Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 23STCV16113, Date: 2024-10-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV16113 Hearing Date: October 2, 2024 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer
concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be
reached. If the parties are unable to
reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the
party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to
submit. The email shall include the case
number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if
applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative
ruling. If the Court does not receive an
email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there
are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar
or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the
Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent
authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
DEPT: |
32 |
HEARING DATE: |
October
2, 2024 |
CASE NUMBER: |
23STCV16113 |
MOTIONS: |
Compel
Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One |
MOVING PARTY: |
Plaintiff
Hee Jung Kim |
OPPOSING PARTY: |
Defendant
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority |
BACKGROUND
On
April 6, 2024, Plaintiff propounded Request for Production of
Documents, Set One, on Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (“Defendant”). Defendant served responses on May 22, 2024. (Bahk
Decl. ¶ 2-3, Exh. B.)
At an informal discovery conference (“IDC”) on August 2, 2024,
Defendant represented that it would supplement responses. (Bahk Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff
contends that no code compliant responses have been served.
This motion was filed on August 27, 2024 and seeks to compel further
responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One.[1]
Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions. Defendant opposes and Plaintiff replies. In the reply, Plaintiff asserts that since
filing this motion, Defendant has produced the crash video and certain
documents. As a result, the only requests at issue are number 1 (personnel
file), and number 15 (training materials).
MEET
AND CONFER
The Declaration of Henry Bahk, Plaintiff’s counsel, shows that
following the August 2, 2024 IDC, Plaintiff corresponded with Defendant
regarding the issues in this motion. (Bahk Decl. ¶ 7-9.)
LEGAL
STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(a) provides that
on receipt of a response to a request for production of documents, the
demanding party may move for an order compelling further responses if:¿
¿
(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is
incomplete.¿
(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate,
incomplete, or evasive.¿
(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too
general.¿¿
A response
consisting of an objection must specify with particularly the document being
objected to, and, if based on privilege, must provide sufficient factual
information for other parties to evaluate the merits of this claim, including
if necessary, a privilege log. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240 (b), (c).)
¿
The motion must set forth specific facts showing good cause
for the discovery and include a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc. §
2031.310(b).)
“Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of
the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or
on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the
responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right
to compel a further response to the demand.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.310(c).)¿¿¿
The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7
(commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who
unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a
demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with
substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of
the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310 (h).)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant’s bus driver, Shamon Michael Todman (“Todman”), struck
Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff alleges negligent hiring, training, and
supervision within his general negligence cause of action against Defendant.
(Complaint ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff seeks to compel Request for
Production, Set One numbers 1 and 15 and argues the objections are without
merit. Number 1 seeks “[t]he complete PERSONNEL FILE of Defendant driver Shamon
Michael Todman (Badge No. 80577).”
Defendant
objected that this request was vague, ambiguous, irrelevant, and asserted an
official information privilege and right to privacy in personnel files.
Plaintiff argues this information is
relevant to show the driver’s training, disciplinary history, or prior
incidents of negligence, to show that Defendant did not properly train or
discipline the driver.
In opposition, Defendant asserts this
request was narrowed at the IDC for the complete disciplinary history of
Todman. Defendant again argues this information is privileged and irrelevant.
Evidence Code
section 1040 states in relevant part:
“A public entity has a privilege to refuse
to disclose official information, and to prevent another from
disclosing official information, if the privilege is claimed
by a person authorized by the public entity to do so and either of the
following apply:
(1) Disclosure
is forbidden by an act of the Congress of the United States or a statute of
this state.
(2) Disclosure
of the information is against the public interest because there is a necessity
for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the
necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice; but no privilege may be
claimed under this paragraph if any person authorized to do so has consented
that the information be disclosed in the proceeding. In determining whether
disclosure of the information is against the public interest, the interest of
the public entity as a party in the outcome of the proceeding may not be
considered.”
(Evid. Code §
1040(b).)
Furthermore, “official information”
under this section “means information acquired in confidence by a public
employee in the course of his or her duty and not open, or officially disclosed, to
the public prior to the time the claim of privilege is made.” (Evid. Code §
1040(a).)
Defendant
argues section 1040 prohibits the disclosure of confidential employee
information. However, Defendant bears the burden to show facts that the
privilege applies. (See Department of Motor Vehicles v. Superior Court
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 363, 370.) Defendant filed a late declaration to its
opposition on September 30, 2024, by Shonda Breland, its Director for
Transportation Operations. In it, Ms. Breland declares the following: “The
information contained in an LACMTA employee's disciplinary records is acquired
in confidence by select employees of LACMTA charged with investigating
incidents and making disciplinary decisions. The final disciplinary report is
confidentially shared with the employee subject to discipline to afford them an
opportunity to review the findings, submit any additional information, and
request a hearing on the final disciplinary decision if desired. LACMTA's
disciplinary records are not disclosed to the public. (Breland Decl. ¶ 3-5.) However,
Defendant fails to show how the driving record of one driver, who is alleged to
have been unfit to drive, would be against the public interest, particularly if
a protective order governed the public disclosure of the records.
