Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV23919, Date: 2024-04-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV23919    Hearing Date: April 3, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOVING PAPERS

1.      Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication; Memorandum of Points and Authorities

2.      Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

3.      Declaration of Amy Aquino in Support

OPPOSITION PAPERS

1.      Plaintiffs’ Opposition

2.      Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Separate Statement

3.      Plaintiffs’ Objections to Evidence

4.      Declaration of Catherine Lerer in Support and Supporting Exhibits

5.      Declaration of Roy Huntsman in Support and Supporting Exhibits

6.      Notice of Lodgment of Exhibits

REPLY PAPERS

1.      Defendants’ Reply

2.      Objections to Plaintiffs’ Evidence

3.      Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiffs’ Objections

4.      Reply Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support

5.      Declaration of Ginger Pigott in Support

BACKGROUND

On July 25, 2022, Plaintiffs Trinidad Garcia, Patricia Garcia, Trinidad Garcia Jr., Jesus Garcis, Velia Garcia Esparza, Modesta Garcia Esparza, Eliue Garcia, and Erbey Garcia (“Plaintiffs”) filed a survival action and wrongful death action resulting from a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiffs also allege a negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of action. Plaintiffs allege that decedent Patricia Esparza (“Decedent”) was killed by Defendant Charles Milton Fullenwider Jr. (“Fullenwider”), who was driving a vehicle owned and rented by Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company and EAN Holdings, LLC. (Complaint, 6.)

Moving Defendants Enterprise Leasing Company-West, LLC and EAN Holdings, LLC now move for summary judgment, or alternatively summary adjudication, arguing the Graves Amendment bars liability, that they did not negligently entrust the vehicle to Fullenwider, and that they owe no contractual duty to insure against Plaintiffs’ alleged harms. Plaintiffs oppose and Defendants reply.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.”¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) ¿“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].)  Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise.  If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.) 

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.  Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].)  Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.  Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)           

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The Court declines to rule on Plaintiffs’ objection number 1 and Defendants’ objections as they have no effect on the ruling herein.

DISCUSSION

Negligence

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)

Graves Amendment

The Graves Amendment provides in pertinent part:   

“An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person … shall not be liable under the law of any State … by reason of being the owner of the vehicle … for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if— 

(1) the owner . . . is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and 

(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)”

(49 U.S.C. §30106 (a).)

The Graves Amendment also contains the following “savings clause”: 

“Nothing in this section supersedes the law of any State or political subdivision thereof— 

(1) imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle; or 

(2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law.”

(49 U.S.C. § 30106 (b).)

California Vehicle Code section 17150 provides that “[e]very owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle … by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.” However, under Vehicle Code section 17151, where the basis for liability is permissive use and the relationship between the owner and the driver is not that of “principal and agent or master and servant,” the owner's liability is limited by statute to $15,000 per person, not to exceed $30,000 per accident. 

The Court finds the case of Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. (11th Cir. 2008) 540 F.3d 1242 to be instructive. There, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Graves Amendment preempts Florida’s tort liability law, which “imposes strict vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to another.” (Garcia, supra, 540 F.3d at 1245 [citation omitted].) Similar to California Vehicle Code section 17151, Florida’s legislature also imposed statutory caps on the amount of vicarious liability a rental car company could face. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that this statutory cap was a “financial responsibility” law within the meaning of the savings clause. (Id. at 1247.) Rather, the court found that “financial responsibility is closely linked to insurance requirements.” (Id.) The court concluded that “neither the common law imposition of vicarious liability on rental car companies, nor the Florida legislature’s endorsement of and limitations on such vicarious liability, constitutes a 'financial responsibility' requirement. … [States] simply may not impose such judgments against rental car companies based on the negligence of their lessees. [citation omitted.]” (Id. at 1249.)

Here, Plaintiffs argue that they “have only pursued Enterprise Defendants for statutory ownership liability.” (Opposition at p. 4.) Plaintiffs further argue that they did not sue Enterprise Defendants for vicarious liability or negligent entrustment, but yet argue that Defendants are liable pursuant to California Vehicle Code section 17150. (Opposition at pp. 7-8.) Plaintiffs have not set forth any facts to establish negligence or any wrongdoing by Defendants. (See PAMF 38-54.) Rather, Plaintiffs’ theory as to Defendants pursuant to section 17150 is one of vicarious liability. (See PAMF 49-50.)

Defendants have met their burden of establishing that the Graves Amendment preempts liability in this case. It is undisputed that Enterprise and EAN were engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles at the time of the renting of the subject vehicle, and that there was no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of Defendants. (UMF 4-12.) Plaintiffs seek to recover solely under the theory that Defendants were owners of a vehicle negligently driven by Fullenwider.[1] The Graves Amendment expressly provides that Defendants shall not be liable.

Because summary judgment is proper, the Court will not rule on Defendants’ remaining issues for summary adjudication. Though Plaintiffs argue that the parties originally agreed to settle this case in July 2023 and have a pending motion to enforce the settlement, that issue is not contained in the pleadings of this case. (Opposition at p. 10.) Additionally, Plaintiffs’ evidence does not show that the parties signed the purported settlement, and no motion to enforce the settlement has been filed.[2] Therefore, it does not appear to be a basis to deny the summary judgment motion.  

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Defendants Enterprise Leasing Company-West, LLC and EAN Holdings, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendants shall file and serve a proposed judgment within 10 days.

            Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling and file a proof of service of such.