Judge Anne Hwang, Case Number: 22STCV23955, Date: 2024-08-15 Tentative Ruling

PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.

1. Plaintiff’s Opposition; Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts; Plaintiff’s Objections; Declaration of George Chapjian, Declaration of Chris Kasian; Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice

2. Declaration of George Chapjian in Response to Defendant City of Monrovia’s Objections

On November 16, 2022, Plaintiff Raquel Boyadjian (“Plaintiff”) filed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants City of Monrovia and Does 1 to 10. Against Moving Defendant City of Monrovia (“Defendant”), Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for dangerous condition of public property under Government Code section 835. Plaintiff alleges that on November 18, 2020, she was jogging on a walking path in a park at 620 S Shamrock Ave, Monrovia, when he tripped on a pothole and fell. (FAC ¶ 8-9.)

Defendant now moves for summary judgment, arguing the trail immunity under Government Code section 831.4, applies.

The Court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice of Plaintiff’s complaint, the first amended complaint, and Monrovia Municipal Code sections 12.32.010 and 12.32.020.

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of the google earth view of the Recreation Park and the “Citywide Park Master Plan” but considers it as evidence filed in support and relied upon by George Chapjian.

Plaintiff filed one document in opposition; on page 15 of the pdf is a document entitled Plaintiff’s “Objections to the Defendant City of Monrovia’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts”, which the Court notes are not objections filed separately, nor are otherwise in compliance with California Rule of Court 3.1354(b), in particular by not stating the grounds for each objection. Accordingly, the Court declines to rule on the “objections.”

The Court declines to rule on Defendant's objections as they have no effect on the ruling herein.

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Ibid.; Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474 [summary judgment standards held by Aguilar apply to summary adjudication motions].) Further, in line with Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “[o]n a motion for summary adjudication, the trial court has no discretion to exercise. If a triable issue of material fact exists as to the challenged causes of action, the motion must be denied. If there is no triable issue of fact, the motion must be granted.” (Fisherman's Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320.)

“On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility.” (Id. at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

Government Code section 831.4 provides immunity to public entities for injuries caused by the condition of walkways if they constitute a “trail” within the meaning of the statute.¿ Section 831.4 provides, in relevant part, as follows:¿

“A public entity . . . is not liable for an injury caused by a condition of:¿

(a) Any unpaved road which provides access to fishing, hunting, camping, hiking, riding, including animal and all types of vehicular riding, water sports, recreational or scenic areas and which is not a (1) city street or highway or (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) public street or highway of a joint highway district, boulevard district, bridge and highway district or similar district formed for the improvement or building of public streets or highways.

(c) Any paved trail, walkway, path, or sidewalk on an easement of way which has been granted to a public entity, which easement provides access to any unimproved property, so long as such public entity shall reasonably attempt to provide adequate warnings of the existence of any condition of the paved trail, walkway, path, or sidewalk which constitutes a hazard to health or safety. . . .”

Trail immunity “extends to trails that are used for the activities listed in subdivision (a), and to trails that are used solely for access to such activities . . . whether or not the trail is paved.”¿ (Amberger-Warren v. City of Piedmont (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1078.)¿ In considering whether trail immunity applies, the Court must consider (1) whether the alleged accident occurred on a trail under the accepted definitions of a trail and (2) whether the injury was caused by conditions of the trail.¿ (See id. at 1078, 1083.)¿

“Whether property qualifies for immunity ‘depends on a number of considerations, including accepted definitions of [the word trail], the purpose for which the property is designed and used, and the purpose of the immunity statute.”¿(Garcia v. American Golf Corp. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 532, 540 [citing Amberger-Warren].)¿ “The plainly stated purpose of immunity for recreational activities on public land is to encourage public entities to open their property for public recreational use, because ‘the burden and expense of putting such property in a safe condition and the expense of defending claims for injuries would probably cause many public entities to close such areas to public use.’ [Citations]” (Armenio v. County of San Mateo (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 413, 417.)

“[I]t is well established that trail immunity covers negligent maintenance of a trail, so the defendant could not be liable for the debris on the trail.”¿ (Arvizu v. City of Pasadena (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 760, 768; see also Leyva v. Crockett & Co, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1110-1111 [holding that trail immunity must extend to claims arising from the design of the trail, as well as its maintenance, and that location, no less than design must be immunized for the same reasons].) ¿¿¿

“The purpose for which a trail is used is ordinarily viewed as a factual issue, but it becomes a question of a law if only one conclusion is possible.”¿ (Armenio v. County of San Mateo (1994) 28 Cal. App. 4^th 413, 418.)

