Judge: Anne Hwang, Case: 23STCV31344, Date: 2024-07-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV31344    Hearing Date: July 17, 2024    Dept: 32

PLEASE NOTE:   Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.  If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that party’s intention to submit.  The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsel’s contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.  If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.  If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.  Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. 

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION

On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff Veronica Aguilar (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Luvic Management Inc. LLC, Luis C. Montes, and Does 1 to 20 for negligence and premises liability. Plaintiff alleges that on December 30, 2021, she was at her place of employment when a piece of ceiling fell on her. (Complaint ¶ 1.) She alleges that Luvic Management Inc. LLC owned, managed, or controlled the subject property. (Id. ¶ 6.) She also alleges that Does 1 to 20 owed a duty of care to reasonably foreseeable persons at the property and breached that duty, thereby causing the incident. (Id. ¶ 11–14.)

On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint, substituting Luvic Health Care, LLC as Doe 3.  

Defendant Luvic Health Care, LLC (“Defendant”) now demurs to the entire complaint on the following grounds: (1) the court lacks jurisdiction (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(a)); and (2) Plaintiff does not have legal capacity to sue (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(b)). Plaintiff opposes and Defendant replies.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings.  It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint).  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)  It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true.  (Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) 

On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to “determine whether or not the … complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

            Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).  

MEET AND CONFER

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).)

The Declaration of Christopher Carrillo, Defendant’s counsel, states that he met and conferred telephonically with Plaintiff’s counsel on May 28, 2024, regarding the issues in this demurrer. (Carrillo Decl. ¶ 2.) Therefore, the meet and confer requirement is met.  

JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s purported worker’s compensation claim filed with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. Defendant does not cite to a specific subsection of Evidence Code section 452. Therefore, the request for judicial notice is denied. (See Evid. Code § 453(b).)

ANALYSIS

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the worker’s compensation exclusivity rule, and thus the Court lacks jurisdiction and Plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue.

Under Labor Code section 3602, “[w]here the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to recover compensation is, except as specifically provided in this section and Sections 3706 and 4558, the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer.” (Lab. Code, § 3602, subd. (a).) Section 3602, subdivisions (b) and (c) set forth the exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision of subdivision (a). Additionally, the exclusive remedy provision of Section 3602, subdivision (a) does not apply where an employer fails to secure the payment of compensation or where the employee’s injury or death is proximately caused by the employer's knowing removal of, or knowing failure to install, a point of operation guard on a power press. (See Lab. Code, §§ 3607, 4558.)  

Here, the complaint alleges: “On December 30, 2021, 57-year-old Veronica Aguilar or "Plaintiff", tragically sustained damaging injuries when a decaying and poorly maintained large ceiling inside her place of employment ("Subject Office") fell on her while he was working on the property located at 924 S. Atlantic Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90022 ("Subject Property").” (Complaint ¶ 1.)

While the complaint appears to allege that Plaintiff was injured at her work, the Complaint does not allege that Defendant was her employer at the time. As stated above, the worker’s compensation exclusivity rule generally pertains to lawsuits against the employer. (See, e.g., Labor Code § 3852.) Therefore, because there are no allegations that Defendant was her employer, or even that her employer secured payment of compensation, the face of the complaint does not demonstrate that the worker’s compensation exclusivity rule applies.

Since the Court is limited to the pleadings on demurrer, and may not consider evidence not judicially noticed, the face of the complaint does not reflect that the Court lacks jurisdiction or that Plaintiff lacks standing and therefore the Court overrules the demurrer.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Therefore, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to the complaint.

Defendant shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file a proof of service of such.