Judge: Anne Richardson, Case: 19STCV29010, Date: 2023-05-09 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT 40 - JUDGE ANNE RICHARDSON - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
The Court issues tentative rulings on certain motions. The tentative ruling will not become the
final ruling until the hearing [see CRC 3.1308(a)(2)]. If the parties wish to
submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance, all counsel must
agree and choose which counsel will give notice. That counsel must 1) call
Dept 40 by 8:30 a.m. on the day of the hearing (213/633-0160) and state
that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling, and 2) serve notice of
the ruling on all parties. If any party declines to submit on the tentative
ruling, then no telephone call is necessary and all parties should appear at
the hearing in person or by Court Call.
Case Number: 19STCV29010 Hearing Date: May 9, 2023 Dept: 40
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ABRAHAM LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. AVITUS, INC.; SOUTHEAST EMPLOYEE LEASING SERVICES, INC.; BARRETT
BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.; ALEXANDER DEMOLITION & HAULING; REAL VENTURES
LTD.; LEGION BUILDERS, INC.; AARDVARK; ALEXANDER CONSTRUCTION & CLEAN UP;
ALEXANDER CONSTRUCTION & ENGINEERING; MURILLO CONSTRUCTION; MONTOYA'S
TRUCK RENTAL; RS GARDENA; FELIPE DA VILA: OSCAR DEVILA; and DOES, 1 to 100,
inclusive, Defendants. ______________________________________ ALEXANDER DEMOLITION & HAULING; FELIPE DAVILA Cross-Complainants, v. ABRAHAM LOPEZ; OMAR LOPEZ; GONZALO DAVILA; L.D. CONSTRUCTION Cross-Defendants. |
Case No.: 19STCV29010 Hearing Date: 5/9/23 Trial Date: 2/27/24 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendant Murillo
Construction & Clean-Up, Inc.’s Motion to Be Relieved Relief from Deemed
Admission Number 1, Set One. |
Plaintiff Abraham Lopez sues, among
others, former employer Defendants Alexander Demolition and Hauling (Alexander
Demo) and its owner and operator Felipe Davila—with all the Defendants tied
together through allegations of integrated enterprise—pursuant to various
claims, including: (1) Retaliation under Qui Tam/California False Claims Act on
the grounds that, inter alia, Plaintiff Abraham Lopez blew the whistle against
the Defendants’ violation of the AB 939 (requiring Solid Waste Haulers pay 10%
of Gross Annual Receipts for landfill disposal of materials exceeding 1,000
tons per year) where the Defendants instructed waste drivers to lie in various
ways to avoid meeting the 1,000 ton limit; (2) Disability Discrimination under
the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) based on discrimination against
Abraham Lopez as a result of his stress eating, weight, and emotional eating;
(3) FEHA Failure to Reasonably Accommodate or Engage in the Interactive Process
as to Plaintiff Abraham Lopez’s protected conditions; (4) FEHA Retaliation on
various grounds, including disabilities, reporting of harassment, and
whistleblowing; (5) FEHA Harassment; (6) Failure to Prevent FEHA
Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation; (7) Wrongful Termination—either
directly or constructively—on January 19, 2018; (8) Labor Code Whistleblower
Retaliation; (9) Labor Code Failure to Provide or Pay Meal and Rest Breaks;
(10) Labor Code Non-Payment of Wages; (11) Labor Code Failure to Provide
Itemized Wage Statements; (12) Labor Code Failure to Pay Wages Upon Discharge
and Associated Penalties; (13) Common Law Assault and Battery by ratification
of conduct of a supervisor named “John” in grabbing at Plaintiff Abraham
Lopez’s chest and making comments to the effect that Abraham Lopez had breasts
like a girl, inter alia; (14) Negligent Hiring and Retention of John; (15)
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress based on the foregoing torts
against and violations of the rights of Plaintiff Abraham Lopez; and (16)
Violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. through the
ABA 939 and Labor Code violations described ante. The initial Complaint was
filed by Plaintiff Abraham Lopez on August 16, 2019, and his First Amended
Complaint thereto was filed on August 5, 2020.
