Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 23STCV28973, Date: 2024-09-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV28973 Hearing Date: September 26, 2024 Dept: 32
PLEASE NOTE: Parties are
encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if
a resolution may be reached. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this
tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date
and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the
identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email
indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or
adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this
tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the
Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent
authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
TENTATIVE
RULING
DEPT: |
32 |
HEARING DATE: |
September
26, 2024 |
CASE NUMBER: |
23STCV28973 |
MOTIONS: |
(1)
Motion for Protective Order Regarding Special
Interrogatories, Set Two (2)
Motion for Protective Order Regarding Requests for
Production, Set Two |
Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. |
|
OPPOSING PARTY: |
Plaintiff
Gianni Pink |
BACKGROUND
On
November 28, 2023, Plaintiff Gianni Pink (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint
against Defendants Carlos Roman, United Parcel Service, Inc., and Does 1 to 25
for negligence related to a motor vehicle accident.
Defendant United Parcel Service,
Inc. (“Defendant”) now moves for a protective order against Plaintiff’s Special
Interrogatories, Set Two and Requests for Production, Set Two. Plaintiff
opposes and Defendant replies.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Under Code of
Civil Procedure section 2017.020, a court shall limit the scope of discovery if
the court “determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that
discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” A “court may make this
determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other
affected person.” (Id.)¿The “motion shall be accompanied by a meet and
confer declaration.” (Id.)¿
Similarly, courts must restrict the frequency or extent of a discovery
method such as interrogatories or inspection of documents if it determines
either of the following:
“(1) The
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive.
(2) The
selected method of discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2019.030.) This can
be done by moving for a protective order.
Protective
Order for Interrogatories
Regarding interrogatories, the
protective order may include, but it not limited to, one or more of the
following directions: “(1) That the set of interrogatories, or particular
interrogatories in the set, need not be answered. (2) That, contrary to the
representations made in a declaration submitted under Section 2030.050, the
number of specially prepared interrogatories is unwarranted. . . .” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 2030.090, subd. (b).)
“Subject
to the right of the responding party to seek a protective order under Section
2030.090, any party who attaches a supporting declaration as described in
Section 2030.050 may propound a greater number of specially prepared
interrogatories to another party if this greater number is warranted because of
any of the following:
(1) The
complexity or the quantity of the existing and potential issues in the
particular case.
(2) The
financial burden on a party entailed in conducting the discovery by oral
deposition.
(3) The
expedience of using this method of discovery to provide to the responding party
the opportunity to conduct an inquiry, investigation, or search of files or
records to supply the information sought.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.040, subd.
(a).)
“If the responding party seeks a
protective order on the ground that the number of specially prepared
interrogatories is unwarranted, the propounding party shall have the burden of
justifying the number of these interrogatories.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.040,
subd. (b).)
If the motion for a protective order
is denied in whole or in part, the court may order that the party provide or
permit the discovery against which protection was sought on terms and
conditions that are just. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090, subd. (c).)
The court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party,
person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a
protective order under this section, unless it finds that the one subject to
the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances
make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090, subd.
(d).)
Protective
Order for Request for Production
“When an inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of documents,
tangible things, places, or electronically stored information has been
demanded, the party to whom the demand has been directed, and any other party
or affected person, may promptly move for a protective order. This motion shall
be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code
Civ. Proc., 2031.060, subd. (a).)
“The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice
requires to protect any party or other person from unwarranted annoyance,
embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This protective
order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following
directions: (1) That all or some of the items or categories of items in the
demand need not be produced or made available at all. . . .” (Code Civ. Proc.,
2031.060, subd. (b).)
“The party or affected person who seeks a protective order regarding
the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of electronically
stored information on the basis that the information is from a source that is
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense shall bear the
burden of demonstrating that the information is from a source that is not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., 2031.060, subd. (c).)
The court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person,
or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective
order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with
substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of
the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., 2031.060,
subd. (h).)
MEET AND
CONFER
The Declaration of Alexis
Morgenstern, Defendant’s counsel, states that there was an attempt to meet and
confer with Plaintiff’s counsel. However, no further description of the meet
and confer effort is provided. (Morgenstern Decl. ¶ 3.)
DISCUSSION
Defendant
asserts that on June 26, 2024, Plaintiff propounded Special Interrogatories, Set
Two, which include 97 interrogatories, and are thus overly excessive for this
case involving a motor vehicle accident. Defendant also contends Plaintiff
failed to provide a declaration justifying the interrogatories past 35, under
Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.050. (Motion, 4.) Defendant asks the Court
for an order shielding it from having to respond beyond the first 35
interrogatories.
Defendant
also moves for a protective order against Requests for Production, Set Two,
which contain 150 requests.[1]
Again, Defendant argues this amount is excessive and intended to harass.
In
opposition, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Carlos Roman (“Roman”), who was
allegedly driving a UPS Truck when the incident occurred, was deposed on April
23, 2024.
Plaintiff argues that Roman testified inconsistently about
his speed (first stating he was traveling 10 miles per hour, and then 25 miles
per hour). Plaintiff also argues Roman’s testimony questions whether he came to
a complete stop before the stop sign where the incident occurred, and whether
he has a recurring issue with braking too quickly. There is also evidence that
Roman’s supervisor talked to a witness at the scene of the incident and took
photographs. Additionally, contrary to Defendant’s assertions, Plaintiff argues
the dashcam footage of the incident shows that Roman was accelerating as he
approached the stop sign. (Zar Decl. ¶ 8.)
Upon
reviewing the discovery requests and given Plaintiff’s contentions above, the
Court finds Plaintiff has met her burden to justify the number of
interrogatories served. In reply, Defendant contends a declaration under
2030.050 has been served but it defective. However, based on the discussion
above, the Court finds the information provided is sufficient. As for the
Request for Production, Defendant fails to show that the requests are
irrelevant or too burdensome to warrant a protective order.
CONCLUSION AND
ORDER
Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc.’s motions for protective orders against Special
Interrogatories, Set Two and Requests for Production, Set Two.
Moving party shall provide
notice and file a proof of service of such.
[1]
Defendant references section 2033.040(b), but that section relates to requests
for admission. (Motion at p. 4.)