Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV19328, Date: 2024-11-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV19328    Hearing Date: November 7, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

PLEASE NOTE THAT THE COURT IS UNAVAILABLE FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ON THE MOTION. IF A PARTY REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT, THE HEARING WILL BE CONTINUED TO NOVEMBER 8, 2024 AT 1:30 P.M.

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

On June 14, 2022, Plaintiff Hector Carbajal (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Kevin Mauricio Gutierrez Munoz (“Munoz”), Postmates, Inc., Mario Santiago Vasquez Linares, Tobby Rolf Alvestad, and Does 1 to 24 for negligence based on a motor vehicle accident that occurred on February 13, 2021.

Defendant Tobby Rolf Alvestad (“Alvestad”) now moves for an order that the settlement entered between Plaintiff and himself was in good faith. Defendant/ Cross-complainant Postmates, LLC (“Postmates”) opposes. Co-defendant Mario Santiago Vasquez Linares (“Linares”) has filed a notice of joinder in opposition. Alvestad replies.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under section 877.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, “[a] determination by the court that [a] settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor . . . from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor . . . for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6 (c).) Any party to an action may move for an order determining whether a settlement between the plaintiff and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors was made in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a)(1).) “The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).)

Section 877.6 requires “that the courts review [settlement] agreements made under its aegis to insure that the settlements appropriately balance the . . . statute’s dual objectives” (i.e., providing an “equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault” and encouraging parties to resolve their disputes by way of settlement.) (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 494 (hereafter, Tech-Bilt).) In Tech-Bilt, the court set forth the factors to consider when determining whether a settlement is made in good faith. The Tech-Bilt factors are: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 498-501.) Not every factor will apply in every case. (Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (Shell Oil Co.) (2015) 242 Cal.4th 894, 909.)

“ ‘A determination as to the good faith of a settlement, within the meaning of section 877.6, necessarily requires the trial court to examine and weigh a number of relevant factors, [fn. omitted] one of the most important of which is the settling party's proportionate liability.’ [citation.] If ‘there is no substantial evidence to support a critical assumption as to the nature and extent of a settling defendant's liability, then a determination of good faith based upon such assumption is an abuse of discretion.’” (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1350.)

However, the rule in Tech-Bilt that the settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be, has an exception. “[B]ad faith is not established merely by a showing that a settling defendant with limited ability to satisfy a judgment will pay less than his or her theoretical proportionate share: ‘Such a rule would unduly discourage settlements. “For the damages are often speculative, and the probability of legal liability therefor is often uncertain or remote. And even where the claimant's damages are obviously great, and the liability therefor certain, a disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint tortfeasor.” [Citation.]’” (Schmid v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1244, 1248 [quoting Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499]; see also City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1264 [“The wealth or non-wealth of the settling defendant is a factor for the trial court to consider under Tech-Bilt.”].)  

Schmid involved a car accident where the plaintiff alleged $500,000 in damages. (Schmid, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at 1247.) The defendant driver, Schmid, offered her insurance policy limit of $55,000 as a settlement. Even though the trial court denied the motion for good faith because the settlement was disproportional to her liability, the Court of Appeal reversed because the settlement represented the policy limit, there was undisputed evidence that Schmid had no other assets, and the non-settling defendant had failed to oppose the motion. (Id. at 1248–49.)  

“All affidavits relied upon as probative must state evidentiary facts; they must show facts and circumstances from which the ultimate fact sought to be proved may be deduced by the court. [citation.] Affidavits or declarations setting forth only conclusions, opinions or ultimate facts are to be held insufficient; even an expert's opinion cannot rise to the dignity of substantial evidence if it is unsubstantiated by facts. [citation.]” (Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834.)

“The party asserting the lack of good faith . . . [is] permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to [the above] factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of [Section 877.6]. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500.)

DISCUSSION

In this case, Plaintiff alleges he was injured as a pedestrian in a three-car collision, resulting in Alvestad’s car ricocheting from the collision and striking Plaintiff on a sidewalk. Plaintiff and Alvestad have settled for $100,000, representing Alvestad’s policy limit.

Alvestad argues the police report found that Munoz was completely at fault. Munoz, on the other hand disputes this and contends he entered the intersection on a green light, and Linares and Alvestad ran the red light. (Perkins Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. A.) As a result, liability is disputed. Alvestad testified that he was driving through the intersection on a green light when Linares’ vehicle hit him on the left side, causing him to go off the road and into the brick wall with Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 5, Exh. B.) Plaintiff sustained fractures to his left tibia and fibula. (Id. ¶ 6.) Alvestad asserts the settlement represents his policy limits and there was no collusion or fraud in reaching the settlement. Linares was purportedly delivering food through the Postmates Application at the time of the incident.

In opposition, Postmates first argues that the settlement at issue here has not occurred since it is conditioned on the Court’s granting this motion. However, Postmates fails to show how this condition affects the Court’s consideration of the instant motion.

Next, it argues that Alvestad has not calculated Plaintiff’s potential recovery, or that the $100,000 policy limit is his only coverage and does not show an allocation of the settlement to Postmates. However, Postmates asserts that Linares was struck first by Munoz, and does not appear to dispute Alvestad’s recounting of the incident. (Opp., 7.) Next, Postmates asserts that Plaintiff’s Statement of Damages claims $2.5 million for pain and suffering, $2.5 million for emotional distress, and $2 million in economic damages. Postmates also points out that Alvestad did not produce the settlement agreement.[1]

            The Court recognizes that Alvestad should pay less in settlement than at trial. However, Alvestad has not discussed his potential liability for being the vehicle that struck Plaintiff and how this affects his proportional liability in relation to the other defendants, nor does Alvestad calculate Plaintiff’s approximate damages. Moreover, Alvestad provides no other information about his assets such that the Court could find that the reasoning in Schmid applies.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the motion for determination of good faith settlement is DENIED without prejudice.

Moving party shall give notice of the ruling and file a proof of service of such.