Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV19440, Date: 2024-10-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV19440    Hearing Date: October 4, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOVING PAPERS

1.     Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment

2.     Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

3.     Request for Judicial Notice

4.     Declaration of Trenton Williams in Support

5.     Declaration of Jocelyn A. Julian in Support

6.     Declaration of Beatrice Byrd-Williams in Support

7.     Separately Bound Volume of Exhibits in Support

OPPOSITION PAPERS

1.     Plaintiff’s Opposition

2.     Plaintiff’s Responses to Defendant’s Separate Statement

3.     Declaration of Hamed Yazdanpanah; Exhibits

REPLY PAPERS

1.     Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition

2.     Objections to Plaintiffs’ Evidence

BACKGROUND

On June 15, 2022, Plaintiffs Brian Massey and Latanya Wiggs (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants Trenton Williams, Honda North America, Inc., American Honda Motor Company Inc., Katrice Riley, and Does 1 to 50 for negligence related to a motor vehicle accident.

Plaintiffs allege that on August 24, 2024, Defendant owned, operated, or negligently entrusted a vehicle to collide into Plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Complaint ¶ 6-9.)

On September 13, 2023, the Court consolidated this case with Riley v. Trenton Williams, et al. (case number 22STCV24271).

Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Defendant” now moves for summary judgment against Plaintiffs complaint, arguing that Plaintiffs cannot establish vicarious liability or independent negligence since it merely leased the vehicle that Trenton Williams was driving. It also argues the Graves Amendment precludes liability. Plaintiffs oppose and Defendant replies.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) ¿“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)  Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise.  If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.) 

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)       

JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Court denies Defendant’s request for judicial notice, but considers the evidence submitted without objection by Plaintiffs.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The Court sustains Defendant’s objections to Plaintiffs’ evidence.

DISCUSSION

Negligence

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)

Generally, “one who places or entrusts his [or her] motor vehicle in the hands of one whom he [or she] knows, or from the circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver's disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness.”¿(Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063 [quoting Osborn v. Hertz Corp. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 708] [alteration in original; citation omitted].)¿ 

Respondeat Superior 

An employer is vicariously liable for an employee’s tort under the doctrine of respondeat superior if the tort was committed within the scope of the employment.¿ (See Montague v. AMN Healthcare, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1515, 1520.) “[A]n employee must be driving a personal vehicle in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident to extend vicarious liability to an employer.” (Newland v. County of Los Angeles¿(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 676, 678–79.) “A plaintiff suing an employer under the doctrine must prove the person who committed the tort was acting within the scope of his or her employment.” (Marez v. Lyft, Inc.¿(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 569, 577.)  

There are two tests for determining when an employee was “within the scope of employment.” Under the first test, “the employer is liable if the activities that caused the employee to become an instrument of danger to others were undertaken with the employer's permission and were of some benefit to the employer, or in the absence of proof of benefit, the activities constituted a customary incident of employment.” (Id. [quoting Purton v. Marriott Internat., Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 499, 509, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 912 (Purton)].)  

The second test (Halliburton Test) requires finding that “(1) the act performed was either required or incident to his duties or (2) the employee's misconduct could be reasonably foreseen by the employer in any event. [citation.] ¿In this test, foreseeability means that in the context of the particular enterprise, an employee's conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among the costs of the employer's business. [citation.]” (Marez, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 577.)  

Graves Amendment

The Graves Amendment provides in pertinent part: 

“An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person … shall not be liable under the law of any State … by reason of being the owner of the vehicle … for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if— 

(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and 

(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)”

(49 U.S.C. §30106 (a).)

“The term ‘affiliate’ means a person other than the owner that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the owner. In the preceding sentence, the term ‘control’ means the power to direct the management and policies of a person whether through ownership of voting securities or otherwise.” (49 U.S.C. §30106 (d).)

The Graves Amendment also contains the following “savings clause”: 

“Nothing in this section supersedes the law of any State or political subdivision thereof— 

(1) imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle; or 

(2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law.”

(49 U.S.C. § 30106 (b).)

California Vehicle Code section 17150 provides that “[e]very owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle … by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.”¿However, under Vehicle Code section 17151, where the basis for liability is permissive use and the relationship between the owner and the driver is not that of “principal and agent or master and servant,” the owner's liability is limited by statute to $15,000 per person, not to exceed $30,000 per accident.¿ 

The Court finds the case of Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. (11th Cir. 2008) 540 F.3d 1242 to be instructive. There, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Graves Amendment preempts Florida’s tort liability law, which “imposes strict vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to another.” (Garcia, supra, 540 F.3d at 1245 [citation omitted].) Similar to California Vehicle Code section 17151, Florida’s legislature also imposed statutory caps on the amount of vicarious liability a rental car company could face. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that this statutory cap was a “financial responsibility” law within the meaning of the savings clause. (Id. at 1247.) Rather, the court found that “financial responsibility is closely linked to insurance requirements.” (Id.) The court concluded that “neither the common law imposition of vicarious liability on rental car companies, nor the Florida legislature’s endorsement of and limitations on such vicarious liability, constitutes a 'financial responsibility' requirement. … [States] simply may not impose such judgments against rental car companies based on the negligence of their lessees. [citation omitted.]” (Id. at 1249.) 

