminary analysis reveals a¿trivial¿defect, the court considers evidence of any additional factors such as the weather, lighting and visibility conditions at the time of the accident, the existence of debris or obstructions, and plaintiff’s knowledge of the area.¿If these additional factors do not indicate the defect was sufficiently dangerous to a reasonably careful person, the court should deem the defect trivial as a matter of law. . .”¿(Stathoulis¿v. City of Montebello¿(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 567-568 [citing Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 719, 729].)

More recently, in Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 102, 110, the Court of Appeal read Government Code section 830.2 to require a more “holistic” approach, stating, “[a]lthough we agree with the premise that the size of the defect is the primary determinant of triviality, as discussed below, we modify the prevailing two-step framework into a holistic, multi-factor analysis.” The first and most important factor is the defect’s size. (Id.) The Court next considers additional factors. “Beyond size, additional factors courts typically consider . . .: the nature and quality of the defect (including whether it has jagged breaks or cracks); whether anything was obstructing or concealing the defect (for instance, an object, debris, or other substance); the lighting and weather conditions at the time of the incident; whether the defect has caused other accidents; and plaintiff's familiarity with the area.” (Stack, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at 115.) With respect to the various foregoing factors, Stack held that “individual familiarity is not a proper factor for consideration within the trivial defect doctrine.” (Id. at p. 120.)

Defendant argues the wall was not a “dangerous condition”. Defendant sets forth the following facts:

- During the 2020-2021 school year (when the incident took place on May 6, 2021), Plaintiff Miella Sneiderman was a second-grade student at Hawthorne. (UMF 8.)

- Miella had been attending Hawthorne since the first grade and was familiar with the campus. (UMF 9.)

- There is no vegetation or anything on top of the wall that obstructs any portion of the planter wall. (UMF 41.)

- The backside of the retaining wall is visible to those walking in front of the school, particularly from the southside of the campus in the northbound direction. (UMF 42.)

- There have been no prior accidents that have occurred on Hawthorne’s campus that are of a similar nature to the accident reported by Plaintiff in the operative complaint. (UMF 43.)

- Prior to Plaintiff’s accident, no one had contacted Principal Sarah Kaber or the PTA expressing concern about the area in front of the school by the tree and planter wall. (UMF 44.)

- Ms. Sneiderman and two of the parents on scene at the time of Miella’s accident did not make any complaints about the planter wall posing a danger to students prior to the incident. (UMF 45.)

- The other supervising parents on scene never heard a parent raise concern about the planter wall during PTA meetings. (UMF 47.)

- The wall was designed and constructed on the existing slope to retain the root structure and protect the tree situation in front of the school between the street and the new building that was being constructed. (UMF 50.)

- Since the wall’s original construction, it has not undergone any structural modifications. (UMF 53.)

- At the time of the accident, the wall was painted white with red letters at the top that read “NO SEATING.” (UMF 54.)

- Facing the front of the school, the planter wall rises more than two feet above the ground. (UMF 57.)

- The height of the wall from the ground at the bottom of the slope varies in height depending on the location. (UMF 59.)

- There is nothing obstructing the ability to see that the height of the backside of the wall is greater than the front of the wall. (UMF 60.)

- The backside of the planter wall is visible to those walking in front of the school and in the northbound direction. (UMF 61.)

Here, Defendant offers the declaration of its expert, Scott Gaudineer, an architect, to opine on the design of the wall. Mr. Gaudineer declares that “[f]acing the front of the school, the wall rises almost two feet above-ground.” (Morosi Decl., Exh. E, Gaudineer Decl. ¶ 11.) However, Defendant provides no measurement of the depth of the wall on the backside. Since Plaintiff contends the height difference between either side of the wall was a dangerous condition, the heights of the wall are necessary to ascertain the size of the defect. Defendant also produces limited information about the condition of the wall on the day of the incident.

On the other hand, Defendant produces declarations from Hawthorne Elementary’s principal, Sarah Kaber, and Georgianne Yonalty, the school’s office manager of thirty-one years, attesting to no prior incidents regarding the wall. (Kaber Decl. ¶ 8; Yonalty Decl. ¶ 4.) It is also undisputed that Plaintiff attended the school since the first grade and was familiar with the campus. (See Pl. Resp. UMF 9.)

However, given the limited information provided, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law that the condition was trivial or was not dangerous. As set forth above, Plaintiff has set forth evidence of a “no seating” sign on the wall, as well as various warnings given to children to stay off the wall. Although Defendant relies heavily on Mathews, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at 1385, where the court found that the “danger of riding a bicycle down a very steep, wet, grassy hill is obvious from the appearance of the property itself, even to children exercising a lower standard of due care,” here, considering all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there remains a triable issue of fact regarding whether the condition of the wall was apparent to children using it in a reasonably foreseeable manner[1] with due care.