In turn, Defendants Alexander
Demo—a Solid Waste Hauler company that disposes(d) of solid, construction, and
demolition waste in landfills—and Felipe Davila—owner and operator of Alexander
Demo—filed a December 5, 2022 Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant
Abraham Lopez and Cross-Defendants Omar Lopez (Abraham’s Lopez’s brother and
his alleged Supervisor while employed by Alexander Demo and the other
Defendants), Elias Gonzalo Davila (Felipe Davila’s brother, who owned a stake
in Alexander Demo from 2006 to 2016 but later sold this to Felipe Davila), and
L.D. Construction and Demolition (company competing with Alexander Demo founded
by Abraham and Omar Lopez [Lopez Brothers] and Elias Gonzalo Davila, to which
the Lopez Brothers and Elias Gonzalez Davila allegedly redirected money,
equipment, and clients belonging to Alexander Demo). The Cross-Complaint
alleges: (1) Tortious Claim for Breach of the Employee’s Duty of Loyalty
(essentially, Breach of Fiduciary Duty) against Plaintiff Abraham Lopez and
Oscar Lopez based on the Lopez Brothers allegedly stealing, taking, or
otherwise misusing funds, monies, and property belonging to Alexander Demo,
removing documents from Alexander Demo to cover their acts, and redirecting
clients to L.D. Construction; (2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty against Gonzalo
Davila based on the same or similar conduct; (3) Conversion against all
Cross-Defendants based on the foregoing conduct; (4) Fraud against all
Cross-Defendants based on misrepresentations or concealments relating to misuse
of Alexander Demo monies and documents, inter alia; and (5) Intentional
Infliction of Emotion Distress (IIED) against the Cross-Defendants based on the
Cross-Defendants’ conduct, including allegations of extortion of Felipe Davila
by the individual Cross-Defendants.
On August 4, 2022 and in relevant
part, Plaintiff Lopez propounded Request for Admissions, Set One from Defendant
Murillo Construction.
On August 23, 2022 and in relevant
part, Murillo Construction moved for a protective order against Requests for
Admission, Set One, set for hearing on March 29, 2023.
On August 25, 2022, Murillo
Construction moved for summary judgment of the claims against it in Plaintiff
Lopez’s FAC, set for hearing on April 27, 2023, but later continued to August
25, 2023.
On November 4, 2022, based on
Murillo Construction’s nonresponse to the admissions request, Plaintiff Lopez
moved for a court order deeming Request for Admissions, Set One admitted, set
for hearing on January 9, 2023.
On November 30, 2022, the Court
advanced and continued the March 29, 2023 hearing on motion for protective
order to January 27, 2023.
On the same day, the Court advanced
and continued the January 9, 2023 hearing on the motion to deem RFAs admitted
to January 27, 2023.
On January 3, 2022, Plaintiff Lopez
opposed the August 23, 2022 protective order motion.
On January 17, 2023, Murillo
Construction replied to the January 3rd opposition.
On January 20, 2023, the Court
advanced and continued the January 27th hearing on the motion for protective
order and motion to deem RFAs admitted to March 3, 2023.
On March 3, 2023, the Court heard,
among other things, the August 23, 2022 motion for protective order by Murillo
Construction and the November 4, 2022 deem RFAs admitted motion by Plaintiff
Lopez, granting the deem RFAs admitted motion as to Lopez’s Requests for
Admission, Set One, No. 1 only, and denying Murillo Construction’s motion for
protective order.
On April 3, 2023, Murillo Construction
moved to withdraw the court-imposed admission of Requests for Admission, Set
One, No. 1, which admitted that Murillo Construction had employed Plaintiff
Lopez.
On April 25, 2023, Plaintiff Lopez
opposed the April 3rd motion.
On April 26, 2023, Murillo
Construction replied to the April 25th opposition.
The motion to withdraw admission is
now before the Court.
The Court TAKES Judicial Notice of
the existence of (1) the Court’s March 3, 2023 minute order and (2) Murillo
Construction’s Requests for Admission, Set One, No. 1 response. (Mot., RJN, p.
2, Exs. 1-2; see Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (d), (h), 453.)
