Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV19356, Date: 2023-08-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV19356 Hearing Date: March 19, 2024 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the
Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent
authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
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DEPT: |
32 |
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HEARING DATE: |
March
19, 2024 |
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CASE NUMBER: |
22STCV19356 |
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MOTIONS: |
Motion
for Terminating Sanctions |
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Defendant Miguel Velasquez dba Montebello
Racing Stables |
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OPPOSING PARTY: |
None
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BACKGROUND
Defendant Miguel Velasquez dba Montebello Racing Stables (“Defendant”)
moves for terminating sanctions against Plaintiff Miguel Mungia in pro per
(“Plaintiff”) for failure to comply with the Court’s discovery orders.
Defendant also seeks monetary sanctions. No opposition has been filed.
LEGAL
STANDARD
“To
the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method
or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected
party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may
impose…sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the
discovery process.” (Code Civ. Proc. section 2023.030.) The court may impose a
terminating sanction for misuse of the discovery process by any of the following:
“(1) An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party
engaging in the misuse of the discovery process; (2) An order staying further
proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed; (3) An order
dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party; (4) An order
rendering a judgment by default against that party.” (Code Civ. Proc. §
2023.030(d).) Failing to respond or to
submit to an authorized method of discovery, or
disobeying
a court order to provide discovery, constitutes a
misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d), (g).)
“The trial court may order a terminating sanction for discovery abuse
‘after considering the totality of the circumstances: [the] conduct of the
party to determine if the actions were willful; the detriment to the
propounding party; and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain the
discovery.’” (Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th
377, 390, quoting Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal. App. 4th 1225,
1246.)
“Generally, ‘[a] decision to order terminating sanctions should not be
made lightly. But where a violation is
willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less
severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the
trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction.’” (Los
Defensores, supra, 223 Cal. App. 4th at p. 390 [citation omitted].)
“Under this standard, trial courts have properly imposed terminating
sanctions when parties have willfully disobeyed one or more discovery orders.”
(Los Defensores, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 390 citing Lang, supra,
77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1244-1246 [discussing cases]; see, e.g., Collisson
& Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1617-1622
[terminating sanctions imposed (by striking the defendant’s Answer and
subsequently granting default judgment) after defendants failed to comply with
one court order to produce discovery]; Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 481, 491, disapproved on other grounds in Garcia
v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 478, n. 4 [terminating sanctions
imposed against the plaintiff for failing to comply with a discovery order and
for violating various discovery statutes].)
DISCUSSION
On September 9, 2022, Defendant propounded written discovery on
Plaintiff, who was then represented by counsel. Plaintiff’s then-counsel was
granted multiple extensions to respond while counsel established contact with
Plaintiff.
On May 15, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to be
relieved. The basis for the motion was a breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship and failure to contact Plaintiff despite multiple attempts. (See
Decl. in Support, 4/18/23.) After counsel was relieved, Defendant’s counsel
sent a meet and confer letter on June 15, 2023, seeking discovery responses.
(Wallick Decl. ¶ 6.) Defendant eventually filed three motions to compel which
the Court granted on August 21, 2023 and August 23, 2023. The motions were
unopposed. Additionally, after Plaintiff failed to attend his noticed
deposition, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to compel Plaintiff’s
deposition on August 17, 2023. The Court also awarded monetary sanctions.
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not served any discovery responses,
and has not appeared for deposition, in violation of the Court’s discovery
orders. (Id. ¶ 16.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff has
not complied with the prior discovery orders and monetary sanctions have been
insufficient. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, Defendant’s motion for terminating sanctions is GRANTED.
The complaint as to Defendant Miguel Velasquez is dismissed with prejudice.
Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof
of service of such.