To prevail on the defense of design immunity, the following three elements must be established: "(1) a causal relationship between the plan or design and the accident, (2) discretionary approval of the plan or design prior to construction, and (3) substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the plan or design.” (Cornette v. Department of Transp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 66; see Gov. Code, § 830.6.)¿

Of the three elements, "[t]he first two elements, causation and discretionary approval, may only be resolved as issues of law if the facts are undisputed." (Grenier v. City of Irwindale (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 931, 940.) A defendant may rely on the complaint to establish causation in the context of a design immunity defense. (Fuller v. Dep't of Transp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1114.) To establish the second element of discretionary approval, a defendant must show “approval in advance of construction by the legislative body or officer exercising authority.” (Alvarez v. State of California (1999) 79 Cal.App.4th 720, 734; Ramirez v. City of Redondo Beach (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 515, 526.) As to the third element, Wyckoff v. State¿(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 45, 50–51 provides:¿¿

The normal rules governing a¿motion¿for¿summary¿judgment, and requiring its denial if any triable issue of fact appears, are not fully applicable [to cases involving¿design¿immunity¿under¿Government Code section 830.6.]¿ For example, the defendant is not required to prove to the court that the¿design¿or plan was in fact a reasonable one. Instead, the defendant is merely required to adduce any ‘substantial evidence’ that a reasonable public employee or legislative body could have approved the plan or¿design¿used under¿[Government Code section] 830.6.¿Thus, when the defendant files a¿motion¿for¿summary¿judgment, the existence of a possible conflict of evidence, as shown by the proof submitted on the motion, will not create a triable issue on this aspect of the defense that can defeat a summary judgment . . . ." "We are not concerned with whether the evidence of reasonableness is undisputed; the statute provides immunity when there is substantial evidence of reasonableness, even if contradicted.”¿

Here, there is a causal relationship between the design of the wall and Plaintiff’s injury because the FAC alleges that due to the lack of barriers and warnings, and the drop on the backside, Plaintiff fell over it and was hurt. (FAC ¶ 10.)

Regarding the second element, Defendant provides evidence that the plans were approved on November 22, 1966 by B.H. Harden, a structural engineer with the State of California’s Department of General Services, Office of Architecture and Construction, what is presently the Department of the State Architect (“DSA”). (UMF 48; Gaudineer Decl. ¶ 14, Exh. H.) This is undisputed by Plaintiff. (See Pl. Resp. UMF 48.) In opposition, Plaintiff provides no evidence or argument regarding this element and thus fails to show a triable issue of fact.

Turning to the last element, Defendant argues that the adoption of the plan was reasonable based on the fact that they were approved. (Motion, 17.) Scott Gaudineer also opined that at the time of the approval and the time of the incident, the design of the retaining wall was reasonable and fully compliant with the codes and standards of California in 1966. (Gaudineer Decl. ¶ 15–17.) Further, he declared the wall “was designed and constructed to retain the root structure and protect the tree situated in front of the school between the street and the new building that was being constructed. The retaining wall was also designed to allow for maintenance of this mature tree and its extensive root system by allowing for proper drainage while also allowing the adjacent building to be constructed without hindrance by the tree or its root system. Additionally, the design allows for better drainage near the building and keeps the water and earth away from it.” (Gaudineer Decl. ¶ 12.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the area was not constructed according to the plans. Plaintiff’s expert, Philip L. Rosescu, a licensed civil engineer, declares that the area around the backside of the wall was intended to be landscaped with soil and shrubbery. (Rosescu Decl. ¶10.) Plaintiff contends this would have reduced the fall hazard. (Id.; Opp., 9.) Plaintiff contends that because the original design was not followed, (the area behind the wall is cement and grass), the immunity claim fails. Plaintiff also argues the wall was modified because “NO SEATING” was written on it. (Opp., 9.)

Additionally, Mr. Rosescu opines that under the 1967 Building Code and 2007 Building Code, guard rails should have been installed when the lower level was paved. (Rosescu Decl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff also contends the plans offered by Defendant are incomplete and provides no measurement or specifications of the subject wall. However, Defendant pointed to pages A-2, A-5, C-1, and L-1 of the plans in exhibit H. (See Gaudineer Decl. ¶ 11; Def. Index of Evid., pdf at pages 185, 188, 212.) These pages contain measurements of the subject wall.

The Court finds a triable issue of fact regarding whether the affirmative defense of design immunity applies based on evidence that the area was not constructed according to the plans. There is no evidence regarding the failure to plant the shrubbery as indicated in the design, and how this may impact the height differential, which is alleged to constitute the dangerous condition. (See generally Castro v. City of Thousand Oaks (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1451.) Although Defendant argues that the original as built design plans were for the retaining wall only, no expert testimony is provided by Defendant regarding the lack of impact of the shrubs on the design of the wall. (Reply at p. 9.) Moreover, Defendant has not established that the lack of shrubs and the insertion of a concrete walkway is a “changed condition,” rather than the original building of the area purportedly pursuant to the design. Accordingly, Defendant has not met its burden of proof regarding the applicability of design immunity.

Therefore, Defendant Beverly Hills Unified School District’s motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file proof of service of such.

[1] Although Defendant appears to argue that the purpose of the wall was to contain the roots of the tree, maintain drainage, and prevent damage from the tree roots to the adjacent building, Defendant does not establish an absence of a triable issue of fact that it was not reasonably foreseeable that children would run and play in that area in front of the school. (Motion at p. 7.) Similarly, Defendant’s evidence that students were dismissed in front of the school to an authorized adult does not establish an absence of a triable issue of fact regarding foreseeability. (Motion at p. 10.)

DEPARTMENT	32
HEARING DATE	June 17, 2024
CASE NUMBER	22STCV02673
MOTION	Motion for Summary Judgment
MOVING PARTY	Defendant Beverly Hills Unified School District
OPPOSING PARTY	Plaintiff Miella Sneiderman