Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 23STCV25486, Date: 2024-01-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV25486    Hearing Date: January 17, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

On October 18, 2023, Plaintiff Guillermo III Vasquez (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Francisco Arredondo Montes, Carlos Arredondo, Miguel Aguilera dba Engineering Blower Systems, and Does 1 to 100 for damages related to a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff asserts negligence and negligence per se causes of action against Defendant Francisco Arredondo Montes and Does 1 to 50. Plaintiff’s third cause of action for negligent entrustment is asserted against Defendants Carlos Arredondo and Miguel Aguilera dba Engineering Blower Systems.

Defendant Engineering Blower Systems and Sheet Metal Inc. (erroneously sued as Miguel Aguilera dba Engineering Blower Systems) (hereafter “EBS”) now demurs to Plaintiff’s complaint, arguing there is a misjoinder, the pleading is uncertain, and fails to state facts to constitute a cause of action.[1] Plaintiff opposes and EBS replies.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings.  It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint).  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true.  (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) 

On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad that the responding party cannot reasonably respond, i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to page and line numbers. (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.)

            Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).  

MEET AND CONFER

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).)

The declaration of Paul Orloff states that counsel called Plaintiff’s counsel to discuss the issues in this demurrer. (Orloff Decl. ¶ 2.) Therefore, the meet and confer requirement has been met.  

JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Court declines to rule on EBS’s requests for judicial notice of Exhibits A-C because they have no effect on the ruling herein.[2]

As such, Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice are also denied.

ANALYSIS

The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff; (2) defendant’s breach of that duty; and (3) harm to the plaintiff caused by that breach. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)  Under the theory of negligent entrustment, liability is imposed on¿the vehicle¿owner or permitter because of the owner’s independent¿negligence¿and not the¿negligence¿of the driver. (Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gilstrap¿(1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 524, 530.) “[I]t is generally recognized that one who places or entrusts his [or her] motor vehicle in the hands of one whom he [or she] knows, or from the circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver's disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness.” (Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063) (quoting Osborn v. Hertz Corp. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 708.)¿

Therefore, to prevail on an action for negligent entrustment, a plaintiff must prove as follows: (1) that the driver was negligent in operating the vehicle; (2) that the defendant was the owner, lessor, or possessor of the vehicle, (3) that the defendant knew or should have known that the driver was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle, (4) that the defendant permitted the driver to use the vehicle, and (5) that the driver's incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff.  (See Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 853, 863–64, 864 fn. 8, citing CACI No. 724.) 

Here, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was injured on May 25, 2023 by Defendant Francisco Arredondo Montes, who was operating a 2007 Chevy Silverado in a reckless manner. (Complaint ¶¶ 12–13.)

The Complaint further alleges:

“At all relevant times, Defendants CARLOS ARREDONDO, MIGUEL AGUILERA doing business as ENGINEERING BLOWER SYSTEMS, and Does 51 through 100 were the registered owners, of a certain 2007 Chevy Silverado.” (Complaint ¶ 9.)

“Defendants, and each of them, owed a duty of due care to Plaintiff to act in a reasonable, prudent, and careful manner in the entrustment, ownership and maintenance of the vehicle which they owned and so as to avoid causing harm or creating a foreseeable risk of harm to others, including Plaintiff. Defendants, and each of them, so negligently and carelessly entrusted and maintained said vehicle so as to cause significant personal injuries and damages to Plaintiff.”

(Complaint ¶¶ 30–31.)

EBS argues that it did not own the subject vehicle and thus, is not liable under a negligent entrustment theory. Even if the Court took judicial notice of EBS’s exhibit C, which purports to show a DMV record that the subject vehicle was transferred from EBS to Carlos Arrendono on December 20, 2021, the demurrer could not be sustained. The Court may only look to the face of the complaint and matters judicially noticed. Therefore, it cannot determine that this transfer record pertains to the subject vehicle in this case because the complaint did not identify the vehicle by a license plate or vehicle identification number. Plaintiff’s complaint only identifies the vehicle as a “2007 Chevy Silverado.”

In light of the ruling above, the Court declines to address Defendant’s arguments surrounding misjoinder and uncertainty since they are based on the issue of EBS’s ownership of the vehicle.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court OVERRULES Defendant Engineering Blower Systems and Sheet Metal Inc.’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint. Defendant shall file and serve an answer within 30 days.

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.