While Murillo Construction moves for
a court order withdrawing its court-imposed admission to Requests for
Admission, Set One, No. 1, Murillo Construction frames its request pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280, subdivisions (a)(1)-(2)—motion for
relief from waiver of objections to requests for admission—rather than Code of
Civil Procedure section 2033.300, subdivision (b)—motion to withdraw party
admission or court-imposed admission. The Court analyzes this motion under the
appropriate statutory section: Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300,
subdivision (b).
Legal Standard
A party may withdraw or amend “deemed
admissions” ordered by the court under Code of Civil Procedure section
2033.280, subdivision (b), or admissions expressly made by a party, only on
leave of court granted after notice to all parties. (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 979; see Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)
The court may permit withdrawal or
amendment of an admission only if it determines (1) that the admission was the
result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect and (2) that the party
who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining
that party’s action or defense on the merits. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300,
subd. (b).)
The court may impose conditions on
the granting of the motion that are just, including, but not limited to, (1) an
order that the party who obtained the admission be permitted to pursue
additional discovery related to the matter involved in the withdrawn or amended
admission and (2) an order that the costs of any additional discovery be borne
in whole or in part by the party withdrawing or amending the admission. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subds. (c)(1)-(2).)
The Court must interpret the
discovery code consistent with the spirit of the law and in a matter that
serves the interests of justice and the policy favoring trial on the merits. (St.
Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 783-784.) Any doubts as
to the showing of mistake, inadvertence or neglect must be resolved in favor of
the moving party. (New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168
Cal.App.4th 1403, 1420 [in the context of motion for relief from admissions to
RFAs].)
Analysis
I. Mistake,
Inadvertence, Excusable Neglect
The terms “mistake, inadvertence,
or excusable neglect” as used in Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300,
subdivision (b), are given the same meanings as similar terms found in Code of
Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). (New Albertsons, Inc. v.
Superior Court (Shanahan) (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1418.)
Murillo Construction first argues
that its failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect because counsel genuinely believed that he
was not required to provide any discovery responses on behalf of Murillo
Construction after filing the August 23, 2022 motion for protective order to,
in relevant part, the August 3rd Requests for Admission by Plaintiff Lopez. (Mot.,
p. 6.) This position is supported by a declaration from Freddie V. Vega,
counsel for Murillo Construction, providing that “[he] was under the mistaken
belief that [he] was not required to submit any responses to Mr. Lopez’s
discovery requests until his client’s [i.e., Murillo Construction’s] Motion for
Protective Order was heard.” (Mot., Vega Decl., ¶ 8.)
In opposition, Plaintiff Lopez
argues that this ‘mistaken belief’ argument, pursuant to case law, (1) does not
fall under the ambit of “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect” (2) is
not reasonable, (3) does not involve a complex or debatable legal issue or
principle, (4) was negligent based on a failure to determine the applicable law
as to this issue , (5) is unjustifiable, (6) is not availing where counsel knew
the admissions requests were served, was put on notice of Plaintiff Lopez’s
motion to deem them admitted, and still failed to respond until well after the
Court deemed the Requests for Admission, Set One, No. 1 admitted, and (7) ignorance
of the law coupled with negligence does not excuse a failure to research the
law in a four month period. (Opp’n, pp. 6-11.)
In reply, Murillo Construction does
not clearly argue these points but does provide another declaration from
counsel arguing that “it behooves [sic] [Murillo Construction’s counsel] as to
why [Plaintiff’s counsel] are of the opinion that [Murillo Construction’s
counsel] honest mistake actually constitutes inexcusable neglect when [Murillo
Construction’s counsel] mistakenly believed that [he] was not required to [provide]
any responses on behalf of [Murillo Construction] until [Murillo
Construction’s] Motion for Protective Order was heard and ruled []on.” (Reply,
Vega Decl., ¶ 14; see Reply generally.)
The Court finds that Murillo
Construction’s counsel’s failure to respond to Requests for Admission, Set One
arose from a mistake or excusable neglect.
