Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 23STCV02907, Date: 2024-08-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV02907    Hearing Date: August 8, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

On February 9, 2023, Plaintiffs Arturo Peza Amezquita, Yolanda Lopez de Salas, and Lizbeth Abigail Salas Lopez (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants Lyft, Inc., Barrett Jeffers, Jane Doe, and Does 1 to 100 for negligence related to a motor vehicle accident that occurred on June 25, 2021. Plaintiffs allege they were passengers in a Lyft vehicle which collided with a vehicle driven by Barrett Jeffers (“Jeffers”). (Complaint ¶ 9.)

On July 31, 2023, Jeffers filed a cross-complaint against Automobile Club of Southern California, Oswaldo Zamora, Lyft, Inc., and Roes 1 to 25 for declaratory relief, equitable indemnity, total equitable indemnity, and negligence.

Cross-Defendant Automobile Club of Southern California (“Cross-Defendant”) now demurs to the cross-complaint arguing it fails to state sufficient facts. Jeffers opposes and Cross-Defendant replies. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings.  It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint).  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true.  (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) 

On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

            Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).  

MEET AND CONFER

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).)

The Declaration of Mark P. LaScola, Cross-Defendant’s counsel, states the following: “Cross-Complainant’s counsel, Arturo Santana, Esq., and I spoke via telephone and communicated via email on multiple occasions, doing our best to resolve the issues contained herein.  Finally, on May 17, 2024, Mr. Santana conveyed to me that -- due to our disagreement over the allegations contained in the Cross-Complaint -- we would be unable to informally resolve the issues now before the Court, thus leaving me no choice but to move forward with filing this Demurrer on behalf of Cross-Defendant.” (See LaScola Decl. ¶ 5.)

JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Court denies Cross-Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the Department of Motor Vehicle’s webpage as it does not appear to be a regulation under Evidence Code section 452(b). (See Exh. A.)

ANALYSIS

Here, the cross-complaint alleges that Jeffers gifted the subject car involved in Plaintiffs’ action to Oswaldo Zamora (“Zamora”) on March 22, 2021. Jeffers further alleges that on March 27, 2021, he “went to the AAA office located near the intersection of Century Blvd and Crenshaw Blvd. Jeffers, accompanied by his wife, went to the noted AAA location to turn in a "Notice of Transfer and Release Of Liability" ("NOTICE") form to the AAA office so that the AAA could process the NOTICE and file it with the Department of Motor Vehicles (which is a service provided to AAA members) and so that the DMV could reflect that the vehicle was now owned by Zamora.” (Cross Complaint ¶ 9.)

Jeffers further alleges: “Notwithstanding that the AAA allegedly processed (or should have processed) the NOTICE with the DMV, the DMV, unbeknownst to Jeffers, apparently reflected that as of June 25, 2021, Jeffers was allegedly still the registered owner of the vehicle.” (Cross Complaint ¶ 13.) “Prior to February 16, 2023, Jeffers had no knowledge that he was allegedly the registered owner of the vehicle or that the AAA had failed to process the NOTICE with the DMV or that the vehicle had been involved in an accident with the vehicle operated by Lyft.” (Id. ¶ 17.)

1. Negligence

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.) “While negligence is ordinarily a question of fact, the existence of a duty is generally a question of law that may be addressed by demurrer.” (Paul v. Patton (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1095.)

In general, “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714.) Section 1714 “establishes the default rule that each person has a duty to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 214.)  “[T]he law imposes a general duty of care on a defendant only when it is the defendant who has created a risk of harm to the plaintiff, including when the defendant is responsible for making the plaintiff's position worse. [Citation.]” (Id. [internal quotation marks omitted].)

“The first element, duty, may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.” (Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1128, internal quotations omitted.)

To determine if a duty to protect exists, the court must make a two-step inquiry: “[f]irst, the court must determine whether there exists a special relationship between the parties or some other set of circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect. Second, if so, the court must consult the factors described in Rowland to determine whether relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that duty.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 209.) “These considerations include ‘the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’” (Id. at 211, fn. 3.)

“[I]n analyzing duty, the court's task ‘is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party.’ [Citation.] Viewed in this light, the question of foreseeability in a ‘duty’ context is a limited one for the court, and readily contrasted with the fact-specific foreseeability questions bearing on negligence (breach of duty) and proximate causation posed to the jury or trier of fact. [Citation.]”  (Laabs v. Southern California Edison Co. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1273 [internal quotations omitted].) Stated differently, “a court's task—in determining ‘duty’—is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party.” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp.¿(1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1620 [quoting Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 573, fn. 6].) 

