Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 18STCV08010, Date: 2023-08-07 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions.The tentative ruling will not become the final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) email Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (smcdept40@lacourt.org) with a copy to the other party(ies) and state that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no email is necessary and all parties should appear at the hearing in person or by Court Call.
Case Number: 18STCV08010 Hearing Date: August 21, 2023 Dept: 40
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ELIAS SEDANO, an Individual, Plaintiff, v. MITCHELL RUBBER PRODUCTS, LLC, a California Limited Liability
Company; MITCHELL RUBBER PRODUCTS, INC., a California Corporation; and DOES 1
to 100, Inclusive, Defendants. |
Case No.: 18STCV08010 Hearing Date: 8/21/23 Trial Date: 4/16/24 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiff Elias Sedano’s Motion to Quash Defendant’s
Subpoena for Production of Business Records Directed at Edwin T. Yu; and Plaintiff Elias Sedano’s Motion to Quash Defendant’s
Subpoena for Production of Business Records Directed at Azul Vision, Inc. |
Plaintiff Elias Sedano sues
Defendants Mitchell Rubber Products, LLC, Mitchell Rubber Products, Inc., Doe 1
Hexpol Compounding CA Inc. (Hexpol), and Does 2 to 100 pursuant to a December
12, 2018 Complaint alleging claims of: (1) Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA) Discrimination Based on Actual or Perceived Disability; (2) FEHA Failure
to Engage in the Interactive Process; (3) FEHA Failure to Accommodate; (4) FEHA
Discrimination Based on Age; (5) Labor Code, FEHA, and California Family Rights
Act (CFRA) Retaliation; (6) FEHA Failure to Prevent Discrimination and
Retaliation; (7) Wrongful Discharge; (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress (no longer operative against Hexpol); and (9) Unfair Business
Practices.
On May 19, 2023, Hexpol served a
subpoena duces tecum for the production of business records from Edwin T. Yu,
M.D.
That same day, Hexpol served a
subpoena duces tecum for the production of business records from Azul Vision,
Inc.
Both subpoenas seek the production
of:
“Any and all documents and/or
electronically stored information related to Elias Sedano (SSN: xxx-xx-8214;
DOB 09/13/1957) for the period of time from January 1, 1992 to present,
including, but not limited to, Mr. Sedano’s complete medical and counseling file(s);
all forms completed by Mr. Sedano in connection with your treatment of him; all
tests administered to and/or taken by Mr. Sedano of any type, character and
reports thereof; statements of charges; any and all of Mr. Sedano’s medical and
counseling notes/records pertaining to medical care, psychological treatment,
psychiatric treatment, hospitalization, surgeries, history, condition,
treatment diagnosis, prognosis, prescriptions, etiology or expense; and any and
all recorded and/or written statements made by or about Mr. Sedano and/or
Mitchell Rubber Products, LLC, and/or Hexpol Compounding CA Inc.”
On June 5, 2023, Plaintiff Sedano
made motions to quash the subpoenas served on Dr. Yu and Azul Vision. The
motions were set for hearing on August 21, 2023.
On August 8, 2023, Hexpol opposed
the motions to quash.
On August 14, 2023, Plaintiff
Sedano replied to the oppositions.
Plaintiff’s motions are now before
the Court.
Legal Standard
Such
a motion may be made by:
(1)
Any party to the action (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (b)(1));
(2)
The subpoenaed witness (e.g., a custodian of another person’s personal records)
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (b)(2); Monarch Healthcare v. Superior
Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1287-1288);
(3)
A person (party or nonparty) whose consumer, governmental, or employment
information or records have been subpoenaed (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.3,
subd. (g) [party consumer], 1985.4 [state or local-agency employee or any other
natural person], 1985.6, subd. (f)(1) [employee], 1987.1, subd. (b)(3)
[consumer], 1987.1, subd. (b)(4) [employee]; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§
1985.3, subd. (g), ¶ 2, 1985.6, subd. (f)(2) [nonparty consumer can make
written objections instead of motion to quash]);
(4)
A person whose “personally identifying information” within the meaning of Civ.
Code § 1798.79.8, subd, (b), subpoenaed in connection with an action involving
that person’s exercise of free-speech rights; and
(5)
The Court, on its own motion, after giving the parties notice and the
opportunity to be heard (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)
A
motion to quash may be based on various grounds, including that:
The
subpoena contains error or irregularities in the deposition notice (see Code
Civ. Proc., § 2025.410, subds. (a), (c));
The
subpoena seeks information that is not relevant to the issues in the case (see,
e.g., Catholic Mut. Relief Soc’y v. Superior Court, supra, 42
Cal.4th at p. 365 [motion to quash deposition subpoena because documents were
outside the scope of discovery]; cf. Cadiz Land Co. v. Rail Cycle, L.P.