While, in an abundance of caution, Murillo
Construction’s counsel should have, as a matter of best practice, filed an
opposition to the November 4th motion to deem Requests for Admission, Set One
admitted, counsel was under the mistaken impression that “[he] was not required
to submit any responses to Mr. Lopez’s discovery requests until his client’s
[i.e., Murillo Construction’s] Motion for Protective Order was heard.” (Mot.,
Vega Decl., ¶ 8.) The Court finds this reasoning sufficient because if Murillo
Construction’s counsel had opposed the November 4th motion to deem Requests for
Admission, Set One admitted simply on the grounds that this request was beyond
the proper scope of discovery and the Court had nevertheless granted the motion
to deem RFAs admitted, the practical effect of such a ruling would be the same
as what actually happened, i.e., the Court denied a protective order against
this discovery and granted the motion to deem RFAs admitted. It would be contradictory
if the Court were to grant relief for Murillo Construction if it had
unsuccessfully opposed the motion to deem RFAs admitted based on the ground
that the request was beyond the scope of discovery but not where Murillo
Construction only moved for a protective order against Requests for Admission,
Set One. The reason for this conclusion is that the practical effect of the
hypothetical opposition to the motion to deem RFAs admitted and the actual
motion for protective order had the same general aim: prohibits discovery as
to, in relevant part, Requests for Admission, Set One. (See Williams v.
Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549 [Generally, if a court grants a
motion for a protective order, it can prohibit discovery of all discovery
sought by the propounding party or permit the discovery of some of what the
propounding party sought and set terms and conditions to alleviate the burden
of discovery, such as requiring confidentiality or prohibiting use outside the
case.].)
The Court also finds it worth
noting that Murillo Construction’s motion for protective order was filed on
August 23, 2022—i.e., 19 days after service of Requests for Admission, Set One
and exactly six weeks before the motion to deem RFAs admitted was made by
Plaintiff Lopez on November 4, 2022—such that Murillo Construction was not
dilatory in attempting to shield itself from Plaintiff Lopez’s Requests for Admission,
Set One.
II. Prejudice
To establish prejudice, requesting
parties must do more than assert that, without benefit of the admission, they
will have to convince the fact finder of a matter previously conceded; rather,
they must prove that they are less able to assemble the evidence needed to
establish the matter involved in the admission than they were when the
admission was made. (1 Modern California Discovery (4th ed.) Requests for
Admission, § 9.15; Moore & Thomas, California Civil Practice: Procedure
(2023) Cal. Civ. Prac. Procedure § 13:178 [citing Modern California Discovery].)
California courts have found no substantial prejudice existed where the party
opposing withdrawal of the admission failed to explain what additional
discovery they would have pursued absent the admission and where the trial
court has discretion to allow additional discovery on the issue, including by
continuing trial or imposing other conditions on the granting of the motion to
withdraw the admission. (New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (Shanahan),
supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1421.) However, withdrawal or amendment of
an admission will not be allowed simply because the other side has not been
prejudiced. (See Gribin Von Dyl & Associates, Inc. v. Kovalsky
(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 653, 660; Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 892, 900.)
In its motion, Murillo Construction
argues that Plaintiff Lopez would not be prejudiced by withdrawal of the
court-imposed admission to the August 4th Requests for Admission, Set One, No.
1—admitting to having employed Plaintiff Lopez—for two reasons. Murillo
Construction argues that it is instead Murillo Construction that would be
prejudiced by a maintenance of this court-imposed admission where the purpose
of requests for admission is to clarify contested facts to expedite trial, and
here, Murillo Construction’s RFA response denies ever having employed Plaintiff
Lopez. (Mot., pp. 6-7; see Mot., RJN, Ex. 2.)
In opposition, Plaintiff Lopez
argues that he will suffer substantial prejudice if the Court permits
withdrawal of Requests for Admission, Set One, No. 1 for several reasons.
First, Plaintiff Lopez argues that Murillo Construction has failed to address
the substantial prejudice element, providing a ground to deny this motion.
(Opp’n, p. 12.) Second, Plaintiff Lopez argues that the court-imposed admission
is vital to Plaintiff’s case insofar as it amounts to an undisputed admission
that Murillo Construction employed Plaintiff Lopez. (Opp’n, p. 12.) Third,
Plaintiff Lopez argues that withdrawal of the admission would undercut
Plaintiff’s forthcoming opposition to a motion for summary judgment by Murillo
Construction that argues that Murillo did not employ Plaintiff and is therefore
not liable to Plaintiff for the claims alleged in the Complaint. (Opp’n, pp.
