Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV33792, Date: 2024-10-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV33792    Hearing Date: October 10, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

Plaintiff Anuja Rane (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“LACMTA”) and DOES 1 to 25, inclusive alleging causes of action (1) motor vehicle and (2) general negligence in Case No. 22STCV37815. LACMTA now moves for a protective order regarding Plaintiff’s Notice of Deposition of the Person Most Qualified (“PMQ”) to testify regarding matters related to the hiring and employment of Defendant Jon Paul Jimenez.

ANALYSIS

“Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (a).)¿ “The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).)¿ 

“The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020, subd. (a).)¿ 

Meet and Confer

            LACMTA submits a declaration attesting to meet and confer efforts made prior to the filing of this motion as required. (Wainfeld Decl., ¶6.)

Motion

Here, LACMTA argues the deposition should not take place because LACMTA is admitting negligence and will argue Plaintiff was negligent as well, so a deposition of the PMQ as to the hiring and employment of Jimenez, its bus operator has no probative value. Furthermore, LACMTA contends during the meet and confer process Plaintiff’s counsel indicated the deposition is part of their trial preparation and goes to the credibility of Jimenez, which LACMTA argues would not have any relevance based on the admission of negligence. Moreover, LACMTA asserts the deposition has no evidentiary value to any of the issues in this case. Specifically, LACMTA asserts nothing in the deposition of the PMQ on hiring and employment would go to the issue of causation in a Traumatic Brain Injury. Thus, LACMTA contends the deposition of the PMQ regarding the hiring and employment of Jimenez should not take place to prevent undue harassment and protect privacy rights.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues LACMTA provides “zero case law” supporting its position that an “admission of negligence negates the relevance” of their PMQ deposition about Jimenez’s training and employment. Plaintiff also argues LACMTA denied negligence in its Responses to Request for Admission dated November 14, 2023 and Jimenez testified at his August 14, 2024 deposition that he was not negligent and that Plaintiff is 100% at fault for the crash. As such, Plaintiff contends Jimenez’s credibility will be relevant at trial because he attempts to shift fault onto Plaintiff. In fact, Plaintiff asserts the deposition of the PMQ is relevant to Jimenez’s claim about the training he received and whether LACMTA’s training practices encouraged or allowed violations of traffic laws, thus directly relevant to determine the extent of LACMTA’s negligence and whether their training practices contributed to the incident.  

In reply, LACMTA argues Jimenez has already been deposed and there is no issue as to negligent entrustment, hiring or supervision of Jimenez because it has not been pleaded in the Complaint. LACMTA also reiterates it has represented to Plaintiff’s counsel it is admitting to negligence but will argue Plaintiff was negligent as well, so it is not admitting liability.

Here, Plaintiff does not address LACMTA’s argument that the complaint does not allege negligent entrustment, hiring, or supervision of Jimenez. The only theory of discoverability is that Jimenez’s credibility will be relevant to the claim that Defendant is not negligent and Plaintiff is completely at fault. As limited to issues relating to comparative fault, the motion for protective order is denied.[1]

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Motion for Protective Order.

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.