- On November 18, 2020, Plaintiff took her son to Recreation Park to play. (UMF 1.)

- While Plaintiff’s son was playing, Plaintiff went for a jog on the path within Recreation Park. (UMF 2.)

- While jogging on the path in Recreational Park, the conditions of the trail caused Plaintiff to trip and fall. (UMF 3.)

Defendant meets its burden to show that Plaintiff’s injury took place on a trail at the subject park, which is a recreational area, and the injury was caused by a condition of the trail. Therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish a triable issue of fact.

- Park contains recreational activity spaces, pathways, trails, walkways, roads, passageways, and streets. (PAMF 3.)

- The asphalt pedestrian path/walkway connects specific parts of the park to different streets. (PAMF 4.)

- The surface of the pedestrian path/walkway is different than other paths that lead to the recreational activities in the park. (PAMF 5.)

- The specific path in question is constructed of asphalt to allow automobiles, A TV's and other vehicles to travel through. (PAMF 7.)[1]

- The entrance of the specific path in question, is sloped similar to a driveway/curb ramp and is wide enough for vehicles to fit and drive over. (PAMF 8.)

- The paths that lead to the picnic areas are leveled dirt paths, the path that leads to the tennis and basketball courts are smooth and leveled concrete path, and the paths that leads to the basketball courts is a smooth and leveled brick path. (PAMF 9.)

First, Plaintiff argues trail immunity does not apply because Defendant’s Master Plan of the park does not specifically characterize the route as a “trail.” (Opp., 7.) However, as discussed above, courts rely on a multi-factor analysis to determine whether a path qualifies as a “trail”, regardless of the actual name it is given.[2] Plaintiff’s evidence, including that the walkway connects specific parts of the park to different streets, demonstrates that it is a trail. (Amberger-Warren, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 1079 [“a paved pathway through a park, and a ‘path,’ . . . is synonymous with a ‘trail.’”].)

Second, Plaintiff argues the purpose was not recreational. However, Plaintiff does not dispute that the path is used by pedestrians to access parts of the park and even has a sloped entrance for ADA access. (Opp., 3.) Plaintiff provides no evidence disputing that the park itself is an area for recreational use. Instead, Plaintiff sets forth evidence that paths leading to other areas of the park are made of different materials and that the subject path can accommodate vehicles.[3] However, Plaintiff sets forth no evidence establishing that it is not used concurrently for recreational purposes or to provide access to recreational activity. (Montenegro v. City of Bradbury (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 924, 932 [“[t]he fact that a trail has a dual use—recreational and non-recreational—does not undermine section 831.4, subdivision (b) immunity.”].)

Third, Plaintiff argues the purpose of the immunity was not to provide blanket liability for all injuries in a park walkway. However, the explicit purpose of the statute is to encourage public entities to open their property for public use since the cost of litigation could cause it to be closed. (See Montenegro, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at 932.)

Therefore, considering all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds the absence of a triable issue of fact. As a result, the motion for summary judgment is granted.

Therefore, Defendant City of Monrovia’s motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant shall file and serve a proposed judgment within 10 days.

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file proof of service of such.

[1] This fact is omitted in the second declaration of Chapjian.

[2] The Master Plan does not appear to label the specific path at issue. Moreover, Plaintiff’s evidence shows that the subject park has “pathways/trails”. (See Pl. Exh. B, Master Plan, at p. 14.) In addition, Plaintiff’s own expert refers to it as a path, or even a “walking path.” (Chapjian Decl. ¶ 12 [“The fact that the Defendant, City of Monrovia is calling their walkways a trail rather than a path does not change the fact that these are ‘developed’ walking paths inside developed City parks for people of all ages and abilities to use.”].)

[3] Plaintiff argues that the “pedestrian path/ walkway did not provide direct access to the park’s amenities.” (Opposition at p. 9.) However, Plaintiff does not explain why the grassy areas with trees surrounding the path are not part of the park’s amenities.

DEPARTMENT	32
HEARING DATE	August 15, 2024
CASE NUMBER	22STCV23955
MOTION	Motion for Summary Judgment
MOVING PARTY	Defendant City of Monrovia
OPPOSING PARTY	Plaintiff Raquel Boyadjian