12-13.) Fourth, Plaintiff Lopez argues that withdrawal of this admission would
force Plaintiff Lopez to conduct substantial additional discovery to oppose the
summary judgment motion, where Plaintiff “anticipate[s] 92 hours of work” would
be required as to the issue of whether Murillo Construction employed him,
including “two depositions, further written discovery, preparing for and defending
Plaintiff’s deposition, and opposing Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.”
(Opp’n, p. 13.) Fifth and last, Plaintiff Lopez argues that the substantial
amount of work, time, and money expended to obtain the court-imposed admission
and respond to this motion amount to substantial prejudice. (Opp’n, p. 13.)
In reply, Murillo Construction
argues that the prejudice to Murillo Construction outweighs any prejudice to
Plaintiff Lopez. (Reply, pp. 4-5.)
The Court finds that insufficient
substantial prejudice exists against Plaintiff Lopez.
The type of substantial prejudice
at issue involves a diminished ability to assemble the evidence needed to
establish the matter involved in the admission than that which existed when the
admission was made. (1 Modern California Discovery (4th ed.) Requests for
Admission, § 9.15; Moore & Thomas, California Civil Practice: Procedure
(2023) Cal. Civ. Prac. Procedure § 13:178 [citing Modern California Discovery];
see New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (Shanahan), supra, 168
Cal.App.4th at p. 1421.)
Such prejudice does not exist here
for various reasons. First, the Court has the power to extend the discovery as
to whether Murillo Construction in fact employed Plaintiff Lopez. (See New
Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (Shanahan), supra, 168 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1421.) Second, arguments of prejudice by Plaintiff Lopez ring somewhat
hollow where he filed this action in August 2019, with his First Amended
Complaint filed on August 5, 2020. (See Complaint and FAC, p. 1.) Plaintiff
Lopez hardly explains in his opposition why, between August 2019, when he filed
this action, and August 2022, when he propounded Requests for Admission, Set
One, he was not able to sufficiently propound discovery establishing that
Murillo Construction employed him. Third and last, the Court could, if
appropriate, continue (1) the February 27, 2024 trial in this action or (2) the
August 25, 2023 hearing on Murillo Construction’s motion for summary judgment
to permit Plaintiff Lopez, in fairness, to conduct further discovery as to his
alleged employment with Murillo Construction. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128 [The
court has inherent power to control the litigation process].) Here, Plaintiff
Lopez’s opposition to Murillo Construction’s motion for summary judgment is not
even due until August 11, 2023, i.e., in more than three months. Should
Plaintiff Lopez require additional time to conduct discovery before these
proceedings, the Court could accommodate him upon a showing of good cause.
III. Withdrawal
Conclusion
The Court is satisfied that the
March 3, 2023 court-imposed admission of Requests for Admission, Set One, No. 1
on Murillo Construction was the result of a mistake or excusable neglect and
that Plaintiff Lopez would not be substantially prejudiced as a result of its
withdrawal.
Murillo Construction’s motion is
therefore GRANTED.
IV. Conditions of
Relief
IV.A. Responses to
Requests for Admission, Set One, No. 1
Murillo Construction provides
evidence that it has filed a response to Requests for Admission, Set One, No. 1
on March 24, 2023. (See Mot., RJN, Ex. 2, Proof of Service.) A review of this
response shows that it answers DENY to the Request for Admission as to whether
it employed Plaintiff Lopez. (Mot., RJN, Ex. 2.) Such a response is
code-compliant because responses to RFAs are “unquestionably code compliant”
when they consist of one-word “Admit” or “Deny” responses. (St. Mary v.
Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 780.)
The Court therefore does not find
the need to order Murillo Construction to answer Requests for Admission, Set
One, No. 1.
Further, as a condition of relief
for this motion, the Court ALLOWS PLAINTIFF TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY as to
Requests for Admission, Set One, No. 1.
IV.B. Monetary
Sanctions and Other Monetary Relief
In opposition to this motion,
Plaintiff Lopez requests compensation for 92 hours of expected work that
Plaintiff’s counsel will have to undertake if this Court were to withdraw the
court-imposed admission to Requests for Admission, Set One, No. 1, i.e., an
expected $96,800.00. (Opp’n, p. 14.) Plaintiff Lopez also requests compensation
for 21 hours of work undertaken by counsel to propound Requests for Admission,
Set One and opposing this motion, totaling $17,107.26. (Opp’n, pp. 14-15.) Last,
Plaintiff Lopez requests $3,607.26 in monetary sanctions against Murillo
Construction and its counsel pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
2023.030, subdivision (a)—misuse of the discovery process—based on Murillo
Construction bringing this motion without substantial justification and for
failure to argue the correct standard for relief. (Opp’n, p. 15.)
