Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV15897, Date: 2023-11-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV15897    Hearing Date: November 17, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

This case involves alleged injuries from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on September 12, 2020. Plaintiff Fernando Cervantes (Plaintiff) now moves to quash two subpoenas for Plaintiff’s records at Chaffey Adult School and Chaffey High School, served by Defendant Postmates, LLC (Defendant). Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions against Defendant. In the alternative, Plaintiff requests a protective order. Defendant opposes and Plaintiff replies.

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure § 1987.1(a) states:

If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

“The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. [Citation omitted.] In Hill, [the California Supreme Court] established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation omitted.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. [citation omitted].” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 533 (citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)

“[Prior] cases correctly recognize that when a discovery request seeks information implicating the constitutional right of privacy, to order discovery simply upon a showing that the Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 test for relevance has been met is an abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.] But they also stand for the proposition that whenever discovery of facially private information is sought, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate a “ ‘compelling state interest’ ” [citation omitted] or “compelling need” [citation omitted]. Although in this they are not alone [citation omitted], they nevertheless are incorrect.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) “To the extent prior cases require a party seeking discovery of private information to always establish a compelling interest or compelling need, without regard to the other considerations articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., [citation omitted], they are disapproved.” (Id. at 557.)

“Only obvious invasions of interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) When lesser interests are at stake, “the strength of the countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information var[ies] according to the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and protective measures.” (Id.) “The trial courts in exercising their discretion should keep in mind that the Legislature has suggested that, where possible, the court should impose partial limitations rather than outright denial of discovery.” (Id. at 559 [quotation omitted].)

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 provides that “the court may in its discretion award the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing [a motion to quash], including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc. section 1987.2(a).)

DISCUSSION

The subpoenas to Chaffey High School and Chaffey Adult School seek: “ANY AND ALL SCHOLASTIC RECORDS PERTAINING TO FERNANDO CERVANTES, TO INCLUDE GRADES, ATTENDANCE RECORDS, TRANSCRIPTS, INTELLIGENCE TESTING RECORDS AND COUNSELING RECORDS, SS#: UNKNOWN, DOB: March 16, 1988. DATE OF INJURY SEPTEMBER 12, 2020.” (Gomez Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A.)

Plaintiff first argues that the request is overly broad and not relevant. Defendant contends the information is relevant because Plaintiff asserts he suffers from traumatic brain injury and cognitive impairment due to the subject accident. (Andrews Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. 1, FROG 6.2, 6.3.) Plaintiff is also seeking damages for back pay and front pay. (First Amended Complaint, 18.) As a result, Defendant argues that the information is needed for experts to determine his pre-accident cognitive baseline and for a vocational rehabilitation expert to ascertain his level of competency and vocation prospects pre-accident and post-accident. As a result, Plaintiff’s scholastic records appear relevant since they could provide information about his cognitive abilities before the accident. Though Plaintiff argues that Defendant already possesses the most relevant information about his cognitive abilities through Plaintiff’s medical records, Plaintiff does not state whether those records include information before the accident. (Reply, 5–6.)  As a result, Plaintiff fails to show that the educational records are irrelevant.

Second, Plaintiff argues that his right of privacy is infringed by the subpoenas. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has the burden to show a compelling need for this information. However, as stated above in Williams v. Superior Court, a compelling need is only required in obvious invasions fundamental to personal autonomy. As a result, Plaintiff has the burden to first establish the three Hill factors. However, he fails to address whether there is a serious threatened intrusion.[1] He further does not address whether there are protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy, such as any limiting language. Therefore, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s privacy objection.

Plaintiff also argues any social security numbers should be redacted from the scholastic records. Plaintiff cites Smith v. Superior Court In and For San Joaquin County (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 6 for the assertion that social security numbers are deemed irrelevant.  However, the court in Smith did not state such a broad principle. Instead, the court found that interrogatory requests, one of which asked a party to list their social security number, was “clearly irrelevant” in that particular motor vehicle accident case. (Id. at 7, 9, 13.)  Plaintiff also cites California Rules of Court, rule 1.20(b). The Court believes that Plaintiff meant to cite rule 1.201(a) which states: “[t]o protect personal privacy and other legitimate interests, parties and their attorneys must not include, or must redact where inclusion is necessary, the following identifiers from all pleadings and other papers filed in the court's public file, whether filed in paper or electronic form, unless otherwise provided by law or ordered by the court:

(1)  Social security numbers. If an individual's social security number is required in a pleading or other paper filed in the public file, only the last four digits of that number may be used.”

Defendant has indicated that Defendant will comply with Rule 1.201. (Opp., 7.) Based on this assertion, and lacking any contrary authority, the fact Plaintiff’s social security number may incidentally appear on records is not enough to limit discovery.

Plaintiff alternatively seeks a protective order, but does not provide any argument regarding what specifically Plaintiff is requesting. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.020, courts “shall limit the scope of discovery if” the court “determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” A “court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person.” (Id.)¿The “motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration.” (Id.) 

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to show that the intrusion of the subpoenas clearly outweighs the likelihood that admissible evidence will be discoverable. Plaintiff argues that Defendant seeks this information to gather improper character evidence. (Reply, 6.) However, that argument is premature in the pre-trial phase since Plaintiff can make evidentiary objections at trial. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to show a burden, expense, or intrusiveness of the discovery.

Lastly, both parties seek monetary sanctions in connection with this motion. However, the Court finds that the motion was not made in bad faith and therefore, declines to award sanctions to either party under section 1987.2.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motions to quash subpoenas for Chaffey High School and Chaffey Adult School.

Plaintiff to provide notice and file a proof of service of such.