(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 74, 122-123 [motion to quash deposition notice because
deposition would not lead to admissible evidence]);
The
subpoena seeks information that is not relevant to the issues in the case (see,
e.g., Slagle v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1314-1315
[motion to quash trial subpoena because medical records were not relevant was
properly overruled]);
The
subpoena makes unreasonable or oppressive demands for information (see Code
Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a); see, e.g., McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior
Court, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 391 [motion to quash deposition
subpoenas because they were unreasonable and oppressive]);
The
disclosure of the records sought will violate the consumer’s constitutional
right to privacy (see Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; see, e.g., Fett v. Medical
Bd. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 211, 213 [petitions to quash to nonparties’ doctor
because of privacy rights]; Manela v. Superior Court (2009) 117
Cal.App.4th 1139, 1150-1151 [motion to quash a subpoena to party’s doctor
because of privacy rights]); and
The
disclosure of records will violate a privilege of the consumer, the witness, or
a person with whom the witness has a relationship that requires the witness to
assert the privilege on the person’s behalf (see, e.g., Monarch Healthcare
v. Superior Court, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290 [objections to
subpoena for business records based on trade-secret privilege]).
Order Quashing Subpoena: GRANTED,
in Part [Modification Only].
I. Introduction
The deposition subpoena for
production of records served on Dr. Yu—Plaintiff’s primary care physician
(Quash Mot. [Yu], p. 3)—reads:
“Any and all documents and/or
electronically stored information related to Elias Sedano (SSN: xxx-xx-8214;
DOB 09/13/1957) for the period of time from January 1, 1992 to present,
including, but not limited to, Mr. Sedano’s complete medical and counseling
file(s); all forms completed by Mr. Sedano in connection with your treatment of
him; all tests administered to and/or taken by Mr. Sedano of any type,
character and reports thereof; statements of charges; any and all of Mr. Sedano’s
medical and counseling notes/records pertaining to medical care, psychological
treatment, psychiatric treatment, hospitalization, surgeries, history,
condition, treatment diagnosis, prognosis, prescriptions, etiology or expense;
and any and all recorded and/or written statements made by or about Mr. Sedano
and/or Mitchell Rubber Products, LLC, and/or Hexpol Compounding CA Inc.”
(Quash Mot. [Yu], Moaven Decl. Ex.
2, SUBP-010, Attach. 3.)
II. Moving Papers
Plaintiff Sedano objects to and
moves to quash this subpoena on various grounds, the gist of which is that
discovery should be limited to the “shoulder injuries and hydrocephalus”
complications resulting from brain surgery thereon, which are alleged in the
Complaint. (See Quash Mot. [Yu], p. 3.)
The first ground for quashing is
that the subpoena is overbroad and invades Plaintiff’s medical and financial
privacy rights by seeking “all documents related to Plaintiff’s medical
history, including financial information related to such medical history,
without any limitations, whether in time or in scope of injuries/conditions”
where “[t]he only injuries/conditions at issue here are Plaintiff’s shoulder
injuries and his hydrocephalus” and “[n]othing about Plaintiff’s payments for
any medical treatment, let alone treatment for his shoulder injuries and hydrocephalus,
is relevant to this wrongful termination action.” (Quash Mot. [Yu], p. 5.)
The next ground is that pursuant to
Evidence Code sections 952 and 954, Plaintiff has and asserts the right to
confidentiality over physician-patient communications. (Quash Mot. [Yu], pp.
5-6.)
Plaintiff also argues that
disclosure of a plaintiff’s medical history requires a compelling need and that
the subpoena here does not meet that standard because it is a fishing
expedition that does not limit itself to the damages at issue. (Quash Mot.
[Yu], p. 7.) Plaintiff Sedano cites to two cases—In re Lifschutz (1970)
2 Cal.3d 415 (Lifschutz) and Mendez v. Superior Court (1988) 206
Cal.App.3d 557 (Mendez)—for what in essence reads as an argument that this
case law limits discovery outside the scope of the litigation and that the
subpoena served on Dr. Yu is a fishing expedition because “[t]he only medical
records Defendant would be entitled to are those relevant to Plaintiff’s
shoulder injuries and hydrocephalus.” (Quash Mot. [Yu], pp. 7-9.)