In reply, Murillo Construction
argues that any sanctions against it should be reduced significantly because
the March 3, 2023 order by this Court granting Plaintiff Lopez’s motion to deem
Requests for Admission, Set One admitted was granted only as to one out of 72
total admissions. (Reply, p. 5.)
The Court DECLINES to award fees
for 92 hours of expected work by Plaintiff’s counsel in securing discovery from
Murillo Construction relating to whether Murillo Construction employed
Plaintiff Lopez. The primary reason for this denial is that the Court is not
satisfied that Plaintiff did not have the ability to obtain such
discovery—beyond a court-imposed admission as to this subject—between the time
be filed this action in August 2019 and the time Requests for Admission, Set One
were propounded on Murillo Construction in August 2022. Based on this dilatory
conduct, the Court finds that it is not unjust to have Plaintiff bear the
burden of such discovery, especially where the admission at issue was only
imposed by the Court on Murillo Construction on March 3, 2023, i.e., more than
three and a half years after this litigation was commenced by Plaintiff Lopez
but only a month prior to Murillo Construction seeking its withdrawal on April
3, 2023.
The Court also DECLINES to award
monetary sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030,
subdivision (a), because Murillo Construction’s filing of this motion was not
an abuse of the discovery process or unjustified, even if Murillo Construction
did not frame its motion and reply within the proper standard for relief—i.e., reliance
on Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280, subdivision (a), rather than the
correct Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300, subdivision (b).
However, the Court finds it proper
to award monetary sanctions against Murillo Construction for the work
undertaken by Plaintiff’s counsel to (1) deem Requests for Admission, Set One,
No. 1 admitted and (2) oppose this motion. The Court AWARDS to Plaintiff Lopez
(1) $3,375 for work performed by counsel Franck and Cummings in obtaining the
admission—the requested amount of $13,500 divided by four, where only some of
this work related to Requests for Admission, Set One, No. 1—and (2) $3,607.26 for
work performed by counsel Butzen in opposing this motion. (See Opp’n, pp. 14-15
[seeking $17,107.26 for work performed by counsel obtaining admission and
opposing this motion]; see also Opp’n, Franck Decl., ¶¶ 21-26 [explaining
grounds for $13,500 in fees sought by Plaintiff in securing admission to
Requests for Admission, Set One, No. 1]; Opp’n, Butzen Decl., ¶ 12 [seeking $3,607.26
for work expended opposing this motion].)
Plaintiff’s total monetary recovery
is thus $6,982.26.
IV.C. Continuance of
Trial or Summary Judgment Motion
Should Plaintiff Lopez wish to
apply or move for a continuance of the February 27, 2024 trial in this action
or the August 25, 2023 hearing on Murillo Construction’s summary judgment
motion, the Court would consider such request upon a proper showing of good
cause.
Defendant Murillo Construction
& Clean-Up, Inc.’s Motion to Be Relieved Relief from Deemed Admission
Number 1, Set One is GRANTED insofar as it seeks withdrawal of this RFA because
(1) sufficient grounds and evidence were presented by Murillo Construction to
show that the court-imposed admission of Requests for Admission, Set One, No. 1
was the result of counsel’s mistake or excusable neglect and (2) insufficient
grounds or evidence of substantial prejudice to Plaintiff Abraham Lopez were
presented for this Court to justify denying this motion.
However, Murillo Construction is
ORDERED TO REMIT PAYMENT of $6,982.26 to Plaintiff Abraham Lopez WITHIN 30
CALENDAR DAYS to compensate Plaintiff for counsel’s work securing Requests for
Admission, Set One, No. 1 and opposing this motion.
Further, as a condition of relief for this motion, the Court ALLOWS PLAINTIFF TO COMPEL FURTHER DISCOVERY as to Requests for Admission, Set One, No. 1.