Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV04904, Date: 2023-08-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV04904    Hearing Date: August 10, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely (which is highly encouraged).  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

Plaintiffs Rumaldo Mazariegos and Gladys Ulban (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) initated this action against Defendant Yasser Ads (“Defendant”) based on a motor vehicle accident, wherein Defendant is alleged to have been driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages in the complaint.  Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

ANALYSIS

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)  On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code § 3294.  (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code § 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)  Under Civil Code § 3294, subdivision (b), “[a]n employer shall not be eligible for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” 

Further, a plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice.  To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages.  (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)  “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.  When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].)  “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.”  (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166._

            Here, Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages because Defendant argues the complaint fails to allege facts showing he acted with malice or despicable conduct. Defendant further argues that the claim for punitive damages has not been alleged with the requisite level of specificity.

            In opposition, Plaintiffs contends that their allegations are sufficiently pleaded under Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890. (Opposition at pp. 3-4.)

As alleged in the Complaint, the following allegations are asserted in support of Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages:

Defendant YASSER ADS knew before he got behind the wheel of his 2020 Jeep Rangler [sic] that it was illegal to drive while intoxicated. He also knew that if he were to drive his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol that it was entiely [sic] probable that he would lose control of his vehicle and cause a collesion [sic] with another motorist. Dispite [sic] this actual knowledge defendant drank alcholic [sic] beverages with the specific intent of getting drunk. By the time he got behind the wheel he was well past the legal limit of .08% blood alcohol concentration. Despite knowing he was unfit to drive, defendant drove his vehicle on public roadways when it was dark out and at a time he know [sic] there would be heavy traffic. He drove his vehicle at excessive speed and lost controle [sic] of his vehicle or intentionaly [sic] decided to make a U turn in the middle of the street without any concern for the vehicles next to him and turned directly into plaintiff crashing into the passenager [sic] side of his vehicle. At the scene defendant refused to provide his drivers license as required to do by law or wait for the arival [sic] of the police.

(Complaint at pg. 5.) 

Based on these pleadings, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations, alone, do not support punitive damages aginst Defendant. The California Supreme Court has held that punitive damages may be imposed for driving while intoxicated under certain circumstances, but it has not held that punitive damages are always appropriate in cases involving driving while intoxicated. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892.)  In Taylor, the defendant had previously caused a serious automobile accident while driving under the influence, had been arrested and convicted for drunken driving on numerous prior occasions, had recently completed a period of probation following a drunk driving conviction, and was presently facing an additional pending criminal drunk driving charge at the time of the accident. (Id. 893.) Further, the defendant accepted employment which required him both to call on various commercial establishments where alcoholic beverages were sold, and to deliver or transport such beverages in his car.  (Id.)  Finally, the complaint alleged that at the time of the accident, defendant was transporting alcoholic beverages and simultaneously driving while consuming an alcoholic beverage.  (Id.)  The California Supreme Court found these circumstances to be circumstances of aggravation or outrage and there was “no valid reason whatever for immunizing the driver himself from the exposure to punitive damages given the demonstrable and almost inevitable risk visited upon the innocent public by his voluntary conduct as alleged in the complaint.” (Id. at 898.) 

Subsequently, the appellate court in Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, clarified that “[t]he risk of injury to others from ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily probable,” and punitive damages may be warranted where the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s decision to drive while intoxicated made the risk of harm to others probable.  (Dawes, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at 89.)  In Dawes, the circumstances constituted more than the “ordinary driving while intoxicated,” where there was a probable risk of injury to others due to the defendant’s driving while intoxicated, at a high rate of speed, zigzagging through traffic, in the middle of the afternoon, and in locations of heavy pedestrian and vehicle traffic.  (Id. at 88-89.)   

Such circumstances showing a probable risk of injury to others have not been alleged here. While it has been alleged that Defendant voluntarily consumed alcohol to the point of intoxication knowing he would later operate his motor vehicle and that he drove at an excessive speed when he made a U-turn, the Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient allegations regarding the circumstances of the incident showing risk of harm to others was probable and that Defendant consciously disregarded the probable risk of injury to others. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages with leave to amend. Any amended complaint must be filed within 20 days.

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.