            Here, the cross complaint alleges that Jeffers has a relationship with Cross-Defendant as a member and Cross-Defendant had a duty to properly register the change in ownership of the vehicle. (Cross Complaint ¶ 32.) Jeffers alleges Cross-Defendant breached this duty, which has led to damages.

      Cross-Defendant argues the negligence cause of action is insufficient because considering the Rowland factor of foreseeability, it owed no duty. It also argues that Vehicle Code section 5600 establishes that it owed no duty to register the change in ownership with the DMV.[1] However, section 5600 does not address Jeffers’ allegation that although not necessarily required by the Vehicle Code, Cross-Defendant provided this service to its members. (See Cross Complaint ¶ 9.) As noted above, a duty of care may be “assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.” (Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1128.) Therefore, Cross-Defendant fails to show that it owes no duty under the alleged facts.

Second, Jeffers sufficiently alleges Cross-Defendants breached their duty. (Cross Complaint ¶ 33.)

As a result, the demurrer to the negligence cause of action is overruled.    

2. Equitable Indemnity and Total Equitable Indemnity

“The elements of a cause of action for indemnity are (1) a showing of fault on the part of the indemnitor and (2) resulting damages to the indemnitee for which the indemnitor is ... equitably responsible. [Citation.]” (Bailey v. Safeway, Inc. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 206, 217 [internal quotations omitted].) “There are two basic types of indemnity: express indemnity, which relies on an express contract term providing for indemnification, and equitable indemnity, which embraces ‘traditional equitable indemnity’ and implied contractual indemnity.” (Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v. Price¿(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 559, 573.)

“Traditional equitable indemnity and implied contractual indemnity share a key feature that distinguishes them from express indemnity: unlike express indemnity, neither traditional equitable indemnity nor implied contractual indemnity is available ‘in the absence of a joint legal obligation to the injured party.’ [Citation.] Under this principle, ‘there can be no indemnity without liability,’ that is, the indemnitee and the indemnitor must share liability for the injury. [citations omitted.].” (Jocer Enterprises, Inc., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at 573 [internal quotations omitted].)  “Thus, no indemnity may be obtained from an entity that has no pertinent duty to the injured third party [Citation], that is immune from liability [citation], or that has been found not to be responsible for the injury.” (Id. at 573-74.)

Here, the cross-complaint provides no facts showing how Cross-Defendant is liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries. Therefore, the demurrer to the second and third cause of action is sustained.  

3. Declaratory Relief

Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 states in part the following:

“Any person interested under a written instrument, excluding a will or a trust, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, . . . may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract.”

Under section 1061, “[t]he court may refuse to exercise the power granted [in section 1060] in any case where its declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1061.)

“Declaratory relief is available to a party ‘who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another ....’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) A complaint for declaratory relief is legally sufficient if it sets forth facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties and requests that the rights and duties of the parties be adjudged by the court. If these requirements are met and no basis for declining declaratory relief appears, the court should declare the rights of the parties whether or not the facts alleged establish the plaintiff is entitled to favorable declaration. [Citation.] ‘Declaratory relief operates prospectively, serving to set controversies at rest before obligations are repudiated, rights are invaded or wrongs are committed. Thus the remedy is to be used to advance preventative justice, to declare rather than execute rights. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In essence, declaratory relief operates to declare future rights, not to address past wrongs.” (Monterey Coastkeeper v. Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.)

“A party seeking declaratory relief must show a very significant possibility of future harm. [Citation.] In assessing whether declaratory relief is available, a court determines whether ‘a probable future dispute over legal rights between parties is sufficiently ripe to represent an “actual controversy” within the meaning of the statute authorizing declaratory relief (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060), as opposed to purely hypothetical concerns ....’ [Citation.] ‘An “actual controversy” under the declaratory relief statute is “one which admits of definitive and conclusive relief by judgment within the field of judicial administration, as distinguished from an advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Monterey Coastkeeper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at 13.) Additionally, where “a party has a fully matured cause of action for money, the party must seek the remedy of damages, and not pursue a declaratory relief claim.” (Canova v. Trustees of Imperial Irrigation Dist. Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497.)

Here, the cause of action for declaratory relief appears to be based on the equitable indemnity causes of action. (See Cross Complaint ¶ 23.) The only other cause of action to survive this demurrer is negligence, for which Jeffers seeks money damages. (See Cross Complaint, 8:2.) Therefore, seeing as the demurrers to the indemnity causes of action have been sustained, the Cross Complaint fails to show a basis for a probable future dispute, especially given that Jeffers has a cause of action for money damages. Therefore, the demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court SUSTAINS Cross-Defendant Automobile Club of Southern California’s demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action in the cross complaint filed by Barrett Jeffers, for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, with leave to amend.

The Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the fourth cause of action in the cross complaint.

Moving party shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.