Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV32272, Date: 2024-01-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV32272    Hearing Date: January 25, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

On October 3, 2022, Plaintiffs Patricia Mattar and Alexander Mattar filed a complaint against Defendants Paige Borenstein and Tina Borenstein (“Defendants”) for injuries related to a motor vehicle accident.

Plaintiff Alexander Mattar (“Plaintiff”) now moves to quash thirteen subpoenas issued by Defendants and directed to Plaintiff’s individual medical providers and pharmacy. Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions. Defendants oppose and Plaintiff replies.

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure § 1987.1(a) states:

If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

“The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. [Citation omitted.] In Hill, [the California Supreme Court] established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation omitted.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. [citation omitted].” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 533 (citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)

“[Prior] cases correctly recognize that when a discovery request seeks information implicating the constitutional right of privacy, to order discovery simply upon a showing that the Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 test for relevance has been met is an abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.] But they also stand for the proposition that whenever discovery of facially private information is sought, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate a “ ‘compelling state interest’ ” [citation omitted] or “compelling need” [citation omitted]. Although in this they are not alone [citation omitted], they nevertheless are incorrect.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) “To the extent prior cases require a party seeking discovery of private information to always establish a compelling interest or compelling need, without regard to the other considerations articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., [citation omitted], they are disapproved.” (Id. at 557.)

“Only obvious invasions of interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) When lesser interests are at stake, “the strength of the countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information var[ies] according to the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and protective measures.” (Id.) “The trial courts in exercising their discretion should keep in mind that the Legislature has suggested that, where possible, the court should impose partial limitations rather than outright denial of discovery.” (Id. at 559 [quotation omitted].)

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 provides that “the court may in its discretion award the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing [a motion to quash], including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc. section 1987.2(a).)

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.)

DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that liability is not disputed in this case. At issue are causation, the nature and extent of injuries, and the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s medical treatment. (Opp., 3.)

The subpoenas at issue request Plaintiff’s records from the past ten years including, “but not limited to examinations, medical history, diagnosis, treatment, testing, radiology, prognosis, prescriptions, and billing.” The subpoenas exclude “documents dealing with psychology and mental issues; reproductive system; and sexually transmitted diseases.” The subpoenas also seek a “breakdown of any and all x-ray films and/or MRI films taken.”

The last subpoena seeks Plaintiff’s pharmacy records from Walgreens Pharmacy for the past ten years.

Plaintiff argues that the thirteen subpoenas are overbroad in time and scope because they seek medical records from the past ten years and are not limited to the injuries Plaintiff is claiming: (1) low back/lumbar spine; and (2) neck/cervical spine. (Motion, 3–4.) Plaintiff states he will waive his knee injury claim. (Id.)

Defendants argue they are entitled to the records to determine whether Plaintiff’s injuries were pre-existing. (Opp., 4.) However, Defendant fails to set forth additional circumstances that would require medical records for the past ten years. The Court finds that five years is a reasonable time for Defendants to discover whether Plaintiff’s injuries were pre-existing before the incident.

Next, Plaintiff argues the subpoenas infringe on his right to privacy. A party’s medical records are privileged under the patient-physician privilege. (See Hale v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1424.)¿ “Discovery of constitutionally protected information is on a par with discovery of privileged information.”¿ (Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1387.)¿ Where the party filing an action has arguably waived the privacy in their protected or privileged information by filing a lawsuit, the waiver must be narrowly construed such that discovery is only permitted of those matters directly relevant to the party’s claims. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 858-859.)¿ Notwithstanding, the party still has privacy rights as to physical and mental conditions unrelated to the claimed injury.¿ (See id. at 864; Heller v. Norcal Mutual Insurance Co. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 30, 44.)¿¿ 

Defendants appear to argue that the court in Britt never stated that discovery was limited to certain body parts. Therefore, Defendants argue, because Plaintiff has put his general medical condition at issue, they are entitled to any records regarding his medical condition. (Opp., 6.)  However, the medical conditions claimed by Plaintiff in this case are specifically limited to certain areas of the body. Additionally, to allow records about any medical condition where only certain areas of the body are injured would frustrate the privacy right surrounding a party’s medical records. It would also run contrary to the assertion in Britt that a party has a privacy right to physical and mental conditions unrelated to the injury. Additionally, Plaintiff has shown that the medical records at issue are protected by a right of privacy, and that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and serious threatened intrusion since they may uncover conditions not related to Plaintiff’s injuries in the low back/lumbar spine and neck/cervical spine. Therefore, weighing the interest in disclosure against the feasible alternatives, the Court finds that Defendants’ subpoenas must be limited to records for the past five years regarding Plaintiff’s back, neck, and spine only.

Regarding the pharmacy subpoena to Walgreens, there is no limit to prescriptions related to Plaintiff’s injuries at issue in this case. The subpoenas also seek records for the past ten years. Patients retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in prescription records. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court¿(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 621, 643.) Here, because the records seek all prescriptions used by Plaintiff for the past ten years, it is overbroad. The subpoenas must be limited to the injuries at issue in this case and be limited to the past five years.  Therefore, the motion to quash the pharmacy subpoena is also granted. 

The Court finds this motion was not made in bad faith and declines to award sanctions to either party.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to quash subpoenas.

Plaintiff to provide notice and file a proof of service of such.

