Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV34416, Date: 2024-07-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV34416    Hearing Date: July 10, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

On October 27, 2022, Plaintiff Shyland Davis (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Dana Caprio (“Caprio”) and Does 1 to 10 for injuries related to a motor vehicle accident on October 28, 2020, at Electric Drive and Fairfax Boulevard in Los Angeles.

On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff was purportedly in another motor vehicle accident.

On January 16, 2024, Caprio filed a cross-complaint against Kierra Deshon and Daren Deshon (collectively “Deshons”), alleging they are liable for the May 16, 2023 accident and exacerbated Plaintiff’s injuries.

On May 1, 2024, Deshons filed an application for determination of good faith of a settlement entered with Plaintiff.

On May 8, 2024, Caprio filed the instant motion to contest Deshons’ Application for determination of good faith settlement. Deshons oppose; Plaintiff filed a joinder to the opposition. Caprio replies.  

LEGAL STANDARD

Under section 877.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, “[a] determination by the court that [a] settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor . . . from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor . . . for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6 (c).) Any party to an action may move for an order determining whether a settlement between the plaintiff and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors was made in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a)(1).) “The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).)

In City of Grand View Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261, the court provided the following guidance regarding a motion for a good faith settlement determination: 

If the good faith settlement is contested, section 877.6, subdivision (d), sets forth a workable ground rule for the hearing by placing the burden of proving the lack of good faith on the contesting party. Once there is a showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue of good faith shifts to the nonsettlor who asserts that the settlement was not made in good faith. If contested, declarations by the nonsettlor should be filed which in many cases could require the moving party to file responsive counterdeclarations to negate the lack of good faith asserted by the nonsettling contesting party. 

(192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1260-1261 [citation omitted].) 

Section 877.6 requires “that the courts review [settlement] agreements made under its aegis to insure that the settlements appropriately balance the . . . statute’s dual objectives” (i.e., providing an “equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault” and encouraging parties to resolve their disputes by way of settlement.) (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 494 (hereafter, Tech-Bilt).) In Tech-Bilt, the court set forth the factors to consider when determining whether a settlement is made in good faith. The Tech-Bilt factors are: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 498-501.) Not every factor will apply in every case. (Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (Shell Oil Co.) (2015) 242 Cal.4th 894, 909.)

“ ‘A determination as to the good faith of a settlement, within the meaning of section 877.6, necessarily requires the trial court to examine and weigh a number of relevant factors, [fn. omitted] one of the most important of which is the settling party's proportionate liability.’ [citation.] If ‘there is no substantial evidence to support a critical assumption as to the nature and extent of a settling defendant's liability, then a determination of good faith based upon such assumption is an abuse of discretion.’” (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1350.)

“All affidavits relied upon as probative must state evidentiary facts; they must show facts and circumstances from which the ultimate fact sought to be proved may be deduced by the court. [citation.] Affidavits or declarations setting forth only conclusions, opinions or ultimate facts are to be held insufficient; even an expert's opinion cannot rise to the dignity of substantial evidence if it is unsubstantiated by facts. [citation.]” (Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834.)

“The party asserting the lack of good faith . . . [is] permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to [the above] factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of [Section 877.6]. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500.)

DISCUSSION

            Deshons have settled with Plaintiff for $8,000. According to the Application for Good Faith, the settlement was reached through negotiations in January 2024; the release was signed on February 6, 2024. Caprio asserts this value is not reflective of their proportionate liability since their accident likely exacerbated Plaintiff’s injuries. Caprio argues her accident with Plaintiff occurred at a low speed. Both cars were at a stopped intersection prior to the incident. (Leach Decl., Exh. F, 13:20–22.) Caprio alleges she had only traveled ten feet before impact; Plaintiff alleges she traveled 20 to 30 feet. Caprio argues this shows that the vehicles were not traveling fast. (Leach Decl., Exh. F, 14:12–13 [Caprio alleges she was traveling less than 5 m.p.h]; Leach Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. D, 46:7–12 [Plaintiff could not recall her speed].) Caprio also produces photographs of Plaintiff’s car following the accident to further argue that the injury was not serious, and that Plaintiff’s injuries were worsened by the second accident. (Id., Exh. D, 52:9–20.)

            During the May 16, 2023 accident, Plaintiff was at a complete stop at an intersection and was rear-ended by one of the Deshons. On February 21, 2024, Dr. Ravi Srinivas conducted an independent medical examination on Plaintiff and concluded “it is within a reasonable medical probability that the 5/16/23 motor vehicle accident aggravated [Plaintiff’s] cervical and thoracolumbar paraspinal muscle strains.” (Leach Decl., Exh. H, p.9.) However, this information would not have been available during the settlement negotiations that took place in January 2024.

            In her Form Interrogatory responses, Plaintiff claimed $220,615.39 in past medical specials and $100,000 to $160,000 in future medical specials. (Leach Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. C, 11:16–13:15.) This discovery response was served June 29, 2023; and the treatment took place from 2020 to 2022—before the second accident. On February 14, 2024, Plaintiff’s 998 offer to compromise was $499,999. Therefore, Caprio contends the Deshons’ settlement is only 0.8% of Plaintiff’s total recovery. Additionally, Caprio speculates the settlement is likely not the total policy limit since the minimum coverage is $15,000.

            In opposition, Deshons argues that Plaintiff was treated starting in October 2020 (when the first accident occurred) until June 6, 2022. Then, following the May 16, 2023 accident, from July 13, 2023 to October 17, 2023, Plaintff was treated at Parehjan, Vartzar and Khosrovian Chiropractic totaling 12 visits and $2,680.00 in billing. Therefore, the settlement demand that Plaintiff sent to Deshons’ insurance carrier in January 2024 only contained the $2,680 in medical billings. Deshons appear to argue the settlement was appropriate since it was three times Plaintiff’s medical specials; as a result, the financial condition/policy limit factor is irrelevant. Additionally, Deshons argue that they cannot be liable for the $220,555.39 in past medical specials since those were incurred prior to the May 16, 2023 accident.

            In reply, Caprio points to Plaintiff’s July 11, 2023 deposition where she stated that she was not treated in 2023 because her “back pain was tolerable until [she] had a second accident.” (Leach Decl., Exh. D, Pl. Depo. 20:8–16.) However, Caprio has not disputed that most of Plaintiff’s damages are for past medical specials incurred before the second accident. While it is possible that the second accident exacerbated Plaintiff’s injuries, Caprio has not shown that significant medical expenses were incurred after the second accident. Therefore, Caprio has not shown that the proportional liability is so far “outside the ballpark.” Caprio also presents no evidence of Deshons’ financial condition, their policy limits, or evidence of collusion. As a result, Caprio fails to meet her burden.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the motion to Contest Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is DENIED.

Moving party shall give notice of the Court’s order and file a proof of service of such.