Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 23STCV15883, Date: 2023-11-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV15883    Hearing Date: November 27, 2023    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEPT:

32

HEARING DATE:

November 27, 2023

CASE NUMBER:

23STCV15883

MOTIONS: 

Motion to Compel Arbitration

MOVING PARTY:

Defendant Lyft, Inc.

OPPOSING PARTY:

Plaintiff Leroy Gibbons

 

 

BACKGROUND

 

On July 7, 2023, Plaintiff Leroy Gibbons (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants Lyft, Inc. (Lyft), Diane Beivavines, Sum Cho Kim, and Does 1 to 20, alleging injuries from a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff alleges that on July 9, 2021, he was a passenger in Sum Cho Kim’s vehicle, who was driving for Lyft. (Complaint, 5.) Diane Beivavines allegedly rear-ended Kim’s vehicle, causing injuries to Plaintiff. (Id.)

 

Lyft now moves to compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings pending completion of arbitration.   

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs a motion to compel arbitration when an agreement provides its ‘enforcement’ shall be governed by the FAA. (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jamon Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 346.)

 

Parties may be compelled to arbitrate a dispute upon the court finding that: (1) there was a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) said agreement covers the controversy or controversies in the parties’ dispute.¿(9 U.S.C., § 4;¿Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostics Systems, Inc.¿(9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130.) If the finding is affirmative on both counts, the FAA requires the Court to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms. (Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc.¿(9th Cir. 1999) 175 F.3d 716, 719–720.) ¿

 

“The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284.) 

 

“If a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)

 

DISCUSSION

 

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the opposition was due November 9, 2023. Plaintiff filed his opposition on November 14, 2023. Though untimely, seeing no prejudice to Lyft, the Court exercises its discretion to consider the opposition.

 

Lyft moves to compel arbitration on the grounds that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate by agreeing to its Terms of Service. The agreement reads in pertinent part:

 

“DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENT,” “YOU AND LYFT MUTUALLY AGREE TO WAIVE OUR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS TO RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES IN A COURT OF LAW BY A JUDGE OR JURY AND AGREE TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE BY ARBITRATION, as set forth below.” The scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement expressly covered “any dispute, claim or controversy whether based on past, present, or future events, arising out of or relating to…the Lyft Platform, the Rideshare Services…and all other federal and state statutory and common law claims.” The arbitration agreement “is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act” and “survives after the Agreement terminates or your relationship with Lyft ends.” [1]

 

First, the FAA governs the agreement according to the explicit terms. Lyft presents evidence from its Safety Program Lead that Plaintiff was using Lyft’s services on July 9, 2021 when the subject accident occurred. (McAchern Decl. ¶ 13.)  The terms above represent the December 9, 2020 arbitration agreement that was in effect on the day of the incident. (Id. ¶ 14.) McAchern declares that on January 10, 2021 and November 1, 2022, Plaintiff accepted the terms of the arbitration agreement. (Id. ¶ 12.) Clickwrap agreements are those in which website users are required to click on an “I agree” box after being presented with a list of terms and conditions of use.  (Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 763 F.3d 1171, 1175-76.)  “Clickwrap agreements require a user to affirmatively click a box on the website acknowledging awareness of and agreement to the terms of service before he or she is allowed to proceed with further utilization of the website. [Citations omitted] Clickwrap agreements ‘have been routinely upheld by circuit and district courts…”  (United States v. Drew (C.D. Cal. 2009) 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 [internal quotations omitted].)  Here, the Lyft Application directed Plaintiff to scroll through and read the entire terms of service and then required Plaintiff to click a button demonstrating his consent. (Id. ¶ 15.) McAchern also testified that Plaintiff could not have used Lyft’s services without first agreeing to these terms. (Id. ¶ 16.) Because the evidence shows that Plaintiff had to read through the terms before affirmatively clicking a button in consent, Lyft meets its burden to show there was a valid agreement.

 

Second, the provision states that all disputes and claims between Lyft that arise out of any services through the Lyft Platform will be resolved by binding arbitration. Therefore, because Lyft maintains Plaintiff was using its services when the accident occurred, Lyft has met its burden that the agreement covers the present controversy.

 

Plaintiff first argues that this case involves two other defendants whom Plaintiff intends to serve. (Opp., 5.) Plaintiff argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c) authorizes the Court to consolidate an arbitration proceeding with a civil action to avoid conflicting rulings. (Id.) However, the arbitration agreement in this case is governed by the FAA, per the terms of the agreement. On application of a signatory, the FAA mandates arbitration when a valid agreement exists. (Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, 218.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 does not apply when the FAA’s rules govern. (See Rodriguez v. Am. Techs., Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115-16.)

 

Next, Plaintiff generally argues that there is no valid agreement. However, Plaintiff does not set forth any specific facts disputing that he consented to the agreement. Therefore, finding that Lyft has met its burden establishing that a valid agreement exists and covers the present controversy, the motion is granted.

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 

Therefore, Defendant Lyft, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration and stay all judicial proceedings against Lyft pending the completion of arbitration is GRANTED.

 

The Court sets the matter for an Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal due to Completion of Arbitration Proceedings for May 28, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 32 of the Spring Street Courthouse.

 

All other dates remain in this case as to any other parties. In addition, the Court sets an Order to Show Cause Re Monetary Sanctions for Failure to Serve for the same date, May 28, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. The Court may impose monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and/or Counsel for Plaintiff, at the time of the Order to Show Cause hearing if counsel or parties fail to appear, or fail to give good cause for the delay in serving the summons and complaint on all defendants in this case.

 

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.

 



[1] Lyft failed to attach the proper exhibits to the Declaration of Paul McCachern in its motion. The exhibits were then attached as a reply. However, “the moving party can meet its burden [to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement] by setting forth the agreement's provisions in the motion.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165; Cal. Rules Court, rule 3.1330 [“The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.”; see Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 409–410 [California procedures for determining arbitration agreement are not preempted by FAA].) Therefore, the Court quotes the verbatim terms included in Lyft’s motion. In addition, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objection to the Second Declaration of Karen L Prodromo. However, to the extent that Plaintiff requires more time to respond, the Court would consider a short continuance of this hearing date.