Plaintiff next relies on Britt
v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844 (Britt) to argue that no
waiver of his patient-physician privilege has occurred because, in essence, the
privilege remains as to physical and mental conditions not placed at issue in
the litigation, and that here, Plaintiff has only placed his shoulder injuries
and hydrocephalus condition at issue. (Quash Mot. [Yu], pp. 9-11.)
The motion fails to address
Hexpol’s entitlement to emotional distress discovery, as raised in the
Complaint. (See, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 59, 66, 79.)
III. Opposition by
Hexpol
In opposition, Hexpol first argues
that the entire scope of discovery sought in the Yu subpoena is relevant to
this action for various reasons. One reason is that Hexpol seeks to discover
whether Plaintiff was released back to work, where Plaintiff’s discovery
responses indicate that he has not found work beyond working several days a
week at a taco stand—as well as jobs working on a farm and delivering animal feed.
(Quash Opp’n [Yu], pp. 8-9; Quash Opp’n [Yu], Owen Decl., Ex. A, SROGS No.
210.6 [employment since termination].) Another reason for relevance of the
requested production is to discover whether Plaintiff has sought to mitigate
the emotional distress that Plaintiff put at issue in his Complaint and in
discovery. (Quash Opp’n [Yu], pp. 6, 8-9, citing to Complaint [see, e.g., at ¶¶
59, 66, 79] and Quash Opp’n [Yu], Owen Decl., Ex. A [see, e.g., SROGS Nos. 212.3,
emotional distress in “stress, depression, anxiety, fear, insomnia,
humiliation, embarrassment, emotional distress, mental anguish and nervousness”];
see also Quash Opp’n [Yu], Owen Decl., Ex. B, SROGS No. 6 [identifying of
providers from which Plaintiff has sought treatment for emotional or mental
distress].)
Hexpol distinguishes Lifschutz
and Mendez by arguing that, unlike in those cases, Plaintiff has put his
emotional distress at issue, and that the scope of the subpoena requests on Dr.
Yu is proper based on Plaintiff’s claims of emotional distress, contrasting the
circumstances in Lifschutz and Mendez. (Quash Opp’n [Yu], pp.
10-12, citing to Quash Opp’n [Yu], Owen Decl., Ex. A, SROGS Nos. 212.2-212.3.)
Hexpol also argues that “Plaintiff
claims economic damages including lost past and future earnings in connection
with his discrimination, wrongful termination, and retaliation claims” (see
Quash Opp’n [Yu], Owen Decl., Ex. A, SROGS No. 210.3) and “[m]edical records
from an institution that conducted his surgery will help Hexpol’s experts
evaluate the amount and extent of Plaintiff’s lost past and future income and
what Plaintiff’s ability to continue to work would be and if that is
[at]tributed to Defendants’ alleged misconduct or something else.” (Quash Opp’n
[Yu], p. 12.)
Hexpol next argues that any
balancing test of privacy rights should favor discovery in this case because,
unlike Britt, where overbroad discovery was sought, here, “the
disclosure of medical records is directly relevant to critical issues in this
matter such that the probative value of such documents outweighs Plaintiff’s
privacy interests,” where “Plaintiff has specifically placed both his physical
and emotional injuries at issue,” and where “Hexpol is not trying to obtain all
of Plaintiff’s medical records from Dr. Yu, but only those between 1992 to
present despite Plaintiff working with MRP since 1986.” (Quash Opp’n [Yu], p.
13, citing Quash Opp’n [Yu], Owen Decl., Exs. A-B.)
Hexpol argues that a protective
order could moot any privacy concerns that Plaintiff has and indicates that
Hexpol has prepared a proposed order. (Quash Opp’n [Yu], pp. 13-14; see Quash
Opp’n [Yu], Owen Decl., Ex. I [proposed stipulation and protective order].)
Hexpol last argues that Plaintiff
has waived the physician-patient privilege by placing his physical injuries and
emotional distress at issue in this matter. (Quash Opp’n [Yu], p. 14.) Hexpol
cites Evidence Code section 996, subdivision (d), as well as Lifschutz, supra,
2 Cal.3d at p. 435 for the proposition that the patient-litigant exception to the
physician-patient privilege applies to matters directly relevant to the nature
of specific mental or emotional conditions that the patient has voluntarily
disclosed and tendered in the pleadings or in answer to discovery inquiries, such
that no constitutional infirmity is triggered because the patient’s privacy
remains essentially under the patient’s control. (Quash Opp’n [Yu], p. 14.)