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

On October 3, 2022, Plaintiffs Patricia Mattar and Alexander Mattar filed a complaint against Defendants Paige Borenstein and Tina Borenstein (“Defendants”) for injuries related to a motor vehicle accident.

Plaintiff Patricia Mattar (“Plaintiff”) now moves to quash 23 deposition subpoenas issued by Defendants and directed to Plaintiff’s individual medical providers and pharmacies. Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions. Defendants oppose and Plaintiff replies.[1]

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure § 1987.1(a) states:

If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

“The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. [Citation omitted.] In Hill, [the California Supreme Court] established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation omitted.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. [citation omitted].” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 533 (citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)

“[Prior] cases correctly recognize that when a discovery request seeks information implicating the constitutional right of privacy, to order discovery simply upon a showing that the Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 test for relevance has been met is an abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.] But they also stand for the proposition that whenever discovery of facially private information is sought, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate a “ ‘compelling state interest’ ” [citation omitted] or “compelling need” [citation omitted]. Although in this they are not alone [citation omitted], they nevertheless are incorrect.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) “To the extent prior cases require a party seeking discovery of private information to always establish a compelling interest or compelling need, without regard to the other considerations articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., [citation omitted], they are disapproved.” (Id. at 557.)

“Only obvious invasions of interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) When lesser interests are at stake, “the strength of the countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information var[ies] according to the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and protective measures.” (Id.) “The trial courts in exercising their discretion should keep in mind that the Legislature has suggested that, where possible, the court should impose partial limitations rather than outright denial of discovery.” (Id. at 559 [quotation omitted].)

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 provides that “the court may in its discretion award the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing [a motion to quash], including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc. section 1987.2(a).)

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.)

DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that liability is not disputed in this case. At issue are causation, the nature and extent of injuries, and the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s medical treatment. (Opp., 3.)

The subpoenas at issue request Plaintiff’s records from the past ten years including, “but not limited to examinations, medical history, diagnosis, treatment, testing, radiology, prognosis, prescriptions, and billing.” The subpoenas exclude “documents dealing with psychology and mental issues; reproductive system; and sexually transmitted diseases.” The subpoenas also seek a “breakdown of any and all x-ray films and/or MRI films taken.”

Two subpoenas seek Plaintiff’s pharmacy records from CVS Pharmacy and Walgreens Pharmacy for the past ten years.

Plaintiff argues that the 23 subpoenas are overbroad in time and scope because they seek medical records from the past ten years and are not limited to the injuries Plaintiff is claiming: (1) low back/lumbar spine; and (2) neck/cervical spine. (Motion, 3–4.)

Defendants argue they are entitled to the records to determine whether Plaintiff’s injuries were pre-existing. (Opp., 4.) However, Defendants fail to set forth additional circumstances that would require medical records for the past ten years. The Court finds that five years is a reasonable time for Defendants to discover whether Plaintiff’s injuries were pre-existing before the incident.

Next, Plaintiff argues the subpoenas infringe on her right to privacy. A party’s medical records are privileged under the patient-physician privilege. (See Hale v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1424.)¿ “Discovery of constitutionally protected information is on a par with discovery of privileged information.”¿ (Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1387.)¿ Where the party filing an action has arguably waived the privacy in their protected or privileged information by filing a lawsuit, the waiver must be narrowly construed such that discovery is only permitted of those matters directly relevant to the party’s claims. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 858-859.)¿ Notwithstanding, the party still has privacy rights as to physical and mental conditions unrelated to the claimed injury.¿ (See id. at 864; Heller v. Norcal Mutual Insurance Co. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 30, 44.)¿¿ 

Defendants appear to argue that the court in Britt never stated that discovery was limited to certain body parts. (Opp., 5.) Therefore, Defendants argue, because Plaintiff has put her general medical condition at issue, they are entitled to any records regarding her medical condition. (Opp., 6.)  However, the medical conditions claimed by Plaintiff in this case are specifically limited to certain areas of the body. Additionally, to allow records about any medical condition where only certain areas of the body are injured would frustrate the privacy right surrounding a party’s medical records. It would also run contrary to the assertion in Britt that a party has a privacy right to physical and mental conditions unrelated to the injury. Additionally, Plaintiff has shown that the medical records at issue are protected by a right of privacy, and that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and serious threatened intrusion since they may uncover conditions not related to Plaintiff’s injuries in the low back/lumbar spine and neck/cervical spine. Here, the only limitation in the subpoenas are towards “psychology and mental issues; reproductive system; and sexually transmitted diseases.”  Therefore, weighing the interest in disclosure against the feasible alternatives, the Court finds that Defendants’ subpoenas must be limited to records for the past five years regarding Plaintiff’s back, neck, and spine only.

Regarding the pharmacy subpoena to CVS and Walgreens, there is no limit to prescriptions related to Plaintiff’s injuries at issue in this case. The subpoenas also seek records for the past ten years. Patients retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in prescription records. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court¿(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 621, 643.) Here, because the records seek all prescriptions used by Plaintiff for the past ten years, it is overbroad. The subpoenas must be limited to the injuries at issue in this case and be limited to the past five years.  Therefore, the motion to quash the pharmacy subpoena is also granted. 

The Court finds this motion was not made in bad faith and declines to award sanctions to either party.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to quash subpoenas.

Plaintiff to provide notice and file a proof of service of such.