Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV24794, Date: 2024-05-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV24794 Hearing Date: May 24, 2024 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the
Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent
authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
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DEPT: |
32 |
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HEARING DATE: |
May
24, 2024 |
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CASE NUMBER: |
22STCV24794 |
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MOTIONS: |
Motion
to Reclassify |
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Defendants Victor Uribe and Miller Freight
and Logistics, Inc. |
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OPPOSING PARTY: |
Plaintiff
Sayed R. Jaiyedi |
BACKGROUND
On August 1, 2022, Plaintiff Sayed R. Jaiyedi (“Plaintiff”) filed a
complaint against Defendants Victor Uribe, Miller Freight and Logistics, Inc.,
and Does 1 to 20 for negligence stemming from a motor vehicle accident.
Plaintiff designated this an unlimited civil case in the complaint.
Defendants Victor Uribe and Miller Freight and Logistics, Inc.
(“Defendants”) now move to reclassify this action as a limited civil case under
Code of Civil Procedure section 403.040. Plaintiff opposes and Defendants
reply.[1]
LEGAL
STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section
403.040 states:
“(a) The plaintiff,
cross-complainant, or petitioner may file a motion for reclassification within
the time allowed for that party to amend the initial pleading. The defendant or
cross-defendant may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed
for that party to respond to the initial pleading. The court, on its own
motion, may reclassify a case at any time. A motion for reclassification does
not extend the moving party's time to amend or answer or otherwise respond. The
court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification,
regardless of any fault or lack of fault, if the case has been classified in an
incorrect jurisdictional classification.
(b) If a party files a motion for
reclassification after the time for that party to amend that party's initial
pleading or to respond to a complaint, cross-complaint, or other initial
pleading, the court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification
only if both of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) The case is incorrectly
classified.
(2) The moving party shows good
cause for not seeking reclassification earlier.”
In Walker
v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, the California Supreme Court held
“a matter may be transferred when: (1) the absence of jurisdiction is apparent
before trial from the complaint, petition, or related documents, or (2) during
the course of pretrial litigation, it becomes clear that the matter will
necessarily result in a verdict below the superior court jurisdictional amount
and the court affords the parties an opportunity to contest the transfer.” (Walker,
supra, 53 Cal.3d at 262.) A matter may be reclassified from
unlimited to limited only if it appears to a legal certainty that the
plaintiff's damages will necessarily be less than $25,000. (Walker, supra,
53 Cal.3d at 262.) If there is a possibility that the damages will exceed
$25,000.00, the case cannot be transferred to limited. (Ibid.) This high
standard is appropriate in light of “the circumscribed procedures and recovery
available in the limited civil courts.” (Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005)
129 Cal.App.4th 266, 278.)
The test is
whether lack of jurisdiction is clear or virtually unattainable. (Walker, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 269.)
This standard involves an evaluation of the amount fairly in controversy, not
an adjudication of the merits of the claim, and requires a “high level of
certainty that [the] damage award will not exceed $25,000.” (Id.) The
trial court may believe it highly unlikely that plaintiff will recover the
amount demanded, but this is not enough to defeat jurisdiction, unless it
appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover the amount of the
demand. (Id. at 270.)
In
deciding whether a matter should be transferred, a trial court must look beyond
the pleadings but not so far as to trespass into the province of the trier of
fact. Pain and suffering are not subject to precise measurement by any scale,
and their translation into money damages is peculiarly the function of the
trier of the fact. (Maldonado v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th
397, 401.)
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues this case involves an alleged side scrape of two
vehicles passing each other that occurred on August 11, 2020. Plaintiff claims
$5,243 in medical special damages and received some chiropractic treatment
after the incident but was discharged in December 2020. Plaintiff was deposed
on July 19, 2023 and testified he is not seeking future medical treatment. (Purcell
Decl., Exh. B.)
Plaintiff has not produced an estimate for damages to his vehicle and
is not making a loss of income or earning capacity claim. To date, Defendants
contend Plaintiff has claimed $13,743 in damages. (Purcell Decl. ¶ 8.)
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants fail to consider
general damages for pain and suffering and that it is possible a trier of fact
may award $11,258. (Opp., 5.)
In reply, Defendants contend the general damages amount is five times
the medical specials and likely excessive.
However, seeing that general damages are peculiarly the function of
the trier of fact, and property damages have not been disclosed, the Court
cannot conclude to a high level of certainty that this case will result in
damages below $25,000. Additionally, the Court notes that the discovery
Defendants rely upon—Plaintiff’s form interrogatories and Plaintiff’s
deposition—are dated March 6, 2023 and July 19, 2023 respectively. (Purcell
Decl., Exh. A, B.) Therefore, Defendants also fail to show good cause for not
seeking reclassification earlier.
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Therefore, Defendants’ motion to reclassify is DENIED.
Defendants shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof
of service of such.
[1] In
reply, Defendants argue they did not receive actual notice of Plaintiff’s
opposition. Therefore, the Court excuses the late-filed reply and considers its
arguments.