Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 22STCV35550, Date: 2023-09-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV35550    Hearing Date: September 18, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jose Rafael Mena (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Tangyuan Ma (Defendant) for negligence involving a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff moves to quash Defendant’s subpoenas for Plaintiff’s employment and personnel files at the University of Southern California (“USC”).

Plaintiff argues the subpoena for his employment, medical, insurance, and scholastic records is an invasion of his privacy and overly broad in scope. Defendant opposes.

LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure § 1987.1(a) states:

If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

“The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern. [Citation omitted.] In Hill, we established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation omitted.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. [citation omitted].” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 533 (citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)

“[Prior] cases correctly recognize that when a discovery request seeks information implicating the constitutional right of privacy, to order discovery simply upon a showing that the Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 test for relevance has been met is an abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.] But they also stand for the proposition that whenever discovery of facially private information is sought, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate a “ ‘compelling state interest’ ” [citation omitted] or “compelling need” [citation omitted]. Although in this they are not alone [citation omitted], they nevertheless are incorrect.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) “To the extent prior cases require a party seeking discovery of private information to always establish a compelling interest or compelling need, without regard to the other considerations articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., [citation omitted], they are disapproved.” (Id. at 557.)

 “Only obvious invasions of interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) When lesser interests are at stake, “the strength of the countervailing interest sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information var[ies] according to the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion, and the availability of alternatives and protective measures.” (Id.) 

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 provides that “the court may in its discretion award the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing [a motion to quash], including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc. section 1987.2(a).)  

DISCUSSION

The subpoena that Plaintiff wishes to quash requested the following from Plaintiff’s employer, USC:

Any and all records pertaining to the employment of the above named individual, said records to include, but are not limited to wage, attendance, any payroll records, salary, benefits, applications, claims for Worker’s Compensation of any kind, timesheets, vacation, sick leave, medical and personnel file records.

THIS REQUEST INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, ALL RECORDS STORED ELECTRONICALLY OR DIGITALLY SUCH AS COMPUTERS, COMPUTER HARD DRIVES, ZIP DISKS, CD ROMS, FLOPPY DISKS, TAPE DRIVES AND ANY OTHER DIGITAL STORAGE MEDIA.

***INCLUDE RECORDS FROM KECK MEDICINE OF USC.

FOR DATES OF: ANY AND ALL.

INCLUDE: ANY AND ALL INSURANCE RECORDS AND SCHOLASTIC RECORDS.

(Decl., Exh. 1.)

Plaintiff argues there is no basis for requesting all his records, including medical, insurance, and scholastic records when this case arises out of a motorcycle/motor vehicle accident.  Secondly, Plaintiff asserts the personnel records are protected by his right of privacy.

 Plaintiff, in the alternative seeks an order limiting the scope of the subpoena to “production of wage, attendance, payroll, pay stubs, applications for reasonable accommodations made by Plaintiff, and grade reports.” (Motion at pg. 8.)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff was treated at Keck Medicine before and after the accident for conditions that were exacerbated by the incident. (Garcia Decl. ¶ 5, Exhs. B, C.) Defendant asserts the insurance records are discoverable and the scholastic records are relevant because Plaintiff testified that his injuries negatively impacted his academic performance. (Garcia Decl. ¶ 6, Exh, D.) Additionally, Defendant argues the employment information around application, salary, benefits, appraisals/reviews, and workers compensation, is relevant to the wage loss, loss of earning capacity that Plaintiff is claiming. (Complaint, 4.) Defendant further argues that because Plaintiff is claiming that he was affected medically, academically, and professionally, Plaintiff’s entire personnel file, which likely includes medical, scholastic, and insurance information reported to his employer is discoverable. (Opposition at pg. 3.)

In light of the damages claims at issue, Plaintiff’s personnel file, including records from Keck Medicine, insurance, and scholastic records, all appear to be reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. As set forth above, Plaintiff is incorrect that Defendant must first establish a compelling need for the records, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams. Rather, Plaintiff bears the burden of meeting the Hill factors. Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant has the right to some information contained in his employment records. (Reply at pg. 1.) Instead, Plaintiff argues that records that are not related to “date of hire, pay stubs, attendance records, requests for work place accommodations,” invade Plaintiff’s right of privacy. However, Plaintiff does not specify what are the “different categories of documents in Plaintiff’s employment records,” or explain what potential records exist that do not fall within the broad categories agreed to by Plaintiff, and does not even attempt to meet his burden under Hill. (Reply at pg. 3.)

Further, the Court agrees that to the extent that documents are produced that are not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence regarding Plaintiff’s damages claim, Plaintiff may seek a protective order limiting the use of those documents in this litigation.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to quash subpoena.

Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Court’s order and file a proof of service of such.