Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV25565, Date: 2023-10-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV25565    Hearing Date: October 18, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

This case involves the death of Plaintiff’s son following an attack by an unknown assailant at an apartment complex owned and operated by Defendants Avalonbay Communities, Inc. and ASN Woodland Hills East, LLC’s (Defendants). Plaintiffs Estate of Christopher Pearson, and Jaclyn Gutierrez (Plaintiffs) allege that the subject property did not have adequate security measures, including functioning gate locks on the entrances and exits. (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 17.)

 Defendants now move for a protective order to prevent the disclosure of the identities and contact information of third parties, including current and former tenants, who made complaints regarding the entry and exit gates at the subject property for the last 10 years. Defendants have already produced work order summaries and email communications related to the entry and exit gates with identifying information redacted. (Motion, p. 10.)

Plaintiffs oppose and Defendants reply.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.020, a court shall limit the scope of discovery if the court “determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” A “court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person.” (Id.) The “motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration.” (Id.)

Similarly, courts must restrict the frequency or extent of a discovery method such as interrogatories or inspection of documents if it determines either of the following:

“(1) The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.

(2) The selected method of discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2019.030.) This can be done by moving for a protective order.

Additionally, discovery can be limited if it infringes on the right of privacy. “The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. [Citation omitted.] In Hill, [the California Supreme Court] established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation omitted.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. [citation omitted].” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 533 (citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)

MEET AND CONFER

The Court finds that Defendants have complied with the meet and confer requirements by attempting to informally resolve the issue. (Delashaw Decl. ¶ 24–27.)

DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that allowing Plaintiffs to receive the names of tenants who had complained of the entry and exits on the premises would infringe on the tenants’ right to privacy, and that the lease agreement prohibits disclosure without a court order. Defendants discuss the three Hill factors: (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances; and (3) a threatened intrusion that is serious.

Defendants first argue the identity and contact information of the tenants fall under the protected right of “informational privacy.”  The right to privacy protects against unwarranted, compelled disclosures of private or sensitive information regarding one’s personal life, including their financial affairs, political affiliations, and medical history. (Hooser v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 997, 1003-04 [disapproved on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531].) (See Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, 851 [the disclosure of sensitive medical information “is at the core of the protected informational privacy interest.”].)  Individuals also have a substantial interest in the privacy of their home, which can include personal addresses and telephone numbers. (Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1252.) Defendants have established a privacy interest in the identities and contact information of past and current tenants.

Second, Defendants argue there is an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in this scenario. The reasonable expectation of privacy is based on widely accepted community norms and as such, depends on the surrounding context. “Customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding particular activities may create or inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 36.) “[R]enters and applicants have a lessened expectation of privacy where the intrusion is confined to a specific setting or limited context….” (Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 896, 904 (DFEH).) Similarly, here, the information sought is confined to a limited context, where Plaintiff seeks information in the context of specific complaints about entry and exit gates. Moreover, the lease agreement contemplates that personal information may be disclosed pursuant to subpoena or court order. (Delashaw Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. B at AVB000037-38.) The lease agreement therefore gives rise to an expectation that private information could be disclosed in the context of a lawsuit.

            Third, Defendants argue the threatened intrusion is serious.  “Actionable invasions of privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 37.) Defendants argue that the intrusion is serious because Plaintiff will contact the individuals to seek information unrelated to their complaints about the gates. (Motion at p. 9.) However, there is no evidence before the Court that Plaintiff’s counsel will violate their ethical obligations regarding contacting witnesses. Moreover, to the extent that counsel asks questions broader than the topic of gates, presumably the topics will still be limited to the specific context of complaints and notice regarding the subject property. (See Opposition at p. 5.)

            In balancing the competing interests, the Court finds that a limited invasion of privacy furthers a substantial countervailing interest. Plaintiff argues that the names and contact information of individuals who complained to Defendants about the entry/ exit gates are necessary to discover Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants had prior notice of the defects on the property. (Opposition at pp. 4-5.) The Court finds that Defendants’ suggestion that Plaintiffs interview security guards, employees, and vendors is insufficient because those individuals do not necessarily know all of the complaints that have been made. In addition, Defendants have not established that the work orders respond to each complaint that has been made. Accordingly, Defendants’ argument that there are less intrusive means does not sufficiently respond to the asserted countervailing interest in discovering evidence of prior notice to Defendants.

            However, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s request appears to cover complaints broader than the asserted interest in prior notice of the defect of a door not closing or locking properly. Defendants argue that the request also covers topics such as a key fob not working properly. (Reply at pg. 2.) Defendant also argues that a request covering the past 10 years is overbroad. In its opposition, Plaintiff does not justify the length of time requested.

Accordingly, the Court orders Defendants to produce the names and contact information of current or former tenants who made complaints in the past five years that the entry/ exit gates at the subject property were not closing or locking properly. To the extent that Defendants seek a protective order governing the confidentiality of this information (see Reply at pg. 5), the parties are ordered to meet and confer and submit a joint stipulation and proposed order. The Court suggests that the parties refer to the model protective order available on the Los Angeles Superior Court’s website.

Sanctions are mandatory against the party that unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2017.020 (b); 2019.030 (c).)

Here the Court finds Defendants acted with substantial justification since they assert they could not release the information without a court order. (Delashaw Decl. ¶ 24.) 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court denies in part and grants in part Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order.

            Defendants shall provide notice of the Court’s order and file a proof of service of such.