Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 23STCV15883, Date: 2023-11-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV15883 Hearing Date: November 27, 2023 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the
Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent
authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
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DEPT: |
32 |
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HEARING DATE: |
November
27, 2023 |
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CASE NUMBER: |
23STCV15883 |
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MOTIONS: |
Motion
to Compel Arbitration |
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Defendant Lyft, Inc. |
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OPPOSING PARTY: |
Plaintiff
Leroy Gibbons |
BACKGROUND
On July 7, 2023, Plaintiff Leroy Gibbons (Plaintiff) filed a complaint
against Defendants Lyft, Inc. (Lyft), Diane Beivavines, Sum Cho Kim, and Does 1
to 20, alleging injuries from a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff alleges that on
July 9, 2021, he was a passenger in Sum Cho Kim’s vehicle, who was driving for Lyft.
(Complaint, 5.) Diane Beivavines allegedly rear-ended Kim’s vehicle, causing
injuries to Plaintiff. (Id.)
Lyft now moves to compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings pending
completion of arbitration.
LEGAL
STANDARD
The Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) governs a motion to compel arbitration when an agreement
provides its ‘enforcement’ shall be governed by the FAA. (Victrola
89, LLC v. Jamon Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 346.)
Parties may be compelled to arbitrate a
dispute upon the court finding that: (1) there was a valid agreement to
arbitrate between the parties; and (2) said agreement covers the controversy or
controversies in the parties’ dispute.¿(9 U.S.C., § 4;¿Chiron Corp. v. Ortho
Diagnostics Systems, Inc.¿(9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130.) If the
finding is affirmative on both counts, the FAA requires the Court to enforce
the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms. (Simula, Inc.
v. Autoliv, Inc.¿(9th Cir. 1999) 175 F.3d 716, 719–720.) ¿
“The petitioner
bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by
the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its
defense. In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact,
weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as
well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final
determination.” (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284.)
“If a court
of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered
arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding
pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or
proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or
proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in
accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court
specifies.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)
DISCUSSION
As an
initial matter, the Court notes that the opposition was due November 9, 2023.
Plaintiff filed his opposition on November 14, 2023. Though untimely, seeing no
prejudice to Lyft, the Court exercises its discretion to consider the
opposition.
Lyft moves to
compel arbitration on the grounds that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate by
agreeing to its Terms of Service. The agreement reads in pertinent part:
““DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENT,” “YOU AND LYFT MUTUALLY AGREE TO WAIVE
OUR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS TO RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES IN A COURT OF LAW BY A JUDGE OR
JURY AND AGREE TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE BY ARBITRATION, as set forth below.” The
scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement expressly covered “any dispute,
claim or controversy whether based on past, present, or future events, arising
out of or relating to…the Lyft Platform, the Rideshare Services…and all other
federal and state statutory and common law claims.” The arbitration agreement
“is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act” and “survives after the Agreement
terminates or your relationship with Lyft ends.” [1]
First, the
FAA governs the agreement according to the explicit terms. Lyft presents
evidence from its Safety Program Lead that Plaintiff was using Lyft’s services
on July 9, 2021 when the subject accident occurred. (McAchern Decl. ¶ 13.) The terms above represent the December 9,
2020 arbitration agreement that was in effect on the day of the incident. (Id.
¶ 14.) McAchern declares that on January 10, 2021 and November 1, 2022,
Plaintiff accepted the terms of the arbitration agreement. (Id. ¶ 12.) Clickwrap
agreements are those in which website users are required to click on an “I
agree” box after being presented with a list of terms and conditions of
use. (Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 763 F.3d 1171,
1175-76.) “Clickwrap agreements require a user to affirmatively click a
box on the website acknowledging awareness of and agreement to the terms of
service before he or she is allowed to proceed with further utilization of the
website. [Citations omitted] Clickwrap agreements ‘have been routinely upheld
by circuit and district courts…” (United States v. Drew (C.D. Cal. 2009)
259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 [internal quotations omitted].) Here,
the Lyft Application directed Plaintiff to scroll through and read the entire
terms of service and then required Plaintiff to click a button demonstrating
his consent. (Id. ¶ 15.) McAchern also testified that Plaintiff could not have used
Lyft’s services without first agreeing to these terms. (Id. ¶ 16.) Because the
evidence shows that Plaintiff had to read through the terms before
affirmatively clicking a button in consent, Lyft meets its burden to show there
was a valid agreement.
Second, the
provision states that all disputes and claims between Lyft that arise out of any
services through the Lyft Platform will be resolved by binding arbitration. Therefore,
because Lyft maintains Plaintiff was using its services when the accident
occurred, Lyft has met its burden that the agreement covers the present
controversy.
Plaintiff
first argues that this case involves two other defendants whom Plaintiff
intends to serve. (Opp., 5.) Plaintiff argues that Code of Civil Procedure
section 1281.2(c) authorizes the Court to consolidate an arbitration proceeding
with a civil action to avoid conflicting rulings. (Id.) However, the
arbitration agreement in this case is governed by the FAA, per the terms of the
agreement. On application of a signatory, the FAA mandates arbitration when a
valid agreement exists. (Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S.
213, 218.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 does not apply when the FAA’s
rules govern. (See Rodriguez v. Am. Techs., Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110,
1115-16.)
Next,
Plaintiff generally argues that there is no valid agreement. However, Plaintiff
does not set forth any specific facts disputing that he consented to the
agreement. Therefore, finding that Lyft has met its burden establishing that a
valid agreement exists and covers the present controversy, the motion is
granted.
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Therefore, Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration and
stay all judicial proceedings against Lyft pending the completion of
arbitration is GRANTED.
The Court sets the matter for an
Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal due to Completion of Arbitration Proceedings
for May 28, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 32 of the Spring Street Courthouse.
All other dates remain in this case
as to any other parties. In addition, the Court sets an Order to Show Cause Re
Monetary Sanctions for Failure to Serve for the same date, May 28, 2024 at 8:30
a.m. The Court may impose monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and/or Counsel
for Plaintiff, at the time of the Order to Show Cause hearing if counsel or
parties fail to appear, or fail to give good cause for the delay in serving the
summons and complaint on all defendants in this case.
Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof
of service of such.
[1] Lyft
failed to attach the proper exhibits to the Declaration of Paul McCachern in
its motion. The exhibits were then attached as a reply. However, “the moving
party can meet its burden [to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement]
by setting forth the agreement's provisions in the motion.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165; Cal. Rules Court,
rule 3.1330 [“The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be
physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by
reference.”; see Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin.
Securities Corp. (1996)
14 Cal.4th 394, 409–410 [California procedures for determining arbitration
agreement are not preempted by FAA].) Therefore, the Court quotes the verbatim
terms included in Lyft’s motion. In addition, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s
objection to the Second Declaration of Karen L Prodromo. However, to the extent
that Plaintiff requires more time to respond, the Court would consider a short
continuance of this hearing date.