Additionally, though Defendant adds that it
is admitting that Todman was acting within the scope of his employment with
Defendant, it does not assert it stipulated to this admission, or otherwise made
a binding admission to this fact. Therefore, Diaz v. Carcamo¿(2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, does not establish that the records
are not relevant.
Next,
Defendant argues the right to privacy applies. “The state Constitution
expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)
Protection of informational privacy is the provision's central concern.
[Citation omitted.] In Hill, [the California Supreme Court] established
a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting
a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a
threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation omitted.] The party seeking
information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important
countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection
may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective
measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance
these competing considerations. [citation omitted].” (Williams v. Superior
Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 533 (citing Hill v. National Collegiate
Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.)¿¿¿¿
“[Prior] cases
correctly recognize that when a discovery request seeks information implicating
the constitutional right of privacy, to order discovery simply upon a showing
that the Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 test for relevance has been
met is an abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.] But they also stand for the
proposition that whenever discovery of facially private information is sought,
the party seeking discovery must demonstrate a “ ‘compelling state interest’ ”
[citation omitted] or “compelling need” [citation omitted]. Although in this
they are not alone [citation omitted], they nevertheless are incorrect.” (Williams,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) “To the extent prior cases require a party
seeking discovery of private information to always establish a compelling
interest or compelling need, without regard to the other considerations
articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., [citation
omitted], they are disapproved.” (Id. at 557.)
“Only obvious
invasions of interest fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a
compelling interest.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) When
lesser interests are at stake, “the strength of the countervailing interest
sufficient to warrant disclosure of private information var[ies] according to
the strength of the privacy interest itself, the seriousness of the invasion,
and the availability of alternatives and protective measures.” (Id.)
The Court disagrees that Plaintiff has the
burden to show a compelling interest in the disciplinary records, since Defendant
has failed to show how the information is fundamental to personal autonomy. (Opp.,
11.) Since Defendant fails to sufficiently discuss the three factors under Hill,
it fails to show the privacy objection has merit. Moreover, any privacy
interests can be addressed by a protective order.
As a result, the motion to compel further
responses to Request number 1 is granted.
Number 15 seeks “[a]ny and all WRITINGS that refer
or relate to any training provided by Defendant LACMTA to Defendant driver
Shamon Michael Todman (Badge No. 80577).”
Defendant’s amended response states the
following: “Objection – this request is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, unduly
burdensome, seeks documents which are not relevant to the issues of this action
or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and seeks document
protected from disclosure pursuant to the official information privilege and
Defendant’s employee’s right to privacy in their personnel/employment files. Without
waiving said objections, after a diligent search and reasonable inquiry,
Defendant will comply with this request and produce all non-privileged
documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession,
custody, or control of Defendant and to which no objection is being made will
be included the production. See Exhibit 8 and Exhibit 9 produced concurrently
with Defendant’s responses.”
In opposition, Defendant asserts that during
the IDC, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated he wanted training records related to
“intersections”, “passing other vehicles”, and “DVR system of the bus.” (Opp.,
6.) Defendant contends it produced Todman’s electronic record of completed
training courses and produced the table of contents for Defendant’s Rulebook
and Standard Operating Procedures. Defendant argues Plaintiff has not shown
that he is entitled to the entire rulebook, and instead asks Plaintiff to use
the table of contents and identify which rules are within the scope of the
training topics.
In reply, Plaintiff asserts Defendant
provided no content of Todman’s training, only the training titles. Additionally,
it appears no training materials related to “intersections”, “passing other
vehicles”, and “DVR system of the bus” have been produced. The Court finds
Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff should have to first request the discovery
based on the Rulebook table of contents to be unpersuasive, given that
Defendant is in the best position to produce the responsive material.
Therefore, the motion to compel further responses to number 15 is granted.
Plaintiff requests $4,625 in monetary sanctions against Defendant and
its counsel, based on a $500 hourly rate. The Court finds sanctions are
warranted but the amount requested is excessive. Therefore, the Court awards $2,500
in sanctions (5 hours of attorney time).
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to compel further
responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, numbers 1 and 15. Defendant
shall serve further responses within 10 days of this order.
The Court awards monetary sanctions in the reduced amount of $2,500.00
against Defendant and its counsel, jointly and severally, due payable to
counsel for Plaintiff within 30 days.
Plaintiff
to provide notice and file a proof of service of such.
[1] Although
the parties also reference a motion to compel further responses to Form
Interrogatories, no such motion or separate statement appears on the Court’s
docket, nor has Plaintiff provided a copy of the responses to Form
Interrogatories. Accordingly, the Court does not address the arguments made
regarding the responses to Form Interrogatories.