Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 23STCV08727, Date: 2023-09-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV08727    Hearing Date: September 7, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

Plaintiff Rafael Cruz (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendant Mayvely Juarez (“Defendant”) and DOES 1-20, inclusive alleging a cause of action for negligence. Defendant moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint referencing punitive damages. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion.

ANALYSIS

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(b).) On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.)  Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) 

A plaintiff must assert facts with specificity to support a conclusion that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice.  To wit, there is a heightened pleading requirement regarding a claim for punitive damages. (See Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.) “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice. When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29 [cleaned up].) In Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp, the Court of Appeal noted that the plaintiffs’ assertions related to their claim for punitive damages were “insufficient to meet the specific pleading requirement.” (Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [plaintiffs alleged “the conduct of Defendants was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's injuries were exacerbated by the malicious conduct of Defendants. Defendants' conduct justifies an award of exemplary and punitive damages”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim”].)         

In Taylor v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held: “We consider whether punitive damages are recoverable in a personal injury action brought against an intoxicated driver.  As will appear, we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of “malice” under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.”  (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892 [cleaned up].) The California Supreme Court further held that “[o]ne who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates, in the words of Dean Prosser, “such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton.”  (Id. at p. 899.) But the Court also stated, “Although the circumstances in a particular case may disclose similar willful or wanton behavior in other forms, ordinarily, routine negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws would not justify an award of punitive damages.” (Id. at pp. 899-900.) 

Here, Defendant argues the complaint fails to allege any facts to support a finding that Defendant’s conduct constitutes fraud, oppression, or malice to support Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages. Defendant argues that Plaintiff only alleges that Defendant was under the influence while operating her vehicle. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff only alleges generally that Defendant understood the dangerous consequences of driving intoxicated and failed to avoid such consequences. The Court agrees.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was “driving and operating the automobile UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A SUBSTANCE, (despicable conduct) with the consent, permission, and knowledge of defendant MAYVELY JUAREZ and/or authorized agents” (Plaintiff’s Complaint at p. 2, ¶ 10). Further, Plaintiff alleges in the complaint:  “On APRIL 12, 2022, defendant MAYVELY JUAREZ, and/or, negligently operated a certain automobile, UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A SUBSTANCE, (despicable conduct) and, as a proximate result of the negligent operation, collided with plaintiff’s automobile.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant “should have known such actions and omissions constituted a dangerous and an unreasonable risk of harm” but “negligently failed to take steps to either make the condition safe or warn Plaintiff of the dangerous condition….” (Id. at p. 3, ¶ 12.)

However, Plaintiff does not plead any circumstances in the complaint which would demonstrate Defendant acted with a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences, i.e., malice. As discussed above, Plaintiff must allege specific facts to support a finding that Defendant’s conduct constituted fraud, oppression, or malice.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to sufficiently allege facts under Civil Code section 3294 to support Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendant Mayvely Juarez’s motion to strike portions of the complaint related to Plaintiffs’ claims and prayer for punitive damages, with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file and serve an amended complaint within 20 days of notice of the Court’s ruling. 

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.