IV. Plaintiff’s Reply
Arguments
In reply, Plaintiff reiterates
arguments that (1) there is no compelling public interest to overcoming
Plaintiff’s medical privacy rights, (2) a balancing test merits quashing the
subpoena, and (3) the records requested are overbroad. (Quash Reply [Yu], pp.
3-5, 6.)
Plaintiff also argues that the
medical records sought by the subpoena are not relevant to any essential cause
of action or defense, that he will not agree to a protective order seeking
disclosure of records that should not be produced, and that he has not waived
his physician-patient privilege. (Quash Reply [Yu], pp. 5-6, 7.)
A review of these arguments show
that they are premised on the idea that only Plaintiff’s shoulder injuries and
hydrocephalus condition are at issue and generally characterizing the subpoena
as involving information that is beyond this scope, for which reason it is
overbroad, not relevant, protected by privilege, and not subject to waiver.
(Quash Reply [Yu], pp. 3-7.) The reply admits to having Plaintiff’s emotional
distress damages at issue. (Compare Quash Reply [Yu], pp. 2 [“This subpoena
does not limit the documents sought to Plaintiff’s shoulder injuries,
hydrocephalus, or emotional distress damages”], 6 [“This subpoena seeks all
medical and financial records without regard to whether they are related to the
shoulder and hydrocephalus injuries or emotional distress” and is thus “overbroad”].)
V. Court’s
Determination
The Court initially notes that it
has reviewed the arguments in the separate statements and because the same are
raised in the papers, the Court discusses the outcome of this motion within the
framing of the moving papers.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff
that the discovery sought from Dr. Yu is somewhat overbroad but also agrees
with Hexpol that Plaintiff has waived his right to confidentiality and privacy
in his medical records related to the physical injuries and emotional distress
raised in the pleadings and in discovery.
The Complaint clearly puts at
issue, at the very least:
(1) Plaintiff’s shoulder injuries,
related disabilities, improvements in such a disability (e.g., did the
disability completely abate at any point?), and damages connected thereto,
where the first workplace related injury occurred in 1992, affording a long
period of discoverable information (see, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 16, 22, 27, 31,
51);
(2) Plaintiff’s hydrocephalus
condition, conditions of leave, ability to return to work, and damages
connected thereto (see, e.g., Complaint, ¶ 39, 88); and
(3) Plaintiff’s emotional distress,
including the existence of such emotional distress, efforts by Plaintiff to
mitigate these efforts, and damages related thereto, including medical expenses
(see, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 59, 66, 79, 84; see also Quash Opp’n [Yu], Owen
Decl., Ex. A, SROGS Nos. 212.3 [emotional distress comprised of “stress,
depression, anxiety, fear, insomnia, humiliation, embarrassment, emotional
distress, mental anguish and nervousness”]).
Plaintiff has waived privilege and
privacy as to the above matters to the extent he has put them at issue by bringing
this litigation. (Evid. Code, § 996, subd. (a) [“There is no privilege under
this article as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the
condition of the patient if such issue has been tendered by” “[t]he patient”]; Lifschutz,
supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 435 [“[T]he patient-litigant exception allows only
a limited inquiry into the confidences of the psychotherapist-patient
relationship, compelling disclosure of only those matters directly relevant to
the nature of the specific ‘emotional or mental’ condition which the patient
has voluntarily disclosed and tendered in his pleadings or in answer to
discovery inquiries” but where “even when confidential information falls within
this exception, trial courts, because of the intimate and potentially embarrassing
nature of such communications, may utilize the protective measures at their
disposal to avoid unwarranted intrusions into the confidences of the
relationship”].)
The Court thus would modify the
subpoena request to compel production of the following, with changes shown in
upper case lettering:
Any and all documents and/or
electronically stored information related to Elias Sedano (SSN: xxx-xx-8214;
DOB 09/13/1957) for the period of time from January 1, 1992 to present,
including, but not limited to, Mr. Sedano’s complete medical and counseling
file(s) RELATING TO ELIAS SEDANO’S SHOULDER INJURIES SUSTAINED IN 1992 AND 2007
AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARISING FROM DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT, RETALIATION,
AND OTHER INJURIES SUFFERED BY ELIAS SEDANO AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS BY
DEFENDANTS AS RAISED IN LASC ACTION NO. 18STCV08010; all forms completed by Mr.