Analysis

Here, the following facts are undisputed. The car accident that is the subject of this case took place on Monday, April 24, 2020 at approximately 4:00 p.m., at the intersection of Manhattan Beach Blvd. and Freeman Avenue in Lawndale, California (the “Incident”). (UMF 1.) The accident was a two-vehicle collision involving a 2019 Honda Insight driven by Mr. Williams and a 2016 Nissan Sentra driven by Katrice Riley, in which plaintiffs Massey and Wiggs were passengers. (UMF 2.) At the time of the incident, Mr. Williams was driving the Honda Insight from Jamba Juice to a friend’s home after Mr. Williams had finished working. (UMF 3.) At the time of the incident, the Honda Insight was being leased by Trenton Williams’s mother, Beatrice Byrd-Williams. (UMF 4.) At the time of the incident, Beatrice Byrd-Williams was employed by Honda R&D Americas, Inc. (UMF 5.) At the time of the incident, Beatrice Byrd-Williams was leasing the Vehicle from AHM pursuant to the optional personal-lease benefit offered by her employer as part of her compensation package. (UMF 6.) At the time of the August 24, 2020 incident, Trenton Williams had not previously been involved in any other vehicle accidents and had received no traffic tickets. (UMF 13.) AHM was the lessor of the Vehicle and held title to the Vehicle. (UMF 15.)

Defendant sets forth the following additional facts:

-        Beatrice Byrd-Williams was not required, requested, or relied upon to drive or use her Honda Insight for Honda R&D Americas, Inc. or AHM at any time. (UMF 10.)

-        Trenton Williams was not working for AHM at the time of the incident.[1] (UMF 11.)

-        Trenton Williams was never an employee of AHM or any other Honda entity. (UMF 12.)

-        American Honda Finance Corporation is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc., which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Honda Motor Co., Ltd.[2] (UMF 18.)

-        AHM and American Honda Finance Corporation “provide various forms of financing in the United States and Canada to purchasers and lessees of Honda and Acura products,” including new motor vehicles. (UMF 19.)

-        AHM and American Honda Finance Corporation “acquire close-end vehicle lease contracts between Honda and Acura dealers and their customers primarily for leases of new Honda and Acura automobiles … We service the leases we acquire.” (UMF 20.)

-        AHM is an authorized distributor of Honda and Acura products, including motor vehicles, and sponsors incentive financing programs in the United States. These programs offer promotional rates on loans and leases to purchasers, lessees, and dealers of Honda and Acura products.” (UMF 21.)

-        Among other operational risks relating to the business of AHM and AHFC, “we are exposed to residual value risk on the vehicles we lease.” (UMF 22.)

Defendant has met its initial burden to establish the absence of a triable issue of fact. The burden shifts to Plaintiffs. In opposition, Plaintiffs do not argue that Defendant negligently entrusted the vehicle to Williams or his mother Beatrice Byrd-Williams. Instead, Plaintiffs argue there is question of fact whether Williams was a permissive user of the vehicle under Vehicle Code section 17150 and whether Williams was an “employee” of AHM because “he was in the service of AHM when he drove the subject vehicle at the request of AHM’s manager, Beatrice Byrd-Williams.” (Opp. at p. 10.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Graves Amendment does not apply because there is no evidence of a lessor/lessee relationship since Defendant did not provide the lease agreement or an affidavit of a person with knowledge, and because the lease “was not made or offered in the normal ‘trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles’.” (Opp. at p. 15.)

However, Plaintiff offers no admissible evidence to dispute the declarations of Williams and Byrd-Williams. Moreover, even if Defendant permitted Byrd-Williams to lease the vehicle and somehow benefitted from Williams being allowed to drive it, there is no evidence that Williams was an employee or otherwise working for Defendant at the time he drove the car and got into the accident, sufficient to support a theory of respondeat superior. Plaintiff also offers no evidence to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether Defendant gave express or implied permission for Williams to drive the vehicle. Plaintiff argues that there is a question of fact regarding “what he was doing and who he was doing it for,” but the only evidence presented is a purported dispute about whether Williams was a full-time student or worked at Jamba Juice. (Opp. at p. 9.) This dispute does not establish or raise an inference of implied permission. Regarding the Graves Amendment, Plaintiff argues that there is no evidence of the lease agreement, but does not dispute that AHM was the lessor and holder of title to the vehicle and that Byrd-Williams was leasing the vehicle from AHM. (UMF 6, 15.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the lease was not made in the normal business of renting, but the plain language of the statute requires the owner or affiliate to be engaged in the business of leasing motor vehicles, for which Plaintiff does not demonstrate a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant shall file and serve a proposed judgment within 10 days.

            Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.