Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 19STCV12643, Date: 2023-07-10 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions. The tentative ruling will not become the
final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to
submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must
agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call
Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0160) and state
that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of
the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative
ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at
the hearing in person or by Court Call.
Case Number: 19STCV12643 Hearing Date: July 10, 2023 Dept: 40
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LAURA AN, an individual, Plaintiff, v. ASAD AYAZ, an individual, HARMA HARTOUNI, an individual, ALI
KETABACHI, an individual, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. |
Case No.: 19STCV12643 Hearing Date: 7/10/23 Trial Date: N/A [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendants Asad
Ayaz, Harma Hartouni, and Ali Ketabachi’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and
Costs on Appeal. |
MOVING PARTY: Defendants Asad Ayaz,
Harma Hartouni, and Ali Ketabachi.
OPPOSITION: [Unopposed]
Plaintiff Laura Aun sued Defendants Defendants Asad Ayaz, Harma
Hartouni, Ali Ketabachi, and Does 1 through 10 pursuant to a March 23, 2020
Second Amended Complaint alleging claims of (1) Declaratory Relief, (2)
Fraudulent Intent to Occupy, and (3) Breach of Los Angeles Rent Stabilization
Ordinance.
On June 15, 2020, Defendants demurred to the SAC’s claims on sufficiency
and statute of limitations grounds.
On September 10, 2020, the Court sustained the demurrer based on the
statute of limitations arguments, with 11 days to amend granted to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff, however, failed to amend her pleadings by September 21, 2020.
As a result, on September 24, 2020, Defendants moved for dismissal of
this action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2)
for failure to amend the pleadings within the permissible timeframe allotted by
the Court after a sustained demurrer.
On October 28, 2020, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Judgment was entered the same day, with notice thereof effected on
November 2, 2020.
On November 30, 2020, Defendants moved for attorney’s fees and costs in
the trial court proceedings.
On March 3, 2021, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for fees and
costs.
On March 19, 2021, the Court signed an order in favor of the fees and
costs and amended the judgment to include the award for fees and costs, with
notice thereof being effected on March 23, 2021.
On April 23, 2021, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal against the
judgment of dismissal.
On May 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal against the order for
attorney’s fees and costs.
On December 2, 2021, the Court of appeal consolidated the appeals.
On September 28, 2022, the court of appeal issued its opinion, which
affirmed this Court’s judgment of dismissal and award of attorney’s fees and
costs and entitled Defendants to costs on appeal.
On December 16, 2022, the court of appeal returned remittitur.
On January 17, 2023, Defendants moved for attorney’s fees and costs on
appeal, filing a memorandum of costs therewith. The hearing thereon was set for
July 10, 2023.
Plaintiff An has failed to oppose this motion and the costs memorandum,
which are now before the Court.
A prevailing party is entitled to
recover costs as a matter of right. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subds. (a)(4),
(b).) Attorney’s fees are also recoverable as costs when authorized by
contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) “[T]o collect appellate attorney fees, a party must
demonstrate the right to do so under either a statute or a contract,
independent of a costs statute.” (Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 918, 927.) Attorney’s fees may be recoverable as costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)
The Court begins this inquiry “with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of
hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM
Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) From there, the “lodestar
figure may then be adjusted [according to a multiplier enhancement] based on
consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the
fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid.) Relevant
multiplier factors include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which
the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and]
(4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24
Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)
No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations for attorney’s
fees are required; the record need only show that the attorney’s fees were
awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach. (Rebney v.
Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1344, 1349.) The Court has broad
discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award, which
will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial
error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi
v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-1394.)
Order Granting Fees and Costs: GRANTED.
I. Entitlement to
Fees on Appeal
Defendants argue that they are
entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal because they were the prevailing party on
appeal, because case law states that a statute authorizing an attorney fee
award at the trial court level includes appellate attorney fees unless the
statute specifically provides otherwise, and because Defendants were entitled
to attorney’s fees in the trial court proceeding pursuant to Civil Code section
1947.10, subdivision (a). (See Mot., pp. 2-3.)
The Court agrees with this position,
which is unopposed by Plaintiff An.
Defendants prevailed in the trial
court proceedings and were granted attorney’s fees. (See 10/28/20 Judgment;
3/19/21 Fees and Costs Order.) Moreover, “‘[a] statute authorizing an attorney
fee award at the trial court level includes appellate attorney fees unless the
statute specifically provides otherwise.’ (Evans v. Unkow (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 1490, 1499[] …; see also Morcos v. Board of Retirement
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 924, 927[] … [‘statutes authorizing attorney fee awards in
lower tribunals include attorney fees incurred on appeals of decisions from
those lower tribunals’].)” (Stratton v. Beck (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 901,
909.) A review of Civil Code section 1947.10, subdivision (a) fails to show a
prohibition on appellate fee awards. (See Civ. Code., § 1947.10, subd. (a).)
Thus, under the circumstances before the Court, as the prevailing party on
appeal (see 9/28/22 Opinion; 12/16/22 Remittitur), Defendants are entitled to
fees incurred on appeal. They are also entitled to costs on appeal. (See
9/28/22 Opinion, p. 18; 12/16/22 Remittitur, p. 18.)
II. Fees, Hours,
Multiplier, and Costs
Defendants seek $11,480 in fees
incurred on appeal and $1,356.98 in costs incurred on appeal. (See Mot., pp. 4,
6; Costs Memo, APP-013, p. 1.)
The fees are comprised of a fee
rate of $400 per hour with 26.7 hours expended on appeal and an additional two
hours expected to be expended in this matter. (Mot., p. 5; Mot., Volkov Decl.,
¶¶ 3, 13, 15-16.) The motion supports the fee rate through a declaration from
counsel explaining his academic and professional background. (Mot., Volkov
Decl., ¶¶ 3, 13.) The motion supports the requested hours through a verified
time breakdown in the same declaration. (Mot., Volkov Decl., ¶¶ 15-16.)
The Court finds that the requested
hourly rate is reasonable in light of counsel’s nearly 12 years of practice and
prevailing fee rates in the Los Angeles area. The Court also finds that the
hours requested are reasonable as explained in counsel’s declaration, based on
the scope of the appeal (appealing the judgment and fees and costs award in the
trial court proceedings), and as supported by case law. (See Horsford v.
Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 397
[“[T]rial court abused its discretion in rejecting wholesale counsels’ verified
time records” where “verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of
the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the
records are erroneous”].)
No multiplier enhancement award is
requested.
The Court last finds that the costs
are reasonable as broken down and supported by authority in the costs
memorandum. (See Costs Memo, APP-013, p. 1 & MC-025, Attach. 1.)
The Court thus GRANTS Defendants’ motion in the amount of $12,836.98.
Defendants Asad Ayaz, Harma Hartouni, and Ali
Ketabachi’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs on Appeal is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Laura An is ORDERED to remit payment of $12,836.98 to Defendants within 90 calendar days of notice of this ruling.