Sedano in connection with your treatment of him RELATING TO THE 1992 AND 2007
INJURIES AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARISING FROM DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT,
RETALIATION, AND OTHER INJURIES SUFFERED BY ELIAS SEDANO AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS
BY DEFENDANTS AS RAISED IN LASC ACTION NO. 18STCV08010; all tests administered
to and/or taken by Mr. Sedano of any type, character and reports thereof
RELATING TO THE 1992 AND 2007 INJURIES, AS WELL AS EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARISING
FROM DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT, RETALIATION, AND OTHER INJURIES SUFFERED BY
ELIAS SEDANO AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS BY DEFENDANTS AS RAISED IN LASC ACTION NO.
18STCV08010; statements of charges EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARISING FROM
DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT, RETALIATION, AND OTHER INJURIES SUFFERED BY ELIAS
SEDANO AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS BY DEFENDANTS AS RAISED IN LASC ACTION NO.
18STCV08010; any and all of Mr. Sedano’s medical and counseling notes/records
pertaining to medical care, psychological treatment, psychiatric treatment,
hospitalization, surgeries, history, condition, treatment diagnosis, prognosis,
prescriptions, etiology or expense ARISING FROM DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT,
RETALIATION, AND OTHER INJURIES SUFFERED BY ELIAS SEDANO AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS
BY DEFENDANTS AS RAISED IN LASC ACTION NO. 18STCV08010; and any and all
recorded and/or written statements made by or about Mr. Sedano and/or Mitchell
Rubber Products, LLC, and/or Hexpol Compounding CA Inc. INSOFAR AS THESE
STATEMENTS RELATE TO DAMAGES ARISING FROM DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT,
RETALIATION, AND OTHER INJURIES SUFFERED BY ELIAS SEDANO AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS
BY DEFENDANTS AS RAISED IN LASC ACTION NO. 18STCV08010.
This motion to quash is thus
GRANTED, in Part, but only as to modification of the scope of the subpoena
duces tecum served on Dr. Yu, as shown in the preceding paragraph. To the extent
that the provider may be unable to determine what records are responsive, the Court
will consider arguments as to the logistics of production.
Sanctions: DENIED.
The Court may in its discretion,
except in certain circumstances, award the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s
fees, where the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or
without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of
the subpoena was oppressive. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2, subd. (a).)
Given that the Court has granted
this motion in part based on meritorious arguments by both parties, the Court
DENIES the sanctions requested by Hexpol. (See Quash Opp’n [Yu], pp. 14-17.)
Legal
Standard
See
above.
Order
Quashing Subpoena: GRANTED, in Part [Modification Only].
The
scope of discovery sought in the deposition served on Azul Vision is identical
to that served on Dr. Yu. (Compare Quash Mot. [Yu], Moaven Decl. Ex. 2,
SUBP-010, Attach. 3, with Quash Mot. [Azul Vision], Moaven Decl. Ex. 2,
SUBP-010, Attach. 3.)
The
parties’ motion and opposition briefs are virtually identical as to quashing or
not quashing the subpoenas served on Dr. Yu and Azul Vision. (Compare Quash
Mot. [Yu], pp. 2-11, with Quash Mot. [Azul Vision], pp. 2-11 [nearly
line-by-line identical briefing]; also compare Quash Opp’n [Yu], pp. 5-17, with
Quash Opp’n [Azul Vision], pp. 5-17 [mostly identical arguments with some
factual differences but same legal argument].)
A
critical difference is that Hexpol argues that third-party deponent Azul Vision’s
predecessor in interest was identified by Plaintiff Sedano as one of his
medical providers that has information about his injuries and the damages
alleged in this action. (Quash Opp’n [Azul Vision], p. 6 & fn. 1 [Azul
Vision is allegedly successor in interest to Foothill Eye Institute]; compare
Quash Opp’n [Azul Vision], Owen Decl., Ex. A, Notice to Consumer or Employee
[subpoena to “Azul Vision Inc. 229 E Beverly Blvd., Montebello, CA 90640”],
with Quash Opp’n [Azul Vision], Owen Decl., Ex. B, SROGS No. 6 [identifying “Foothill
Eyecare Services; 229 E. Beverly Blvd., Montebello, CA 90640” as one of
Plaintiff’s health care providers for Plaintiff’s emotional and mental distress
between April 12, 2012 and the present].)
Plaintiff
argues that “Azul is not related to the Foothill Eye Institute, and Defendant
has no proof of such, as well as the fact that the records are unrelated to any
claims made by Plaintiff, [for which reason] this subpoena should be quashed.”
(Quash Reply [Azul Vision], p. 6.)
The
Court finds that to the extent this subpoena was served on a business operating
out of 229 E. Beverly Blvd., Montebello, CA 90640, and to the extent that the
business currently operating out of that address is a successor in interest to
a healthcare provider that provided medical services to Plaintiff Sedano, the
subpoena duces tecum served thereon is proper.
Accordingly,
the Court adopts its above discussion as to the subpoena duces tecum served on
Dr. Yu and similarly would limit the production of records from Azul Vision as
follows:
Any
and all documents and/or electronically stored information related to Elias
Sedano (SSN: xxx-xx-8214; DOB 09/13/1957) for the period of time from January
1, 1992 to present, including, but not limited to, Mr. Sedano’s complete medical
and counseling file(s) RELATING TO ELIAS SEDANO’S SHOULDER INJURIES SUSTAINED
IN 1992 AND 2007 AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARISING FROM DISCRIMINATION,
HARASSMENT, RETALIATION, AND OTHER INJURIES SUFFERED BY ELIAS SEDANO AS A
RESULT OF ACTIONS BY DEFENDANTS AS RAISED IN LASC ACTION NO. 18STCV08010; all
forms completed by Mr. Sedano in connection with your treatment of him RELATING
TO THE 1992 AND 2007 INJURIES AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARISING FROM
DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT, RETALIATION, AND OTHER INJURIES SUFFERED BY ELIAS
SEDANO AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS BY DEFENDANTS AS RAISED IN LASC ACTION NO.
18STCV08010; all tests administered to and/or taken by Mr. Sedano of any type,
character and reports thereof RELATING TO THE 1992 AND 2007 INJURIES, AS WELL
AS EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARISING FROM DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT, RETALIATION, AND
OTHER INJURIES SUFFERED BY ELIAS SEDANO AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS BY DEFENDANTS AS
RAISED IN LASC ACTION NO. 18STCV08010; statements of charges EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
ARISING FROM DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT, RETALIATION, AND OTHER INJURIES
SUFFERED BY ELIAS SEDANO AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS BY DEFENDANTS AS RAISED IN LASC
ACTION NO. 18STCV08010; any and all of Mr. Sedano’s medical and counseling
notes/records pertaining to medical care, psychological treatment, psychiatric
treatment, hospitalization, surgeries, history, condition, treatment diagnosis,
prognosis, prescriptions, etiology or expense ARISING FROM DISCRIMINATION,
HARASSMENT, RETALIATION, AND OTHER INJURIES SUFFERED BY ELIAS SEDANO AS A RESULT
OF ACTIONS BY DEFENDANTS AS RAISED IN LASC ACTION NO. 18STCV08010; and any and
all recorded and/or written statements made by or about Mr. Sedano and/or
Mitchell Rubber Products, LLC, and/or Hexpol Compounding CA Inc. INSOFAR AS
THESE STATEMENTS RELATE TO DAMAGES ARISING FROM DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT,
RETALIATION, AND OTHER INJURIES SUFFERED BY ELIAS SEDANO AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS
BY DEFENDANTS AS RAISED IN LASC ACTION NO. 18STCV08010.
The
Court notes that the subpoena is modified to order that the business operating
out of 229 E. Beverly Blvd., Montebello, CA 90640 produce the above discovery
to the extent that it is a successor in interest to a medical provider that in
any way provided services to Plaintiff Sedano. Again, to the extent that the
provider may be unable to determine what records are responsive, the Court will
consider arguments as to the logistics of production.
Sanctions:
DENIED.
The
Court similarly denies any sanctions in favor of Hexpol related to the Azul
Vision deposition. (See Quash Opp’n [Azul Vision], pp. 15-17.)
Plaintiff Elias Sedano’s Motion to
Quash Defendant’s Subpoena for Production of Business Records Directed at Edwin
T. Yu is GRANTED, in Part, only as to modification of the subpoena.
Hexpol’s related request for
sanctions is DENIED.
Plaintiff Elias Sedano’s Motion to
Quash Defendant’s Subpoena for Production of Business Records Directed at Azul
Vision, Inc. is GRANTED, in Part, only as to modification of the subpoena.
Hexpol’s related request for sanctions is DENIED.